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World-Horizon Expanded:  
Astronautics, Earth-ground, and The Space Exploration Science Fiction Film 
Chaorong Hua 
This thesis explores the issue of world-horizon, as well as its essential role in the interaction 
and interfusion of film experience and everyday perception. By examining the images of Earth 
and Space in the science fiction films belonging to the subgenre of Space exploration and those 
in non-fictional footage produced in the context of live television broadcast and scientific 
astronautics, I attempt to show how the perceptual and the imaginary worlds infiltrate and 
influence each other. I argue that Fritz Lang’s 1929 Frau im Mond (Women in Moon) played a 
crucial role in the history of this subgenre and in the broader horizon of real astronautics, for it 
blazed the trail of the embodied tradition that served as an alternative to the speculative methods 
used in many other science fiction films, expanded the horizon of the general public by treating 
science and astronautics seriously, and even contributed directly to modern rocketry and Space 
programs through its sponsorship of research in real rocket and its use of visual codes and 
syntagmas that later became the standard visual syntax and semantics for live television 
broadcasts. In turn, live television broadcast later established the standard for the audiovisual 
experience of real astronautics, whose visual codes and syntagmas then went back into more 
contemporary Space exploration films, such as Gravity and Interstellar. The latter films made 
full use of those established audiovisual codes and created a kinaesthetically affective and 
emotionally immersive world-horizon by pushing further the embodied tradition that had started 
with Lang’s film. Although I find in this particular subgenre the inherent logic of the 
world-picture that tends to turn Earth and Space into mere objects, an alternative way can be 
found through close analyses of these two contemporary Space exploration SF films. These films 
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Space1, in its cosmological sense, mesmerizes people particularly. It is regarded as either 
some sort of extension of our everyday spaces—my bedroom, my apartment building, the 
backyard, the street, the grocery store, schools, and office buildings—or as something entirely 
different, something that has little to do with the everyday use of the term. Despite the scientific 
knowledge we now possess about the cosmos, people still subconsciously subscribe to the notion 
that cosmic space is very different from “ours.”2 The image of Space, or “outer space” as we are 
more inclined to call it, has changed enormously in the last century and it is still constantly being 
revised today. What I will argue in this thesis is that scientific footage and contemporary Space 
exploration films in the science fiction3 genre are blurring the boundary between outer space and 
the everyday perceptual space. 
I grew up in a time when China’s astro-technology experienced rapid maturation. The first 
Shenzhou spacecraft was launched (1999)4 one year later after the first component of the 
International Space Station (ISS) was in place5; back then I was in elementary school. As soon as 
I entered middle school, Yang Liwei became China’s first astronaut to be sent up above the “sky” 
(2003) but that same year saw the horrifying disaster of the U.S. Space shuttle Columbia6. With 
Tiangong-2, the experimental space laboratory, joining the ISS in orbit in 2016,7 the picture of 
Space has now very much changed from what it looked like in the mid-twentieth century, and is 
almost entirely different from how it was depicted in the early 1900s. At the same time, the film 
industry seems to have developed a taste for Space exploration in accordance to the normalized 
human activities in Space. Such films include: NASA IMAX documentaries such as Space 

1 I will keep the capitalized “S” when the word Space is used to indicate the cosmic outer space or universe, while 
keeping the general orthography for all other uses.  
2 As I proceed, we will see that this headstrong tendency is not ungrounded, but rather profoundly rooted. 
3 “Science fiction” will be used interchangeably in my thesis with its abbreviated form “SF”. Note that SF stands 
solely for science fiction in this thesis and does not have any other indications, namely “speculative fiction.” 
4 See the news page from the CCTV website. http://news.cntv.cn/special/tiangong/shenzhouhuimou/01/index.shtml. 
5 See the International Space Station site by NASA. 
6 See Howell. 
7 See Reis. 
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Station 3D (2002) and Hubble (2010); cinematic reenactments of real events in Space such as 
Apollo 13 (1995), Гагарин. Первый в космосе (Gagarin: First in Space) (2013), Время первых 
(The Age of Pioneers) (2017), Салют 7 (Salyut 7) (2017), and First Men (2018); as well as 
science fiction films of potential Space exploration such as Contact (1997), Deep Impact (1998), 
Mission to Mars (2000), Gravity (2013), Interstellar (2014), The Martian (2015), and 
Passengers (2016), to name but a few. 
In this thesis, I will look at images of Earth and Space in science fiction films that belong to 
a subgenre of Space exploration and at non-fictional footage of scientific exploration in order to 
investigate their mutual influences: how imaginary depictions have brought about changes to our 
conception and imagining of Earth and Space, and how non-fictional and scientific footage sets 
up the conventions for what is understood as “real” in images of astronautic explorations, which 
equally impacts the making of contemporary Space SF films. I will further examine these 
interactions and interfusions8 against current discussions on Space, our position in it, and the 
Anthropocene.  
Literature Review and Three interventions 
This project is intended to intervene into three areas of study: science fiction genre studies, 
film phenomenology, and theories of “world” in literary and media studies. I wish to show that 
the framework of “world” can be crucial to the first two disciplines and that an investigation into 
Space exploration SF can benefit all three fields respectively: it offers a borderline case for SF 
studies, a renewed attention on “horizon” and “world” for film phenomenology, and an affective 
and pre-cognitive aspect for the formal studies of (represented) imaginary worlds.  
1. Cinematic Science Fiction and Space Exploration 
As most scholars who work on genre films have already stressed over and over again, any 
general treatment of a genre risks homogenizing what amounts to a diverse and variegated 
corpus. Genres, as Mark Bould notes, are “discursive phenomena, constantly defined and 

8 By “interfusion,” I mean the action of state of mixing two different matters together. 
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redefined by a host of different voices, with different degrees of influence, for many different 
reasons” (1), however, he adds that, “genres are [at the same time] frequently regarded as clearly 
defined objects, as boxes into which individual texts can be smoothly slotted” (1). The apparent 
paradox between the manifold texts and a unified category calls for a distinction between two 
kinds of discourses: the study of specific generic texts and meta-theoretical reflections on genre 
studies as a whole. The former deals with the diversity of texts and looks at the ways they 
manifest a particular genre, while the latter inquires into what makes such a study possible in the 
first place if a genre cannot be clearly defined.  
Attempts to define science fiction have been made by many scholars, most famous among 
which are Darko Suvin’s definition of the genre in literature as a “cognitive estrangement” (“On 
the Poetics” 372) and Susan Sontag’s conception of the SF film as a fantastic way to cope with 
the “unremitting banality” and “inconceivable terror” of modern life (42). Vivian Sobchack in 
her Screening Space also offers an insightful definition of SF cinema as a genre that “emphasizes 
actual, extrapolative, or speculative science and the empirical method, interacting in a social 
context with the lesser emphasized, but still present, transcendentalism of magic and religion, in 
an attempt to reconcile man with the unknown” (64). Other scholars have typically chosen the 
thematic expression of utopia/dystopia as an entry point to the genre; for instance, Fredric 
Jameson understands the world created in SF to bear a deep resemblance to our own while from 
a particular starting point in the “future,” he also takes it as a fundamental feature of SF to 
deliberately deviate from the literary “reality principle” (xiii-xiv). Nevertheless, he does agree 
with Suvin on the fact that “utopia is not a genre but the socio-political subgenre of science 
fiction” (Metamorphosis 61). 
The issue of world is prominent in SF films, for this particular genre, as many scholars have 
noticed, often downplays the storytelling in favor of “displays”. It has a way of exhibiting “its 
own distinctive matters of expression” and of attending to the “sensuous immediacy of the 
viewing experience” (Kuhn 5). Cinema gives us something concrete and tactile relative to SF 
worlds, which the other traditional media, like literature cannot accomplish. Whereas science 
 	
fiction worlds have received abundant attention, one particular subgenre is somehow left out, 
perhaps because of the almost invisible distance between the worlds created by these films and 
our own perceptual world. This subgenre is precisely the Space exploration SF film.  
Seeking a definition of this subgenre within the generic bounds of SF, I cling to Suvin’s 
conception of it as a genre “whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and 
interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an imaginative 
framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment” (“On the Poetics” 375). This is 
because all the films that make up this subgenre have to be SF films in the first place and they 
should be neither truly scientific nor purely fantastical—that is, without any reference to real 
science. In addition to that, I also draw on Rick Altman, who, in his famous 1984 essay on genre, 
proposed a method that synthesizes the syntactic and the semantic approach. This somewhat 
structuralist methodology understands the nature of film genre as consisting of the selection of 
content (i.e., iconicity, settings, stereotypical events) and the ordering and structuring of that 
content (the syntagmas that produce relatively stable meaning). In a similar fashion, my project 
attempts to identify the Space exploration SF as a specific subgenre within the cinematic SF 
genre.  
As will be shown in Chapters one and two, this particular subgenre involves the semantic 
content of 1) a serious treatment of science and scientific activities, 2) a series of iconic images 
of vehicles, satellites, and stations in Space activities as well as that of planets, stars and other 
celestial bodies popularized by mass media, and 3) embodied space constructed according to 
available astrophysical knowledge and theories. Syntactically, as well as affectively speaking, 
this subgenre also entails 4) sets of syntagmas that organize images in certain orders which have 
been conventionalized by television broadcasts of Space exploration (such as the countdown, the 
ignition, the close-up from the service structure, and tracking shots by the telescopic tracking 
systems, etc.), and 5) stylistic devices that help achieve an immersive experience for spectators 
(i.e., camera movements, lighting, mise-en-scene, and sound design).  
In addition to my personal enthusiasm, I choose to focus on this particular subgenre because 
 

of the ways recent Space exploration SF cinema has maximized the sensory experience of its 
fictional worlds by blurring the boundary between non-fictional scientific footage and fictional 
images. Such blurred boundary indicates an interfusion of ontologically different worlds, the 
scientific world (and its knowledge and theories), the video-mediated scientific world (via 
televised broadcasts), and the fictional (or imaginary) world (in SF movies). If the fundamental 
feature of the SF genre is that it must rely on a deviation from reality/real science, this very trend 
of Space exploration SF seems to have pushed the basic idea to its limit by coming very close to 
breaking its generic confines. However, I argue that the actual films that belong to this subgenre 
do not depart from the basic principles of SF (cinema); they are by nature fictional yet at the 
same time are imaginatively pushing the limit further for potential Space explorations. On the 
one hand, they are thought experiments based on speculations about the unknown universe and a 
possible prediction about future astronautic events; on the other hand, these thought experiments 
still have to be embodied in sound and image through technical experiments in cinematic form. 
In these experiments, world-experience and world-representation are taken up as core elements 
that determine the success of these films. Thus, my project can potentially bring an in-depth 
examination of this subgenre and in the process show how a perspective of world is necessary for 
understanding the interaction between the SF genre and real scientific activities. 
2. Making Husserl Present in Film Phenomenology 
Ever since Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye (1992) and Carnal Thoughts (2004), 
the discipline of film studies has witnessed an outburst of works on film phenomenology: 
monographs such as those by Laura Marks—The Skin of the Film (2000), Touch (2002), and 
Enfoldment and Infinity (2010)—Malin Wahlberg’s Documentary Time (2008), Jennifer Barker’s 
The Tactile Eye (2009) and a forthcoming book of hers on synaesthesia in film experience, Julian 
Hanich’s Cinematic Emotion in Horror Films and Thrillers (2010) and The Audience Effect 
(2018) originally published in German in 2012, Jennifer Chamarette’s Phenomenology and the 
Future of Film (2012), Daniel Yacavone’s Film Worlds (2015), Lee Carruthers’ Doing Time 
(2016), Saige Walton’s Cinema’s Baroque Flesh (2016), and Scott Richmond’s Cinema’s Bodily 
 
Illusions (2016); articles on film phenomenology have been constantly published by New Review 
of Film and Television Studies and Film-Philosophy, a special issue on the synaesthetic turn 
appeared on New Review of Film and Television Studies (2009), and Studia Phænomenologica 
recently also published a special issue on film phenomenology (2016).  
Given the increasing numbers of articles, books, and special issues dedicated specifically to 
this approach, one would easily come to a conclusion that we are witnessing a renaissance of 
phenomenology in film studies. But I feel less certain about this especially when I look into how 
most of these studies bring phenomenology back to the discipline. It is prominent that the 
phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty has enjoyed an almost exclusive place in most of 
today’s film phenomenological studies with a particular focus on his contributions to the issue of 
the body. Other philosophers belonging to this tradition are rarely discussed. It is true that 
Merleau-Ponty is one of the few phenomenologists to have directly engaged with cinema, 
especially in his 1945 lecture “Film and the New Psychology” where he argues that “the 
philosopher and the moviemaker share a certain way of being, a certain view of the world which 
belongs to a generation. It offers us yet another chance to confirm that [...] ‘What is inside is also 
outside’” (59), but it in no ways makes him the only possible source for inspiration in this area. 
The current predominance of Merleau-Ponty in film phenomenology is probably also a result of 
two other factors: the rather negative reception of Allan Casebier’s 1991 book on film 
phenomenology that draws almost solely on Husserl and Vivian Sobchack’s explicit antagonism 
against Husserl in her extremely influential 1992 book The Address of the Eye. In that book, 
Sobchack speaks of Husserl’s project as “completely antithetical to those of contemporary 
cinema studies” due to his proposal of a “transcendental ego” (xiv; my emphasis).9 She justifies 
her preference for Merleau-Ponty over the other on an absolute distinction between an 
“existential phenomenology” and a “transcendental” one (xv; 26). It is on the one hand rather 
dubious whether such a distinction really exist (since such a different version of phenomenology 

9 On the same page, she is equally critical of phenomenology’s involvement with French Catholicism, which is, if 
viewed against Bazin’s deep fascination with the world, a very problematic judgment to make. A similar argument 
against Husserl can be found in Hanich, Cinematic Emotion 40.  
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is never pronounced by Merleau-Ponty himself and the ongoing publication of Husserl’s research 
manuscripts as well as lecture notes10 demonstrate the great amount of attention he spent on the 
body, the world and other existential issues), and on the other hand Sobchack is somewhat 
headstrong in assuming the devastated fate of the latter project (for Merleau-Ponty never truly 
abandoned the transcendental project started by Husserl despite their disagreement on some of 
the methods this project should take). Interestingly, little has been said within film studies on the 
late Merleau-Ponty whose work is very different from that in Phenomenology of Perception, and 
who constantly comes back to Husserl and Heidegger11. As a result, there is a tendency in current 
film phenomenology to reduce philosophical phenomenology (which addresses the global 
problems of meaning and sense) to a regional study of the embodied conscious experience.  
While Merleau-Ponty is indispensable for a film phenomenology, the wide range of topics 
addressed by Husserl’s phenomenology is equally inspiring and can help spur even more fruitful 
investigations due to the latter’s rigorous methods in reflection and description. Husserl’s 
in-depth explorations of the structure of intentionality, inner time-consciousness, the structure of 
phantasy, image-consciousness and memory, the importance of the lived body and operative 
(fundierende) intentionality, horizon and Lifeworld (Lebenswelt) as the conscious background, 
and the sedimentationality of history and tradition offer highly pertinent insights into the 
affective and cognitive workings of cinematic sense-making. In addition to a similar focus on the 
studies of conscious experience, Husserl’s major contribution is his largely unfinished project to 
establish a transcendental phenomenology, a philosophy that is “interested in an investigation of 

10 See in particular, Husserl’s Experience and Judgment (1939), Ideas II (1952), Analyses Concerning Passive and 
Active Synthesis (1966), Thing and Space (1973), and Formal and Transcendental Logic (1974) for Husserl’s 
account of the body.  
11 Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of a more complicated Husserl can be seen clearly in the posthumously published 
notes of his lectures delivered at the Collège de France, especially the one published under the title of Husserl at the 
Limits of Phenomenology. I have to note that Sobchack forms her central idea about the film body being at once the 
expressing expression and the expressed expression on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s later notion of “chiasm” 
without recognizing that this very idea is deeply rooted in Husserl’s later works, especially “Origin of Geometry,” 
which is collected in his Crisis. See Lawlor for an explication of Husserl and Heidegger’s influence on later 
Merleau-Ponty. In that short essay, Lawlor notices that “in order not to fall into irrationalism, Merleau-Ponty always 
remains close to the Husserlian concept of transcendental intersubjectivity” (158-59). In recent film 
phenomenological studies, Scott Richmond has explicitly touched on such a “return” to Husserl via Renaud 
Barbaras’ works (15). His book is one of the few exceptions that focus on late Merleau-Ponty. 
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consciousness in so far as consciousness is taken to be a condition of possibility for meaning, 
truth, validity, and appearance” (Zahavi, “Project of Naturalization” 339). Nonetheless, this 
project is by no means essentialist as people have accused it of being (Sobchack, Address xiv, 29; 
Hanich, Cinematic Emotion 40). It stands instead as a necessary methodology for investigating 
the source of meaning and sense without taking for granted metaphysical assumptions, namely 
those that would concern a pre-existing world independent of consciousness. The transcendental 
ego is not a static goal, or an essence, in itself to be discovered but a constantly developing and 
changing structure that enables and empowers our rigorous investigations. As Husserl himself 
has said, the transcendental ego (or subjectivity) is by nature transcendental intersubjectivity 
(Cartesian 30, 136).12 The transcendental project goes much beyond a proposal of the 
transcendental ego, which the later Husserl tends to speak less of; it is an inquiry that “also 
includes the world itself, with all its true being” (Husserl, Erste 432; Zahavi, Phenomenology 46). 
The purpose of such a project is more “to liberate us from a natural(istic) dogmatism and to 
make us aware of our own constitutive (that is, cognitive, meaning-giving) contribution” than to 
locate an eternal essence (Zahavi, Phenomenology 46). Furthermore, Husserl tends to do much 
more than describe phenomenal content—that is, he offers more than a simple phenomenological 
psychology—and aims instead at both the fundamental sources of intersubjective meaning and 
the shared horizons of value, culture, and tradition.13  
My thesis is intended to serve partly as a gesture toward a film phenomenology that draws 
more on the foundational analyses and investigations by Husserl (and other philosophers, namely 
Heidegger and Sartre) by incorporating both his methods and findings into the established realm 
of film phenomenology. I wish to address the specific issue of Space exploration in cinematic SF 
with a phenomenological attitude that is both transcendental and existentialist, and by doing so 
demonstrate a more colorful and variegated aspect of phenomenology. Husserl’s later endeavors 
in perfecting a transcendental approach will hopefully be accepted without biases set up by an 

12 In a sense, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity is definitely different from the Kantian subject as “an abstract, 
ideal, general, or transpersonal subject” (Zahavi, Phenomenology 48). 
13 See also Zahavi’s most recent book (Zahavi, Legacy), especially the third and fourth chapters. 
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almost absurd, if fashionable, antagonism against the word “transcendental” and will contribute 
to the discussions happening at once within film studies and phenomenological aesthetics.  
The journey with Husserl I am proposing here starts with his concepts of “horizon” and 
“Lifeworld” (Lebenswelt), which open the ground for later investigations of “worldliness” 
(Weltlichkeit) by Heidegger and the “expressed/sensible world” by Merleau-Ponty. My thesis 
aims to elaborate and develop these reflections on “world” in terms of film experience so as to 
supplement the already established theories of the “imaginary world” or “storyworld.” Most 
previous studies on the imaginary world are carried out within contemporary narratology and 
media/game studies where the focus falls almost entirely on the representational aspect, leaving 
the affective-phenomenological world-experience seldom addressed. Some preliminary work has 
been done in Daniel Yacavone’s Film Worlds, where he sets up the basic framework for a 
philosophical inquiry of the film world as consisting of three major phases: the 
cognitive-symbolic aspect of the represented world (based on Nelson Goodman’s analytical 
methods), the affective-phenomenological aspect of the expressed world (based on Mikel 
Dufrenne’s phenomenological aesthetics), and the historical and transsubjective aspect of the 
hermeneutic world (based on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer). My thesis engages in particular 
the latter two phases of film worlds within a generic framework (that of SF). In this project, I 
wish to complement, and in some aspects even challenge, Yacavone’s contribution.  
3. World-Representation and World-Experience 
A question immediately arises if one is to study cinematic SF from a phenomenological 
perspective: how is Science Fiction, a typically speculative genre, felt as concrete? Or, how is 
such a genre that is partly fantastical, yet partly requiring a deep sense of reality, actualized in 
the medium of cinema? The question urges us to investigate the relation between a SF world and 
our own perceptual world (usually referred to as “reality”).  
Narrative theories have offered plentiful explanations about our comprehension of a 
represented (story)world. Classical narratologists, for example, regard the concept of “diegesis” 
as a synonym to “storyworld” as the represented content of a narrative. Similar conceptions of 
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artistic worlds can also be found in logical (truth-conditional) semantics, where scholars 
conceive of referents as either “factual” or “objectless,” and understand the artistic worlds as 
combinations of the two, so long as the worlds are taken to be existent (Yacavone 4-5). Under 
the influence of media studies in the past few decades (such as Henry Jenkins’ Convergence 
Culture and Klastrup and Tosca’s conception of “transmedial worlds”), contemporary narrative 
scholars have tended to move away from the narrative sense of the term to conceptualize the 
storyworld as fundamentally transmedial. Recent in-depth studies of storyworlds can be found in 
monographs by Marie-Laure Ryan (2006), David Herman (2009), Ciccoricco (2015), Thoss 
(2015), and Jan-Noël Thon (2016). Thon also edited a special issue of Storyworlds in 2015 on 
the concept of transmedial storyworld after co-editing with Marie-Laure Ryan an anthology 
Storyworlds across Media one year before. 
From a broader perspective, Mark J.P. Wolf’s conception of “world” has made a significant 
contribution to this shift of focus. His work on imaginary worlds and world building has offered 
both historical and formal accounts of how such practices come into being and develop, what 
elements usually constitute an imaginary world, how worlds are (sub)created within other worlds, 
and who exactly creates a world. Although more inclusive and expansive than most 
narratologists’ conception of the term, Wolf also delineates the fundamental picture of world as a 
representation, a (imaginary) reality experienced by characters, created by artists, and 
represented through artistic articulations. This notion of world, following J.R.R. Tolkien’s idea 
of “subcreation”, serves as a starting point for our inquiry but at the same time a point that we 
need to overtake. Wolf and other scholars tend to stick to the conception of world as, for instance, 
“abstract content systems” (Klastrup and Tosca). The dichotomy between diegesis and form, 
though necessary in our conception of narrative, faces serious challenges (Yacavone 22-23). In 
order to bring it to the current study of film world, the presupposition of a “primary world” of 
reality and the imaginary world’s independence from it also needs careful examination. 
Thorough and scrupulous though they may be, these studies have little to say about the 
affective and hermeneutical aspects of world-experience (Welterfahrung). It is true that we can 
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directly grasp, or intuit such formal structures of the imaginary world when viewing a film; 
nonetheless, it is unclear how we come to see them and how the imaginary is given to us within, 
and in relation to, our perceptual world. Imaginary worlds in the current literature are considered 
primarily in their form of representation—as world-representation (Weltvorstellung).14 When we 
say that the world of the Star Wars series is a universe that is “far far away” and “in a time long 
long ago,” we are speaking of it metaphysically, as if it were independent of our experience of it.  
From a perspective of film phenomenology and film-philosophy, Daniel Yacavone’s Film 
Worlds offers a synthesis of symbolic and aesthetic accounts of the cinematic experience of 
worlds. As mentioned above, in order to arrive at a comprehensive symbolic-aesthetic theory, he 
draws on a variety of philosophical schools to address three rather distinctive aspects of film 
worlds: the symbolic, the affective, and the interpretive, which are considered as providing 
experiences that are at once “cognitive and immersive and sensuous” (xiv). Despite its great 
intervention to the issue of world and its effort of bringing these studies together under the 
banner of "film world," internal conflicts and contradictions are still somewhat prominent. I 
contend that such conflicts may have resulted from the over-ambitious goal of Yacavone's 
synthetic work, for it is an extremely difficult task to integrate such fundamentally dissimilar 
strands of thinking. One cannot address so distinctive subjects as world-experience and 
world-representation without a unified methodological standpoint that ties the symbolic, the 
affective, and the interpretive together. 
The creation and reception of artworks are deeply intertwined with our ordinary perceptual 
experiences. World-experience in cinema has to be situated within a broader discussion of 
"world-horizon" in general. In contrast to Yacavone, Dudley Andrew, in Concepts in Film 
Theory, offers a more nuanced and complicated conception of world as composed of 
comprehensive systems that “comprise all elements that fit together within the same horizon, 
including elements that are in the foreground of experience, and those which sit vaguely on the 
horizon forming a background” (38). Moreover, Andrew also brings into the picture the 

14 See Walton, “World-Experience” for a detailed explication. More discussions on these will be provided in 
Chapter one. 
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complexity of spectators’ own Lifeworld experience, recognizing the viewer’s role in world 
building. I find Andrew’s conception of world to be closely related to the foundational 
understandings set out by Husserl and shared by other major phenomenologists. Husserl studies 
the structure of consciousness and its fundamental role in world-constitution, which in turn has 
much to offer to our investigations of film worlds. The experience of cinema should not be 
treated separately from but as participatory and contributory parts in our ordinary Lifeworld (or 
world in short).  
World is first of all a world as horizon. In our ordinary perceptions, when we see a cube, it 
never appears to us with all its six sides at once. But somehow, we grasp it as a cube that 
possesses these aspects. The reason for this lies in our ability to make the unavailable aspects 
co-present with what is directly given in our vision. Husserl calls such a mode of consciousness 
“horizontal intentionality” (Crisis 161) and the unavailable aspects of a cube are conceived as  
“appresented” with the help of our horizon (Ideas 174-75). The situation is slightly different in 
our film experience. In his early magnum opus Logical Investigations (Logische 
Untersuchungen), Husserl dedicates the entire third investigation to a mereology, the theory of 
the relation between parts and wholes. When I see a table, what is given is not only an object 
table, but also the elements that comprise it, namely the legs and the surface. A conclusion can 
be derived from it that the table cannot be given without the purport of those constitutive 
material elements. The object table is in a relation of “necessary implication” to the material legs 
and surface, so we can say that the table is, as defined by Husserl, founded (fundiert) by those 
material elements (Logical 25-6). However, our perception of the table does not necessarily rely 
on our perception of those constitutive parts. The object table is not a synthetic result from our 
cognitive act of adding those parts together. Rather, the table is directly given to us, and we 
directly and intuitively grasp it as a table. This relation of foundation (Fundierung) is crucial to 
understanding the structure of image-consciousness (Bildbewusstsein), a mode of consciousness 
different from but not entirely exclusive of perception.15 In an image-consciousness, Husserl 
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15 Husserl’s conception of image-consciousness differs from the one Sartre develops in The Imaginary 
(L’Imaginaire) where the latter regards imaging consciousness (conscience imageante) as fundamentally distinct 
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distinguishes the image-thing (the image in its materiality) from the image-object (the object we 
identify in the image) and the image-subject (the thing that this object stands for or refers to) 
(Phantasy 20-1). Their relations are described as that of foundation (Fundierung). The 
image-subject is founded by the image-object that in turn is given foundation by the image-thing 
(43). But due to our ability to apprehend the object directly and intuitively without going into 
detailed examinations of its constitutive parts, the image-consciousness usually creates a 
paradox. 
The image object as image object must be the bearer of conflict in a double sense. In one 
sense (a), it is in conflict with the actual perceptual present. This is the conflict between 
the image as image-object appearance and the image as physical image thing; (b) in the 
other sense, there is the conflict between the image-object appearance and the 
presentation of the subject entwined with it or, rather, partially coinciding with it. 
(Husserl, Phantasy 55; my emphasis) 
Therefore when seeing a cube in a film, we encounter the paradox, namely a conflict 
between two objects within the same intentionality: on the one hand, we wish to apprehend it as 
a cube with a solid body by supplementing it with the unavailable aspects in our horizon about 
the cube. It is given in a fashion that approximates how a cube appears in perception. On the 
other hand, the cube is intended as merely patterns of light and shade projected onto the screen, 
which does not have other aspects or dimensions. Both intentionalities involve appresentation of 
the horizontal content: the former calls for a horizon for a cube in perceptual space. The 
unavailable aspects are co-present because our experience with cubes offers the potentiality of 
such aspects that awaits our discovery if we move around the cube.16 The latter intentionality 
focuses on the constitutive materials; the cube is withheld and gives way to the light, the shade, 
and the screen. The horizon supplies us with the flatness of the screen and the intangibility of the 
light, hence reminding us of the emptiness behind the object. Taken together, they make the 
image-consciousness that intends the cube as an image-object that is at the same time founded 
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from perception. 
16 This experience is fundamentally kinaesthetic, and because my kinaesthetic knowledge of a cube is in the form of 
know-how (or savoir-faire) and only implicitly given to my conscious mind, the horizon is not explicitly known as a 
linguistic knowledge. See John J. Drummond for an explication of kinaesthesis’ role in visual perception, based on 
Husserl’s lecture notes published in Thing and Space.  
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(fundiert) by the material of light and shade: the image-thing.  
Note that the difference between the two modes of film intentionality is not at all 
fundamental, but rather depends on the horizons we supplement with what is presented. The 
horizon for the cube intended as image-object creates the space around the cube along with its 
six aspects, hence supplying the object with a quasi-perceptual world as if it were a real 
embodied cube in our perceptual world. It is only when we subordinate this world to the 
perceptual world—one given along with the horizon for the image-thing, the light, the shade, and 
the screen—that we tend to dismiss the former world-horizon as merely imaginary. Materialist 
film theories have tried to disparage such a world-horizon of the image-object as nothing but an 
illusion. The goal of such projects is to lay bare cinema’s nature as an illusion-making apparatus. 
But the theoris overlook the fact that what spectators typically see in most fiction films are the 
objects in the film, not the material of the film projection, even if the former must be founded by 
the latter.17 
My thesis is going to explore the interactions and interfusions among these different levels 
of world-horizons: how the horizon of an imaginary world can greatly impact and even change 
the perceptual world, how the perceptual world expands its horizon via audiovisual means (by 
taking the form of image), and how fictional films employ such an expanded horizon to directly 
engage problems in our perceptual world. These inquiries will be carried out by examining the 
cinematic subgenre of Space exploration SF, since these films offer great examples of interfusion 
and mutual influence between horizons in the history of film and that of real scientific 
developments. The project will equally shed light on current events happening in actual Space 
programs and their horizontal background of the Anthropocene, from a perspective offered by 
Husserlian phenomenology: its insight on world-horizon, the earthground (Erdboden), and a 
Heideggerian critique of the world-picture (Weldbild) developed out of his teacher’s legacy.  
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17 A similar argument has been developed by Roman Jakobson to pin down the relation between a formal study of 
la langue (the language system) and an empirical study of langage (the languages in use). The former is founded by 
the latter but can be independently studied (525). But of course, things can be more complicated when the film 
image is foregrounded because of its grain or other material qualities (think of Jean-Luc Godard for instance). In 
these occasions, the image-thing also manifests itself.  
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Methodology and Chapter Synopses 
This thesis is conducted in part as a philosophical (phenomenological and semiotic) inquiry 
into the problem of "world," or world-horizon. It is an aesthetic study of the (synthetic) 
semiotico-aesthetic nature of film worlds and their relations with the perceptual world. The 
project seeks to arrive at a theory that is capable of accounting for our world-experience on both 
local and global levels without a presupposition of pre-given worlds or a dichotomized and 
hierarchical framework. To do so, I make use of both film texts that belong to Space exploration 
SF and non-fictional audiovisual footage of scientific activities. I try to bring aesthetic texts in 
dialogue with historical events, hence involving historical research that does not usually take up 
great portions of theoretical writings in film studies. Backstories of SF films as well as that of the 
Space Race and the later Space programs are examined as horizons that make the texts 
meaningful. Additionally, textual analyses (both formal and thematic) are fundamental to this 
project, for they afford the very possibility of thinking through such problems. As an essential 
part, textual analyses both render the issue of world prominent and better situate philosophical 
discussions with/in a particular screen culture (the SF genre) as well as its historical interplay 
with cinematic and scientific technologies.  
Starting with an inquiry of the genealogy of a particular subgenre of science fiction films 
that centers on the topic of Space exploration, Chapter one will delve into the history of science 
fiction films and its subgenre of Space exploration. I will argue that Georges Méliès’ Le Voyage 
dans la lune (1902) starts both this subgenre as well as a speculative tradition of world building 
specific to it, through an analysis of the film’s treatment of the theme of Moon landing and by its 
stylistic choices. This tradition later continues in other films that belong to the subgenre but 
gradually fades from film screens as astrophysical science becomes more available and more 
widely accepted by the general public. The change of general conceptions about Space 
corresponds to a change in (or expansion of) our horizons, which has undergone a long process. 
However, I argue that such a horizon shift does not only result from the proliferation of scientific 
knowledge but also, and perhaps more significantly, results from the influences of popular media, 
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such as science fiction films. Fritz Lang’s Frau im Mond (Women in the Moon) (1929) is taken 
as the primal text that sets up an embodied tradition in the subgenre as an alternative to the 
speculative approach initiated by Méliès. This embodied tradition then becomes one of the most 
important factors in our horizon’s expansion. Along with Destination Moon (1950), another 
exemplary Space exploration SF film, the chapter attempts to show that they contributed not only 
to a conceptual shift regarding Space in the general public but also to the real development of 
modern rocketry and Space programs in the scientific sector. 
The second chapter begins with how modern Space programs gained public attention with 
the help of the recently available technologies of live television broadcasting. The syntagmas and 
the visual codes of such televisual footage bears strong resemblance to the embodied SF films I 
have mentioned above, but somehow these images have established themselves as the standard 
reality for scientific and astronautic activities. The rest of the chapter argues how contemporary 
(21th century) SF films on Space exploration make use of such conventional syntagmas and 
visual codes and how they push these conventions further by employing new filmmaking 
equipment and digital imaging technology. I then go on to examine in depth Gravity (2010) and 
Interstellar (2014) as two prominent cases of contemporary Space SF, and I break down their 
formal constructions and special effects so as to lay bare the specific ways these films immerse 
the spectators into an aesthetic (and kinaesthetic) world-horizon.   
Chapter three demonstrates how such immersive experience embodies very different themes 
in Gravity and Interstellar. Drawing on Heidegger and Husserl, I will show how these two films 
engage with the issues of world-picture (Weltbild) and earth-ground (Erdboden) in distinct ways. 
The difference between the content and expressions of the two films leads further to their 
different attitudes toward the future of human beings, the home planet, and interstellar 
colonization. I identify among them two major issues: whether we should leave the Earth or save 
it and whether we should focus on colonizing other planets or exploring the universe. The former 
choices of each pair are highly visible in contemporary Space programs and films, and they 
follow an ideological lineage that can be traced all the way back to some metaphysical premises. 
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Particular in such a tradition is the Nazi rocket industry and its direct legacy inherited by the 
postwar Space Race, later Space programs, and the science fiction film genre. I will explore in 
what ways such an ideological legacy is deeply intertwined with—and perhaps highly 




Chapter 1. Speculative and Embodied:  
Two Traditions in Space Exploration Science Fiction Cinema 
Because fictions do not refer in a “reproductive” way to reality as already given, they 
may refer in a “productive” way to reality as intimated by the fiction. [...] Because it 
has no previous referent, it may refer in a productive way to reality, and even 
increase reality. 
          —— Paul Ricœur, “The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality” 126-27 
At the turn of the twentieth century, humanity had not yet sent anything up above the earth’s 
atmosphere. To put it in a different way, Space was in practice outside of human territory. 
Comparable to the Antarctic continent before 1895, outer space was not yet a place that humans 
had set foot on.1 One major difference however was that paying a visit to the Antarctic was only 
a matter of time while going up to outer space called for an evolution in technology. While 
captain James Cook was purportedly only about 193 km (120 miles) away from Antarctica in 
1773 (Herdman 534), the first visit to outer space was not made possible until a camera attached 
to a captured-and-modified V-2 rocket brought back moving images taken beyond the Earth’s 
atmosphere (65 miles or 104.61 km above the ground) on October 24, 1946 (Daley).  
However, in 1902, the world, or at least the Western world, witnessed the release of one of 
Georges Méliès’ most loved films, Le Voyage dans la lune (A Trip to the Moon). The Jules 
Verne-inspired short film not only took spectators above the atmosphere but also had them 
witness a Moon-landing long before any of these feats had been accomplished in reality. The 
film was a tremendous success when released both in France and internationally (Solomon 3). 
After a period of obscurity, it was rediscovered around 1930 (3). With the recovery of another 
original hand-colored print in 2000 (8), the film was finally restored and celebrated as one of the 
100 greatest films in history (Village Voice). Le Voyage dans la lune marks the beginning of the 
long and prosperous history of cinematic science fiction as well as that of the particular subgenre 
I call Space exploration SF cinema.  
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1 See Tuan, Space and Place for more on the distinction between space and place. 
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In this chapter, I will look into changes brought about by cinematic images upon our 
conception and imagining of Earth and Space on one hand and at the impacts these imaginary 
depictions have had on modern rocket technology and astronautic explorations, as well as our 
understanding of them on the other. I start with a genealogy of what I call the speculative 
tradition and the embodied tradition in Space SF films to show how the latter of the two departs 
from the former one. The chapter will examine how the embodied tradition, unlike the 
speculative one, has infiltrated the real perceptual world, how it has enabled imaginary worlds to 
expand our horizons about Space and astronautics in real life, and how early Space SF films, in 
particular, have contributed to real scientific developments and anticipated real astronautic 
events.  
The Speculative Space and the Rise of Cinematic Space SF 
Georges Méliès made several shorts that can properly be called science fiction, not only for 
their fantastic stories based on works by authors like Jules Verne,2 but also because of their 
cinematic endeavors in bringing out those fantastic spaces in the concrete and sensible manner 
that the new medium of cinema made possible. Le Voyage dans la lune (1902) set the bar high 
for almost all science fiction films to follow. However, a brief comparison between Mélièsian SF 
and today’s mainstream SF cinema will reveal sharp contrasts in both content and expression.3  
Le Voyage dans la lune relates the story of a group of scholars from an astronomy academy 
who decide to go to the Moon4. They hire workers to build a spacecraft that can send them up 
there. Shortly, the bullet-like rocket ship is ready and the scholars depart on it as people fare 
them well and ignite the launch fuse. The ship is sent up to the Moon by a cannon. Soon, we see 

2 According to Tom Gunning, Méliès’ film follows the Moon landing plot in H.G. Wells’ The First Men in the 
Moon, instead of Verne’s (Gunning and Loew 569).  
3 In my thesis, I try to avoid the traditional content-form dichotomy by following the Danish linguist Louis 
Hjelmslev’s more nuanced distinction between expression and content. Form is used to address the abstract structure 
behind the façades of particular films. For instance, the content-form may include the iconic elements for a specific 
genre and its conventional narrative (or syntax), while expression-form involves all kinds of expressive devices we 
can use in making such films. These forms can only be arrived at through their manifestations in particular films, 
that is, the substances of content and expression. See Hjelmslev for his explanation of these categories.   
4 Here, I am following the story of the rediscovered print found by Lobster Film in Spain in 2000. 
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the Moon, surrounded by clouds, looming large, its face becoming increasingly visible. The ship 
strikes directly into the right eye of the Moon’s face, which turns it into a disgusted expression. 
This is followed by a scene on the Moon as the ship arrives crashing onto its surface and the 
scholars get off the ship without any equipment or specially made spacesuits. A strange 
landscape comprising of alien rocks and mounds surrounds them. Once all crew members get off 
the ship, the spacecraft simply vanishes into thin air. The scholars are then excited at seeing the 
Earth rising on the horizon. A series of fantastic occurrences soon ensue, such as sudden 
explosions from the ground, a sense of exhaustion that puts the Space travellers to sleep, a 
passing comet, the Big Dipper appearing with seven faces, and an encounter with gods and 
goddesses of the stars and planets who call for snow. The snow wakes up the scholars and they 
move underground where alien plants (most of which look like giant mushrooms) flourish. An 
umbrella is turned into a mushroom and continues to grow. An alien being suddenly appears on 
the scene and interrupts the wonder, but its friendly gestures are met by the scholars’ aggressive 
responses. It disappears, or supposedly dies, after being hit by one of the astronauts. This 
aggressive gesture attracts more alien beings until all the scholars are taken to the palace of the 
alien king as prisoners. One of the scholars soon kills the king by smashing him unto the ground. 
As a result, the scholars have to run for their life and escape the pursuing alien soldiers. The 
space ship is retrieved (the film does not show how) and pulled off a cliff. By doing so, the ship 
and its crew fall back on earth dropping into the ocean. They are towed back home, celebrated by 
a welcoming crowd, and rewarded with giant Moon-faced medals. The scholars then present the 
gift brought back from the Moon: a captured Moon alien held by a rope around his neck and 
beaten with a stick. He is displayed in the parade in front of a statue honoring the leader of the 
scholars and his brave travel to the Moon.  
As we can see, the story revolves around a journey that is not treated as a serious scientific 
exploration but almost as a parody of science and scientists. The scholars are portrayed in a 
fashion so disrespectful that they accomplish almost nothing except coming up with the empty 
idea of going to the Moon. While the workers build the ship the scholars visit and disrupt its 
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construction; the friendly aliens are met by the scholars’ aggressive beatings; on the Moon, the 
scholars do nothing save fall asleep and run away from the pursuing aliens; the captured alien is 
treated and displayed in a manner not so much different from the way exotic slaves or aboriginal 
people were through during the colonial era. In all, the entire event of going to the Moon is 
depicted in the film as a sort of joke, though it is nonetheless celebrated by the inhabitants of the 
film world (Solomon 9-11). While the film is a showcase of Méliès’ tricks and special effects, 
neither Space exploration (Moon-landing) nor Space is taken as objects of serious or scientific 
consideration. In this regard, it is possible to surmise that such a “light” treatment of the topic 
reflected the era’s mainstream opinions toward Space and Space travel (i.e., as something 
scientifically “impossible” and therefore not wanting of serious consideration but best treated as 
fantasy) while at the same time deepening them.  
The method and the vehicle used to carry the scholars to the Moon seem somewhat peculiar, 
if not absolutely imaginative, to a modern spectator. The cannon and the metal bullet-like 
spacecraft are far from how we conceive of Space travel today. As traces of the theatrical 
traditions are obvious in this film’s world building, it is easy to concur that Méliès did not at all 
intend to convince the audience into believing in the reality (or the real feasibility) of a trip to the 
Moon or else to give them the impression of witnessing how such a trip would really look like. 
What drives the impression of reality here is less the images than the fictional narrative. When 
the travellers are escaping the pursuing aliens, their spacecraft simply drops off the edge of the 
Moon, and voilà! They are back home on Earth. This idea of going off the edge of Moon and 
falling back to Earth (from the sky) apparently contradicts the rising image of the round Earth the 
scholars see just moments after landing on the Moon. Thus, two rather opposing ideas about 
cosmos—the pre-scientific and the scientific—seem to have been both taken up by Méliès 
without any effort to reconcile them. Moreover, the displacement of the spacecraft from Earth to 
the Moon is only implied by showing the planet Earth as over-there (seen as an object in the 
background) instead of right-here (felt as the ground where the characters stand). Indeed, the two 
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locations are not represented as fundamentally different; rather, their difference must be inferred5. 
Spectators have to understand the event as taking place respectively on Earth and on the Moon 
according to information provided either from the storyworld through the drawings on the 
blackboard in the academy, from the conventional portrayal of the Moon, or from the title of the 
film. For a modern viewer of the film, there are non of the tell-tale signs that we are on the moon: 
reduced gravity, absence of oxygen, barren landscape, absence of the sky, etc.  
With regards to its stylistic and expressive choices, Méliès’ SF film can still be seen as a 
product of theatrical art, not only is the camera fixed, what is presented seems also to depart little 
from a drama played out on a proscenium stage. The performance is exaggerated so as to 
stimulate laughter; the costumes are flamboyant and unpractical, unfit for the activities depicted 
in the story. The movements and actions are generally carried out on a horizontal line parallel to 
the backdrop and for the most part of the film the orientation is limited to left and right (côté 
jardin and côté cour). As a result, depth of space is shallow with only a few exceptions where the 
actors stand in multiple lines and walk toward or away from the backdrop. That said, we can see 
attempts throughout the film to create a limited sense of depth. Several sets divide the shooting 
stage into layers or planes overlaying one another though they remain parallel to each other—a 
theatrical device but one that, in the context of cinema, reminds us of multi-planar cel animation. 
Also by using the principles of monocular perspective, actors and objects (be they painted or 
crafted) appear in the frame relative to their size as seen from the point of view of the camera 
lens so as to create a visual order where the objects closer to our viewpoint occupy a larger 
portion of the image than those represented as farther away. Several scenes offer prominent 
examples of this. In the preparatory sequence, the scholars exit the factory where the ship is 
being built and ascend a terrace overlooking the entire manufacturing complex which is 
supposed to show the industrial sector of the city. The actors are positioned at the right front 
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5 An equally prominent case can be found in the Danish SF film Himmelskibet (A Trip to Mars) (1918), where the 
appearance of Mars is almost identical to that of the Earth, the gravity, the air, and even the magnitudes of the Sun. 
Similarly, differences can be detected only through inferences and the intertitles. However, whereas Méliès’ shorts 
are not really interested in the scientificity of Space travel, Himmelskibet pays a considerable amount of attention on 
how the scientists carry out such an expedition. Also, significantly, the Martians greet the expeditors with a globe of 
Earth, an image of the planet Earth indeed!  
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edge of the frame against the vast hand-painted background sets that cover the frame from its 
lower end all the way to the top. The multilayered sets are arranged to deliver a pictorial sense of 
depth: rooftops are seen at the lower end to indicate a point of view set on an equal level with the 
terrace and above most of the buildings in the region. In the middle part of the frame we can see 
layers of factory houses with chimneys that are painted in smaller sizes and in a paler shade to 
indicate the distance between them and the camera’s viewpoint. The most interesting design is 
found in the upper portion of the frames. Méliès manages to show real smoke coming out of the 
factory chimneys by installing pipes in between the layers of painted backdrops, which adds a 
visual attraction as well as a sense of reality to the scene. To indicate the altitude of the launch 
ground, the scene that follows is constructed with at least four planes: the front layer consisting 
of rooftops that are supposed to be nearer to the camera (though they fail to give that impression), 
the platform where the scholars enter the capsule of the spacecraft, the platform that is higher 
and overlooks the spacecraft, and a backdrop layer that is painted with distant houses and the 
night sky. Similar techniques are used in later scenes on the Moon. When the scholars become 
excited at seeing Earth rising from the horizon, the distant plane lowers in tandem with the raised 
plane of Earth so as to simulate the greater altitude to which Earth has risen.  
The style and expressive devices used are deliberately dramatic since, according to Méliès 
himself, the priority is given to the “stage effect,” the “trick” or “a nicely arranged tableau” 
rather than the tale (118, Qtd. in Gunning, “The Cinema of Attraction” 64). The film’s prominent 
“cinema of attraction” features, as Tom Gunning argues, foreground the possibilities of the 
cinematic medium, promote in an exhibitionist way the cinematic machine itself as a selling 
point, and even create an avant-gardist impact on the spectators (64-70). Such films aimed at 
evoking sensuous responses or even extreme emotional reactions; priority was given to the 
sensational aspect of the medium over incorporating events into the more established traditions 
of narrative fiction in art forms that are branded as bourgeois, namely novels, theater, et cetera. 
As a whole, Le Voyage dans la lune belongs instead to a tradition inherited from vaudeville 
shows and the circus. The film is not intended to offer a rigorous account of what a real scientific 
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exploration of Space would be like; nor is the filmmaker interested in creating a 
world-experience of Space travel and of the Moon in a strictly exploratory sense for the 
spectators. I call this kind of world building practice in Space SF cinema the speculative method 
because the emphasis has been put on the speculative content in the story instead of the 
expressive form that confers the world-experience. That is to be contrasted to what I call the 
embodied method, on which I shall elaborate in the following sections.  
From 1907 to about 1913, the film industry changed rapidly from a tendency to “attract” and 
“amuse” to a preference for narrative. With the arrival of feature films, especially those by D.W. 
Griffith, developments in SF cinema also witnessed a trend to reorient the focus from attractive 
spectacles to narrative and (realistic) world building.  
Taking up the classical cinematic forms of narrative recently developed in the United States 
and retaining a Mélièsian interest in the spectacular, Aelita (1924), directed by Yakov 
Protazanov, succeeded Le Voyage dans la lune and went further by combining it with socialist 
realism and constructivism. The film’s crosscutting goes back and forth between the Soviet 
world (portrayed in realistic style) and the Martian world (depicted through constructivist 
settings). The two rather disparate worlds are then bridged when the protagonist-engineer Los 
(Nikolai Tsereteli) launches his rocket to reach Mars. Interestingly, the image of the round Earth 
once again plays the important role of indicating, or narrating in terms of its formal function, the 
change of space, although this time it is not rising from the horizon but moving away from the 
flying spaceship (the camera’s point of view). The spectators, who assume the perspective of the 
sugar-profiteer (Pavel Pol), are told in this fashion that the characters are leaving the Earth on a 
spacecraft (or whatever vehicle that the film does not even explicitly show). Along with this, the 
extraordinary space on Mars, presented with highly expressionist and stylistic sets and costumes, 
appears to be more symbolic than realistic. Like some Soviet reviewers who understood the 
Martian world to be merely the protagonist’s fantasy (Christensen 107-8), we are confused by 
the reality of such a planet and constantly referred back to the film’s realistically set Soviet city. 
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In spite of disputes over the film’s ideological message6, the “Martian Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics” seems to embody the Soviet revolutionary ideology. The constructivist Mars is but a 
symbolic allegory either for the pre-revolutionary bourgeois society, the post-revolutionary 
remnants of bourgeois culture, or else the fantasized realm of the protagonist-engineer.  
Together with Le Voyage dans la lune, the speculative method shared by these two early 
classics of SF cinema clearly downplays the role of any scientific facts already available at the 
time with regards to Space or Space travel.7 Instead, they focus on messages conveyed through a 
symbolic space. The sets of the Moon in Le Voyage dans la lune and that of Mars in Aelita are 
not supposed to present worlds of some remote realities but only to symbolically represent or 
designate our own world: a displaced reflection upon ourselves. They function in a similar way 
to theatrical sets. The plants of abnormally huge size on Méliès’ Moon and the geometrically 
shaped architecture on Protazanov’s Mars are not to be taken to represent what the Moon or 
Mars “really” look like, were it possible to travel there. Rocks on the Moon, for instance, would 
not be made of paper or wooden boards and they would not move in the manner that a plane of 
painted sets would. Even if cinematic images of such hand-drawn sets are materially identical to 
that of real photographed space, they nonetheless manifest rather different qualities since most 
handcrafted 2D settings were easily discernible prior to the digital age.8 The crucial point here is 
that the shooting and performance of these films take place in a speculative space that requires 
the imaginative supplement on the part of the viewer. In this sense, they belong to an older 
tradition of space/world building as seen in theater.   
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6 Kristin Thompson has pointed out that Soviet films in the 1920s were indeed international films for their 
dependence on foreign trade and credit. By 1928, the IAH (Internationale Arbeitshilfe) almost took over their shares 
of the film firm Russ, which resulted in Mezhrabpom-Russ films (that produced Aelita) being aimed more at 
Western audiences than domestic ones (30). Christensen, following Thompson, argues that Bolshevik film critics at 
the time accused Mezhrabpom-Russ of “making films [...] deliberately for export to gain money from Western 
audiences” (109).  
7 Although such knowledge was not widely accepted and remained largely unknown by the general public, these 
films did not intend to bring it to their audiences. Scientificity was not something that concerned these filmmakers 
and this sets them apart from those of the embodied tradition to come.  
8 To be sure, some special effects might be more difficult to discern if they are meticulously done in combination 
with location shooting, such as the use of miniature models.  
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The Birth of the Embodied Tradition 
Such an imaginative and highly expressive method of world building gradually declined as 
scientific studies with regards to Space and astronautics became more available and more widely 
accepted by the general public. But just as Gunning has noted, the preeminence of narrative in 
classical Hollywood cinema did not rule out, nor eradicate, certain aspects of the attraction mode 
of filmmaking. Attractive elements linger on and are for the most part synthesized with the 
narrative.9 Scientific spectacles nonetheless came to replace purely fantastic ones; rigorous 
efforts in presenting potential experiences of “real” future Space explorations came to substitute 
the comic, parodic, or fantastic visual effects. Even if the speculative tradition of Méliès has 
remained a key element for SF and is still visible in contemporary films, as we can see in recent 
films such as Luc Besson’s Valerian and the City of a Thousands Planets (2017) and Ari 
Folman’s The Congress (2013), treating science seriously has become a standard way of doing 
things for the majority of SF films. In order to make a Space narrative believable, it now has to 
be compatible, or at least not incompatible, with available scientific knowledge because the latter 
has become an essential part of our worldly horizons since the proliferation of aviational 
technologies and modern physics.  
In this sense, the shift identified by many film scholars as one from a cinema of attraction to 
a narrative cinema could also be seen as a shift from cinema as spectacle to cinema as world. 
The greatest change seems to lie in the immersiveness rather than the spectacularity or 
attractiveness of the film: whereas cinema as spectacle provokes context-poor sensational and 
emotional responses, and perhaps entails fragmentary points of curiosity, cinema as world 
situates the spectacles within the specific contexts of a storyworld and usually organizes the 
sequences of mere attractions into a consistent narrative. As I mentioned in the Introduction, it is 
necessary that characters and events, as image-objects, be presented not in isolation but within a 
horizon which provides the spectator with an immersive experience. An image-object without 

9 There are prominent exceptions however. Certain genres such as musicals have kept attractive elements as 
somewhat extra-narrative components of the film.  
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horizon would not be recognized or identified as an object at all. An object presented is always 
and already an object appresented, that is, supplemented by certain horizons.10 The change of 
cinematic styles implies a change of cinematic horizon, hence a change in the cinematic 
institution itself. What at one point was only intended to produce sporadic amusement for 
viewers has now become a greater apparatus that seems to attract their full immersive attention. 
Audiences wish for a world, for a more intense form of film experience, and such a world cannot 
but be built around our perceptual horizons.  
This tradition of world building is reflected in Space SF through what I call the embodied 
method, whose origin can be traced back to Fritz Lang’s 1929 Frau im Mond (Women in the 
Moon). Five years after the release of Aelita, this film—which is Fritz Lang’s last silent 
feature—totally changed the experience of science fiction cinema. In a manner very different 
from the previous SF films, Frau im Mond celebrates (the spiritualization of) modern technology, 
especially modern rocketry. The film, notes Tom Gunning, “merges film text and historical 
context to such a degree that categories of science and fiction, technology and artistic design, 
blur” (Gunning and Loew 555). This insightful comment has to be understood on several levels: 
in terms of the film’s thematic treatment of science and technology, its realistic manner of 
portraying Space and astronautic activities; and in terms of its ties with and its indisputable 
impact on modern rocketry (including the V-2 rocket of Nazi Germany) as well as future 
aeronautics. I will begin with the first two aspects and continue with the third in the next section.  
First, the film’s focus on the technological (or even the technical) details of Space travel as 
well as modern rocketry revolutionized the conception of the SF genre. Whereas the emphasis of 
the genre previously fell on the second word “fiction,” Lang’s film reversed the situation by 
bringing to the fore the first term “science”. Such a thematic shift distinguishes it from previous 
cinematic renditions of SF in their choice of content. As we saw earlier, neither Méliès nor 
Protazanov showed much interest in the reality (or scientifically based depection) of the 

10 Nowadays, it has become a standard that the production of a fantastic blockbuster usually involves the tedious 
and demanding work of world building. A trustworthy world is even more important than a plausible story or 
realistic performance (Wolf, “World Design” 67). 
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extraterrestrial world. Nor did they especially care how the astronauts manage to travel such 
great distances or cope with issues of astrophysics.  
Space travel is particularly downplayed in both earlier films and what we see about the 
journey is limited to the crash-landing on the Moon of the bullet-shaped spaceship in Le Voyage 
dans la lune and the unnamed spaceship that is only shown rather briefly in Aelita, which lands 
on Mars also by crashing onto its surface. Little is explored or even imagined about the travel per 
se. In contrast, Lang demonstrated great enthusiasm in perfecting the minute details of the 
scientific design of the spacecraft, the boarding of the astronauts, the launch procedures 
(especially the well-known count-down sequence), effects of gravity on the crew, the landing, all 
the way to the lift-off on the Moon for the return trip. Lang chose a rocket design over the bullet 
cannon model of Méliès for the spaceship based on the then ongoing scientific experiments and 
trends in early Space travel research and discussions in Germany (Neufield). The famous Verein 
für Raumschiffahrt (or VfR, Society for Space Travel) of amateur rocket enthusiasts was formed 
in 1927 and followed the rocket-travel idea popularized by Hermann Oberth’s book Rakete zu 
den Planetenräumen (The Rocket into Planetary Space) published in 1923 and expanded in 1929 
as Wege zur Raumschiffahrt (Ways to Spaceflight).11 The rocket in the film was designed by 
Oberth and his team (many of whom were members of VfR) and was featured in the promotion 
for the film. Although the scheduled launch of a model rocket was not realized due to various 
issues, the imagery we see in the film reflects what a real operational rocket would look like. The 
components of the rocket, which include a habitation module for the crew on top of the vehicle 
and the engines and nozzles in the lower part have become signature traits of real Space travel 
and still remain the same in today’s rockets. The interior of the habitation module consists of two 
decks: the upper deck for the pilot and the lower deck for the other crew members, connected by 
a steel ladder. All of the crew are buckled up and fixed to their bunks for takeoff. The rocket 
launches partly immersed in water to reduce the shock, which is a technique still widely used for 
submarine ballistic missiles today. The launch is accompanied with a countdown to increase the 

11 The 1929 book was dedicated to Thea von Harbou and Fritz Lang (Oberth v). Among the other members, some 
such as Willy Ley and Wernher von Braun later became associated with the U.S. Space programs.  
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tension and the subsequent situation of increasing G is enacted through both the barometers and 
the actors and actress’ performance. Ahead of all other Space exploration films, Lang has even 
presented the zero-G situations of Space travel, where the characters have to slip their feet into 
straps attached to the ground of the habitation module to stay still or move. A sequence of shots 
shows the boy character Gustav (Gustl Gstettenbaur) moving from the lower deck to the upper 
one by setting himself free from the straps and floating upward. The shots are done in a concise 
and believable manner, especially when the boy hits the top of the module for not being able to 
stop his floating motion. Any details of wire are carefully hidden.  
 
Figure 1.1 Screenshot from Frau im Mond (top left) ©Ufa, the first photograph of the Moon by J.W. Draper in 1840 
(top right) ©Getty Images, and screenshot from NASA’s Apollo 8 footage in 1968 (lower) ©NASA 
The depiction of the Moon is yet another prominent feature where this film differs from 
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previous ones. Unlike the strange, yet life-flourishing, Moon represented in Le Voyage dans la 
lune and the highly expressive Martian palace in Aelita, the Moon in Frau im Mond is bleak and 
barren. The surface is first shown in the background when the rocket approaches and travels 
across the vast plains of the crater-filled landscape. It would be difficult to tell the difference 
between this image and what the Moon appears through a telescope.12 The meticulously crafted 
model in close-ups comes very close to what the Moon actually looks like. It also serves as a 
depressing signal for the explorers who wish to find gold on the Moon. The rapidly passing 
scenery of the Moon surface through the rocket’s windows resembles those we will see years 
later through the window of the Eagle from the Apollo 11 mission as the landing module 
searches for a spot to land (see Figure 1.1).  
Other aspects of the Moon that are no longer scientifically accurate are nevertheless 
presented in the film as discoveries from careful scientific experiments. For instance, despite the 
film’s mistaken conception of breathable air on the Moon, its presence is nonetheless first tested 
by the crazy scientist Georg Manfeldt (Klaus Pohl) by striking a match in the air. The much 
smaller gravity on the Moon is also taken into consideration; characters are dressed in shoes that 
have particularly thick (hence heavy) soles. The discovery of gold on the Moon in a subterranean 
cave, though purely fantastical, is sidelined as a metaphorical denunciation of insatiable 
capitalistic greed and misled scientific pride.  
As indicated in the film’s epigraph “‘Never’ does not exist for the human mind ... only ‘Not 
yet’” (“Es gibt für den menschlichen Geift kein Niemals, höchstens ein Noch nich”), the film’s 
technophilic quality straightforwardly rejects the satirical tone prominent in previous SF films.13 
Technology in Frau im Mond is not something that is ridiculed as a form of medieval magic;14 
nor is it the absolute accomplice of imperialism and capitalist greed. It is treated with respect. 
Thus, the film’s attitude toward science and technology marks the first major departure from the 

12 Retrospectively, we can even say that it resembles what we see in the photograph taken by the Soviet Luna-2 
probe sent to the Moon in 1959. 
13 Matthew Solomon summarizes in the Introduction to an anthology on the film, the critical tendency to regard Le 
Voyage dans la lune as a satirical piece that points out clearly the problems of “Western imperial ambition” (12).  
14 It is intriguing that in Lang’s Metropolis, technology is given an equally complex view, neither entirely good nor 
entirely bad despite the indicated deep connection it has to medieval magic.  
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speculative tradition.  
Second, Lang’s Frau im Mond signals a bifurcation in the practices of SF world building 
which are still with us today. The realistic manner Lang has taken to portray technology and 
extraterrestrial exploration rejects the mostly fantastical representations of alien space that had 
been popular and pervasive in previous SF films. Moreover, the possibility for Space travel in 
the film is not set in some inconceivable age to come. Rather, the story treats the available 
science seriously and envisages Space travel in an almost contemporary era (or, at most, a near 
future). In this way, scientific and technological knowledge about rocketry and Moon-landing is 
raised to an equal footing with artistic creations and imagination in the making of SF films. The 
film does not extrapolate an entirely distinct world from pure and fantastic speculations, but 
instead relies heavily on an extended and expanded horizon of our own world (circa 1929) made 
possible by new technologies and the newly available scientific knowledge.  
Hence, Frau im Mond becomes perhaps the first film that falls under the rubric of the 
embodied method in representing Space travel on screen. As Husserl has noticed, 
world-experience [Welterfahrung] is prominently different from world-representation 
[Weltvorstellung].15 What we encounter primarily in an artwork (be it literary, theatrical, 
painterly, or cinematic) is a world for experience, a world-horizon, a latent background for 
perception and understanding. Only in our reflection do we come up with a “picture” of the 
diegetic world—the world-representation. No representational world can exist without 
manifesting itself in a specific world-experience. Hence, even the same world-representation can 
take very different forms of experience. Different media and styles offer different 
world-experiences. The world experienced when reading a novel relies heavily on the readers’ 
symbolic comprehension and imagination, while the world experienced when reading a comic 
book may be less symbolic but still involves the readers’ imaginative supplementation. Watching 
a film offers greater immersive experience in a quasi-perceptual way but it also varies according 
to the style being used. The heavy uses of sets and theatrical performances foreground the 

15 See an in-depth interpretation of Husserl’s distinction among world-experience, world-representation and 
world-Idea in Walton, “World-experience”.  
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materiality of the painterly sets and models since they are easily identified as different from the 
actually embodied perceptual objects. The discrepancy between a photograph of the real city and 
a painting of the city can be prominent if efforts are not taken by the set designers to produce 
photorealistic effects. What I call the speculative method therefore makes the film space and 
objects less spontaneous and less felt as present for spectators.  
SF films prior to Frau im Mond rely heavily on spectators’ comprehension of their 
world-representation—what a certain set means or refers to, what certain actors/actresses’ 
performances indicate, and what a cartoonized Moon-face (in the case of Le Voyage dans la lune) 
symbolizes, all have to be worked out by the spectators. The demand for spectatorial inference 
and conception intelligibly transcends the filmic image given intuitively.16 It calls for 
disembodied rational connections that will link what is seen and heard to what is meant. The 
spectators undergo a process not entirely unlike that of understanding a linguistic word—a 
process of signification. Although the filmic image does not conform to a double articulation, 
this process is comparable to the act of accessing the denotative signified through a signifier.17 
The use of props and sets as stand-ins for the diegetic world makes the films of the speculative 
tradition closer to theatre where the reality of the dramatic space is only understood if the 
spectator is familiar with the medium’s conventions. This process of signification relies therefore 
on both the filmmaker and the spectator: Filmmakers have to make sure that the stand-in objects 
are easily comprehensible so that the spectators familiar with the convention will grasp what they 
mean without difficulties.18 Such is what I call the speculative method of world building.  
Lang and Thea von Harbou (who was his wife at the time and co-worked with him on the 
film) rejected these world building practices of SF cinema prior to Frau im Mond (including, to a 

16 I distinguish conception from intuition in the same fashion that Immanuel Kant does in his Critique of Pure 
Reason: whereas conception is general, an intuition is singular and individual. Intuition “has an immediate relation 
to the object” while conception “has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be 
common to several things” (222-23).  
17 Christian Metz has pointed out that for cinema, there is no primary or secondary articulation. It also differs from 
languages (and literature) in that cinematic signifiers (he means images here) are by nature already “expressive” 
(Film Language 79).  
18 For people who are not at all familiar with the tradition of anthropomorphizing nonhuman objects or with the 
ancient notion of “the man in the Moon,” the cartoonized Moon-face will be difficult to comprehend.  
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certain extent, Lang’s Metropolis). The theatrically suggested storyworld gives way to a truly 
cinematic and hence somewhat embodied form of space. This departure from the theatrical 
tradition transfigured the look of Space exploration SF cinema. It not only carefully constructs a 
world-experience in the most realistic fashion available, but also pays tribute to contemporary 
science and technology. Science and technology for the first time feature in a science fiction film 
as themselves, instead of in the form of some incomprehensible magic. They are treated seriously. 
Professor Georg Manfeldt who is considered to be mad by the general public in the story is held 
with utmost respect by Wolf Helius (Willy Fritsch), the protagonist who later leads the team to 
the Moon. Although technology is for Helius an embodiment of his Romanticist ideal for 
knowledge and superhuman potency, while for the cartel (or the evil businessmen) it is a way to 
satisfy their insatiable greed for wealth, it is nevertheless treated in a more positive, or at least 
complicated, light. No wonder Katharina Loew calls it “scientifically grounded realism” 
(Gunning and Loew 566).  
Among the many ways Frau im Mond deviates from the speculative tradition, some appear 
more outstanding. The diegetic spaces in the film world were photographed in embodied 
three-dimensional places, either in real locations or in one of Ufa’s giant studios where the 
facsimile was created. The performers therefore traverse and step on the real spaces, carrying out 
real interactions with their environment. This is particularly true of the interior space of the 
rocketship and the space on the Moon. Even though the aerial shots that open the launch scene 
used miniature models, they are beautifully done through crosscuttings with location shots of real 
performers. Such a preference for embodied space also extends to the portrayal of depth. 
Whereas the spaces are usually shallow in Le Voyage dans la lune and Aelita, Lang delivers a 
sense of depth in every possible way. The opening sequence emphasizes the vertical space of the 
staircase at Professor Manfelt’s apartment building to indicate his solitary lifestyle; the sequence 
following it where the man from the cartel sneaks into Helius’ home to steal his rocket sketches 
is also rendered with deep space, so that dramatic irony is created to show the unequal 
knowledge different characters have of the occurring event. The depiction of the launch scene 
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and Moon-landing remarkably foreground the depth and width of the space. Establishing shots 
are used to give the spectators a sense of what a rocket launch and its facilities would look like, 
something no one at the time would have known, not even the rocket engineers. Deep space is 
also enacted in the scene on the Moon so as to show the vastness of the barren landscape, 
something not expected prior to the journey. Moreover, this vast desertedness enhances the 
heroicness of Helius’ self-sacrifice. His decision to be the one who remains on the Moon 
resonates with the cinematic imagery of him standing alone beside the giant rocket against the 
landscape of the Moon, producing a solemn yet sorrowful sense toward the end of the film.  
Most of the methods and stylistic techniques used in Frau im Mond will find their way into 
later Space exploration films, both fictional and documentary. In the aftermath of World War II 
Space exploration films will revive the embodied tradition: Destination Moon (1950), 2001: A 
Space Odyssey (1968), and Marooned (1969) all follow Lang’s lead and develop, each in their 
own manner, a strong sense of scientificity and of embodied spatiality. More recently there have 
been films that can be regarded as a third generation in this particular tradition. They have 
enormously deepened and expanded it by incorporating digital imaging technologies as well as 
mobile and remotely controlled cinematographic equipment. In Chapter two, I will elaborate on 
these later films to demonstrate how they carry on such a legacy while pushing further the limits 
of embodiment by their own means.  
The Formative Power of the Imaginary 
Not only does the embodied tradition take up the constantly expanding horizons of science 
and technology but it also contributes to the process of expanding the very horizon of our 
perceptual world. The imaginary SF films have displayed their formative power to influence and 
change what is considered the real world—the world as perceived not imaged. It would be 
extremely difficult for theories that focus purely on the representational aspect of the fictional 
world to account for such an inverse infiltration of the fictional into the actual. If the fictional 
world were solely dependent on and subordinate to the actual world, such an impact would be 
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unthinkable. The proposal of this thesis to consider world as primarily a horizon aims to deal 
with this issue.  
Because our apprehension of an object largely depends on the horizon we take up, the 
difference between a cinematic rocket and a real one only comes to the fore when I conceive of 
the former one within a horizon of cinema (an image-consciousness) instead of direct perception. 
That is, the fictionality regarded as fundamental in theories of world-representation is now 
considered as a supplement. In fact, the doubleness, or twofoldness (as Richard Wollheim calls it) 
of the film experience entails the presence of two somewhat contradictory horizons, that of 
perception and that of image-consciousness. To see the rocket in Frau im Mond as an object, one 
has to suppress the horizon of cinematic materiality, i.e., the attitude to see the whole thing as 
merely a flat mixture of light and shade. In fact, the immersive experience of cinema lies 
fundamentally in such an act of suppression and such an imbalanced orientation toward 
maximizing the perceptual horizon. Paul Ricœur offers an insightful comment on this in an essay 
published in 1979. 
Imagination is “productive” not only of unreal objects, but also of an expanded vision of 
reality. Imagination at work—in a work—produces itself as a world. (Ricœur 128) 
The ultimate role of the image is not only to diffuse meaning across diverse sensorial 
fields, to hallucinate thought in some way, but on the contrary to effect a sort of epoche 
of the real, to suspend our attention to the real, to place us in a state of non-engagement 
with regard to perception or action, in short, to suspend meaning in the neutralized 
atmosphere to which one could give the name of the dimension of fiction. In this state of 
non-engagement we try new ideas, new values, new ways of being-in-the-world. (134) 
The “new ways of being-in-the-world” are exactly what these embodied Space exploration 
SF films are aiming for. Instead of trying to produce something that is totally different from and 
independent of our perceptual reality, these films attempt to expand our perceptual horizons, and 
they have succeeded. They have extended our perception as would a prosthetic. The films I am 
addressing in this thesis therefore contribute to both a general conception of Space (as well as 
Space travel) and the real science of cosmology and astronautics. They have managed to do so in 
two major ways: the sponsorship for scientific/technological research and the visual(-auditory) 
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presentation (both the visual codes and the syntagmas) of astronautic activities.  
Dieter Huzel, an officer at Peenemünde’s secret German Army rocket center recounts as 
follows what he felt in 1943 when being shown the V-2 (then called the A-4) rockets: 
I saw them—four, fantastic shapes but a few feet away, strange and towering above us in 
the subdued light. I could only think that they must be out of some science fiction 
film—Frau im Mond brought to earth. (Huzel 44; Qtd. in Neufield, Preface) 
The mention of Frau im Mond is by no means accidental, not only because the film stirred a 
great passion for rocket science and Space travel at that time but also due to a direct connection 
between the making of the film and the making of the rocket. Fritz Lang’s fascination with 
science and technology is played out not only within the film, but also without. It resulted in 
moving the cinema beyond its own limited industry and directly led to sponsoring 
contemporaneous technological research in rocketry and astronautics. On the one hand, Space 
travel procedures, especially the launch and countdown introduced by Frau im Mond were 
directly integrated into the postwar Space programs (reportedly through Willy Ley’s personal 
memory of the film19); on the other hand, in order to promote the film, Lang persuaded Ufa to 
invest in a real rocket launch that later turned out to be a model rocket produced under Hermann 
Oberth’s leadership (Gunning and Loew 562).20 It became one of the world’s first liquid 
powered, auto-propelled reverse-thrust rockets, anticipating both the V-2 rocket and later modern 
rockets for Space transportation.21 In the end, the rocket was not only the selling point of the 
film but also the idea that pushed forward almost the entire modern rocketry and astronautic 
sciences, ever since. Understandably, Wernher von Braun, the most important figure in modern 
rocketry and in the history of U.S. Space programs and to whom we will return in Chapter three, 
later painted a Frau im Mond logo on the base of the first successfully launched V-2 rocket 

19 Eisner reports that Willy Ley, a German rocket enthusiast and member of the Verein für Raumschiffahrt (VfR, or 
Society for Space Travels) who also participated in the building of the model rocket for Lang’s Frau im Mond 
alongside with Hermann Oberth, probably introduced the countdown procedure to NASA when he fled Nazi 
Germany and later joined the postwar Space program in the United States (Gunning and Loew 579).  
20 Hermann Oberth was one of the fathers of modern rocketry, member of VfR and author of Die Rakete zu den 
Planetenräumen (The Rocket into Interplanetary Space), one of the first books to depict a visionary but scientifically 
plausible way of Space travel.  
21 It is possible that Oberth did not finish the model rocket due to constant delay and Ufa’s cut-off of funding, but 
only produced a functional liquid rocket engine nozzle that makes one step toward the V-2 missile.  
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(Hardesty and Eisman 2) and called Lang’s sponsorship of rocket research “the oddest source of 
funding in the history of rocket science” (Braun and Ordway 65).  
Frau im Mond is not alone in exerting an impact on the real world. The idea of crash landing 
actually became one of the first widely used methods in the early days of the Space Race for 
probes and satellites that were not manned. Amongst them, the Soviet Luna-2 probe was the first 
to carry out the Mélièsian fantasy by hitting the surface of the Moon on September 12, 1959.  
Following Lang was the 1950 U.S. science fiction film Destination Moon (1950). This film 
was among the very first attempts to adapt the Space exploration SF subgenre to an increasing 
enthusiasm for serious Space travel and exploration after the Second World War. It had been 
only four years since the picture of Earth was sent back from the camera mounted on a V-2 
rocket when George Pal and Irving Pichel produced this motion picture, where the sole focus 
was on making-possible humanity’s first landing on the Moon: the science, the potential 
technologies, the trip to and return, and, most important of all, the dangers of the journey. If Frau 
im Mond anticipates the serious Moon-landing films, Destination Moon is the precursor to many 
of today’s Space rescue features, such as Gravity and Salyut-7.22 In this regard, whereas Lang’s 
film helped the development of rocketry and astronautic technologies, Pal and Pichel’s film 
contributed to the field an audio-visual illustration of the potential issues concerning real Space 
travel, a sensorial rendering of speculation for the scientific community and an 
easy-to-understand demonstration for the general public. The film also anticipates the Cold War 
anxiety that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States if the latter did not win the Space 
Race. Jim Barnes (John Archer), the chief engineer and the central protagonist, presents the basic 
scientific knowledge about Space travel and Moon landing to a group of private entrepreneurs 
whose patriotism will lead them to sponsor his research. Interestingly, it is done through an 
animated sequence with the famous figure of Woody Woodpecker. The animated demonstration 
reduces the real event of Moon landing in the storyworld to a speculated idea while the film itself 
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22 The film also features major elements that would later be taken up and made well known by other SF 
blockbusters. The opening credit, for instance, is conducted in the manner of a crawling carpet that disappears at the 
vanishing point, a clear and reputed signature of the later Star Wars series.  
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acts as much more of an embodied simulation that sets up the world-experience for the spectator. 
The laughable experience of Woody the Woodpecker in the embedded animation has thus been 
realistically rendered when the situation happens to the character-astronauts in the filmic reality. 
In this way, the film can be seen as a mise-en-abyme of the move from the speculative to the 
embodied traditions of SF filmmaking. 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Destination Moon helped build up the mood in 
the general public for the coming of the Space Race. The Cold War atmosphere, or horizon, was 
set up when the spectators watched the film, more than seven years before the successful launch 
of Sputnik-1, the first artificial celestial object to be sent up in orbit. The beeping sound coming 
back from its broadcasting radio was heard worldwide and it stirred up a public terror in the 
West. What followed this “Sputnik Crisis” bore striking resemblance to the imaginary events 
told in Destination Moon, making the film both a prediction of and a preamble to the real Space 
Race. The film is quite ahead of its time not only in its conceptualization of the Space Race but 
also in its proposition to open Space industries to private companies and capitals. Given the 
rather successful achievement today in both research and commercial applications of Space 
technologies by private companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Bigelow, businessmen like 
Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Robert Bigelow have indeed come to embody the main spirit of this 
film. But at the same time, it has to be noted that they also seem to carry on a Cold War 
mentality to race and colonize, which I will further explicate in Chapter three.23 
In addition to the thematic and content-related approach, these Space exploration SF films 
equally contribute to the horizontal expansion of real Space experience through the form of 
cinematic expression. This is done in mainly two aspects: the establishment of the visual codes 
(the semantics) and the construction of the syntagmas (the syntax).  
Frau im Mond is again the first to offer a concrete example of what a future spaceship, the 
Moon, and Space exploration would look like. The appearance of the Friede rocket has become 

23 Despite its deeply entrenched Cold War ideologies, Destination Moon is true to the spirit of Space technologies 
pioneered by Frau im Mond, and itself in turn becomes a source of inspiration for later Space (rescue) films, such as 
Marooned (1969), Apollo 13 (1995), Salyut 7 (2017) and other contemporary SF dramas such as Gravity (2013) and 
The Martian (2015). 
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the icon for human Space travel, an archetype for almost all rockets to follow. The upper part of 
the towering giant inherits the look of a bullet but the lower part is attached by four fixed wings 
which function both as supporting feet when it is standing still on the ground and as devices to 
facilitate airflow and stabilize the rocket-body when it is flying. The look was taken up by the 
real rocket engineers who worked on experimental models and later on the V-2 rocket for the 
Nazi regime. Dieter Huzel’s statement quoted earlier can thus be seen as evidence for the lineage 
in appearance between the Friede and the V-2. This very look of the rocket is also used in films 
like Destination Moon where the designers give it a more streamlined and elongated shape. 
Coupled with scientific experiments, later developments in rocket industries retain the basic 
shape of the Friede and add modifications according to a variety of specific needs. If we compare 
the major rocket types used in the Space Race by both the Soviets and the U.S. (see Figure 1.1), 
it would not be difficult to see that all of them are indebted to the original Friede from Frau im 
Mond in varying degrees. The launch pads and the service structures are also decidedly modeled 
after the original designs appearing in Frau im Mond (see also Figure 1.2). 
  
  
Figure 1.2 Screenshot of Friede in Frau im Mond (upper-left) ©Ufa, screenshot from Destination Moon (upper-right) 
©Eagle-Lion, screenshot of Saturn V in NASA’s “The Journeys of Apollo” in 1969 (lower-left) ©NASA, and 
screenshot of Soviet’s R-7 in documentary footage used by BBC’s docudrama Space Race (lower-right) ©BBC 
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With regards to syntagmas, the launch scene in Frau im Mond starts with a series of aerial 
shots of the rocket facilities, though this is achieved with the help of miniature models. The 
segment is followed by a series of shots (from long shot to medium shot) of the rocket as it is 
being prepared for lift-off, crosscut with shots of the press and onlookers. Then, we are shown 
several establishing shots of the launch complex from a ground view: the spectator’s boxes, the 
vehicle assembly building, the rail tracks for transporting the rocket from the assembly building 
to the launch pad, and the service structure that holds the rocket still before ignition. The film is 
silent, and the images are constantly accompanied by intertitles providing description of the 
rocket and the launch status. This is a feature that has been absorbed and has become standard 
for modern television broadcasts of rocket launches. The words representing the voice of a radio 
commentator continues until the start of countdown for lift-off. When the engine ignites, shots 
featuring spectators are given as reaction-shots, implying the movement of the rapidly rising 
rocket. The lack of a tracking telephoto system is thus solved by the use of cut-aways and 
off-screen space. Later films and television programmers so frequently employ such a sequence 
of images (and sounds) that the combination of these shots (and sounds) have gradually become 
stabilized and conventionalized. When many television stations broadcasted the launch of Apollo 
11, this sequence had already achieved an established status; it had been turned into a syntagma 
(or a syntax) specifically for the Space program. In a manner reminiscent of claims by Christian 
Metz24, we can say that the repeated uses of such a sequence from Frau im Mond have attached a 
certain truth-value to this syntagma. It has gained discursive power, a claim for the reality of the 
astronautic events it is depicting. In this way, Frau im Mond and its followers in Space 
exploration SF cinema have not only drawn on the scientific horizons of their time but have also 
contributed significant audiovisual elements and grammars to the horizon of our conception of 
Space programs and astronautic activities. 
Early Space exploration SF cinema has thus played a significant role not only in the history 
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24 In the essay “Problems of Denotation in the Fiction Film,” Metz develops his famous model for “La grande 
syntagmatique du film narratif.” He attempts to synthesize the most conventional syntagmas used in classical 
Hollywood cinema (Film Language 108-46).  
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of the genre of science fiction but also in the development of real science and technologies of 
Space and astronautics. They act as one of the most important driving forces to open up our 
horizons about the world. But ever since the live broadcast of the Moon landing by Neil 
Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin in 1969, this relation between film and reality has begun to change 
yet again. I turn to this issue in Chapter two.
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Chapter 2 
World Building in Contemporary Space Exploration SF Cinema 
The world is not the mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar and 
unfamiliar things that are just there. But neither is it a merely imagined framework 
added by our representation to the sum of such given things. The world worlds, and 
is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe 
ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that stands before us and can be 
seen. World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths of 
birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into Being. 
                   —— Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” 43 
Fritz Lang’s Frau im Mond plays the most significant role in connecting the early SF cinema 
to the modern one, pre-scientific fantasy about Space travel to scientific practices of such, and 
technophilic Romanticism to expansionist imperialism. In this way, Lang blazed the trail, set up 
a standard, and popularized the methods for the Space exploration SF films to come. However, 
this genealogy appears to be more complicated due to the interfusion of two horizons—the 
perceptual and the imaginary. Following Chapter one, I will start here with how modern Space 
programs have come into the public attention with the help of the recently available technologies 
of live television broadcasting. We will see how the latter has reversed the fictionally propelled 
Space imagination during the early days of SF cinema by establishing the recorded footage (and 
its form) as belonging to a scientific discourse of objectivity. This conventionalized audiovisual 
grammar will in turn be fully employed by contemporary Space exploration SF cinema. The 
chapter will explore how these contemporary films, aided by digital technologies and new 
cinematographic devices, incorporate such a discourse into the imaginary world-experience and 
how, by doing so, they push the horizon of Space and astronautics further.  
The concept of the “contemporary Space (exploration) SF cinema” is extremely 
underdeveloped, despite there being constant discussions around “contemporary SF cinema” on 
the Internet. I find it particularly exigent if we wish to focus on how this subgenre is inextricably 
tied up with scientific and technological developments. If it is still possible to compose a SF 
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story about some future society and aliens with little or no knowledge of contemporary science, 
the task of creating a Space exploration SF in a similar way is almost unthinkable today. This is 
in part due to the increasing worldwide reception of scientific knowledge about Space. As I have 
mentioned in the preceding chapter, the rapid development in the fields of modern rocketry and 
astronautics after World War II soon led to a U.S.-Soviet Space Race. At the same time, these 
militarily oriented programs also brought back images that people could never have imagined 
seeing, hence literally expanding the visual horizons of humankind.  
The CBS live broadcasts hosted by the legendary news anchor Walter Cronkite of the first 
Moon-landing totally revolutionized the world-experience of the general public. If scientific 
knowledge had already prepared people with a representation, an abstract picture of what landing 
on the Moon would be like (as shown in the simulated images in the first part of the televised 
program), this live broadcast, for the first time in human history, brought back photo-electronic 
moving images of humans on the Moon; it made the conceptual idea sensible to its audience, 
made the representation presentational. When Neil Armstrong was shown descending the ladder 
of the Eagle, the lunar module, and barely managing to set his foot on the surface of the Moon, 
the world (or our perceptual horizon) was no longer the same. Unlike fiction films whose staged 
nature was already widely absorbed by the audience, the new televisual technology turned 
imagination into reality. The televisual image showed the astronaut on the Moon, facing the 
camera, with one hand still holding the rail. It was superimposed by the caption “ARMSTRONG 
ON MOON,” which seemed to be more of verification than an explanation of the image, 
re-affirming (with a stress on each one of the letters) the impressions felt by the spectators 
toward this event: the sensorial experience of being there with Armstrong and the meaning of a 
human being reaching the mysterious satellite of Earth, which could otherwise only be seen from 
afar.1 The now famous quote “That’s one small step for [a] man, one giant leap for mankind” 
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1 Walter Cronkite, as the news anchor who covered extensively John F. Kennedy’s assassination, the Vietnam War, 
Martin Luther King Jr., the Watergate hearings, was treated as a spokesman of truth, and many media scholars 
regarded his news programs in the 60s and 70s as a ritualistic event that made watching his broadcasts a most 
trustworthy situation. Elihu Katz and Daniel Dayan argue that the “live broadcasts of great events [. . .] transform 
individuated and stratified masses into the communitas of whole societies. [. . .] They offer the audience a 
participatory role and propose the reintegration of society” (305). In a sense, the audience’s experience of 
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was thus made literal: with the help of the technology of live television broadcasting, the 
embodied vision of the camera became the extension of our bodies, the eye of our eyes, and the 
ear of our ears. The images, therefore, became part of our sensory experience and the world 
Armstrong visited expanded our world-experience and horizon.2  
In the aftermath of the Apollo missions, new Space programs within and without the United 
States enormously boosted the evolution of astronautic technologies. With the emergence of 
Space stations, ushered by the Soviet Salyut series beginning in the 1970s, and the Space shuttles, 
spearheaded by NASA since the 1980s, Space activities have produced images greatly different 
from those of the 1900s. Through the rapid distribution of mass communication media, the 
world-experience of Space underwent profound transformations. Today, with a simple click of a 
mouse, one can access on YouTube live streaming videos from cameras mounted on the 
International Space Station. Channels such as “Space & Universe” (NASA’s official affiliated 
network partner) have nearly 24 hour live streaming of images coming from those cameras. In a 
sense, viewing Earth from Space has become an activity almost comparable to checking out 
one’s own backyard.3  
Living in such an age, spectators cannot be satisfied with Space films constructed through 
Mélièsian tricks. The appetite for cinematic renderings of believable and immersive Space 
adventures has led the film industry and SF filmmakers to readjust the genre’s position. The 
major concern of this chapter revolves around the influence that the widely spread knowledge 
about astrophysics (even at a basic level) and Space images already absorbed as an extended 
world-experience have had on the contemporary SF world building practices. While the 
interaction between the film industry and the Space industry, as seen in the case of Lang’s Frau 
im Mond, is still undeniably present, contemporary cinematic images and sounds of Space are 
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“not-being-there” in their viewing of the live television programs actually is “more, somehow, than that of being 
there;” it offers a “sense of occasion” (308-09, original emphasis). Hence, as a narrator of the history, Walter 
Cronkite helped made the live images of the event believable and even affectively sensible. A critique of this can be 
found in Susan G. Davis’s review of Dayan and Katz’s book.  
2 The audiovisual expansion of horizon takes place directly on our perception, while pre-photographic (written and 
oral) documents can only expand our conceptual horizon. I will discuss more on this issue in the Conclusion. 
3 The embedded issue of such “world-images” will be addressed in the next chapter as I turn from the 
phenomenological senses of Space images to that of our conceptions of life and Earth.  
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greatly indebted to the proliferation of visual and auditory experiences conferred by real Space 
activities.  
Viewed against the scientific/televisual images of Space programs, contemporary Space 
exploration SF films appear to have converged toward the same aesthetics—what I shall call 
“embodied science fiction realism”. In Chapter one, I have expounded on the two distinct 
approaches to Space SF world building: the speculative tradition ushered by Méliès and the 
embodied tradition that began with Lang’s enthusiasm for real rocketry and astronautic sciences. 
One thing that slightly complicates matters here is that the embodied method does not entirely 
discard the speculative ways of cinematic display. That is, even though such films seek a look 
that makes them almost indistinguishable from non-fictional scientific or documentary footage of 
Space, they still strive to offer viewers a spectacle. As a result, the products of the embodied 
method usually end up as a “synthesis” of the two approaches, providing the spectators with a 
scientific spectacle, one that does not only function as an attraction but also, and more 
significantly, as a subliminal wonder. As I have said, the shift can also be viewed as one that 
goes from cinema as spectacle to cinema as world, from fragmentary spectacles to immersive 
ones. To achieve this, two major aspects of formal construction have to be carefully managed: 
the scientifically informed realism of image and sound, and the embodied experience of S/space.  
Footage of Science and Footage of Fiction 
Space exploration SF films try as much as possible to call on real science and put great 
efforts in reproducing the audiovisual qualities of scientifically made or sanctioned documentary 
footage. This feature is however somewhat tricky, since Darko Suvin has famously defined 
Science Fiction as a genre of “cognitive estrangement” and hence distinct from “realistic” 
traditions (375). But it is important to note that Suvin’s definition relies on an additional 
condition, according to which, SF lies somewhere between positivist naturalist accounts and the 
other fantastical genres. SF usually “introduces into the old empirical context only one easily 
digestible new technological variable” (“Poetics” 376; original emphasis). While the actual 
 	
situation sometimes cannot be captured by Suvin’s definition against realism, it is usually 
consistent with this additional statement. Without going into too much detail in the discussion 
over realism, which I am sure deserves a proper treatment in another thesis, I will focus now on 
explaining what I mean by “embodied science fiction realism”.  
If I may quote Susan Sontag as a testimony for what SF films were like during the 1950s and 
1960s, we can see a clear contrast between those films and our contemporary Space exploration 
SF.4 Sontag regarded the SF cinema of that era as an excellent response to a two-sided fear: one 
for “unremitting banality” and the other for “inconceivable terror.” Hence, SF films either help 
us to “escape” the boredom or “inure” us to unbearable disaster (42). They were not so much 
about science than about morality: the technology is beneficent (or at least neutral) while the 
“errant individual will of a lone intellectual” is poisonous (48). The point is that simplified 
morals always surpassed the interest for science in those early post-war SFs while technology 
was mainly responsible for spectacles. In comparison, a particular string of Space SF films led to 
an alternative path. Destination Moon, as I have mentioned, was a rare precursor that appeared 
before the inundation of SF blockbusters that dominated the 50s and 60s. It was not until the end 
of the 1960s that this subgenre really gained its ground. 1968 saw Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A 
Space Odyssey and a year later Marooned was released immediately following the live broadcast 
of Armstrong’s and Aldrin’s landing on the Moon. However, these are not yet what can be 
properly called “embodied science fiction realism” for their rendering of Space as well as Space 
travel is still largely speculative and not yet embodiedly immersive as their counterparts today.5  
Despite an interruption by the disembodied world building practices pervasive in the 1960s 
and 1970s which deviated from Lang’s tradition by emphasizing the lack of depth and spatiality 
of the emerging cyber technology, contemporary Space exploration SF films appear to have 
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4 I have to emphasize again that what I am dwelling on in this thesis is the Space exploration SF film. I am not 
referring here to other SF films or SF literature that only use Space as a backdrop. For instance, Space operas such 
as Star Wars series or Star Trek series are typically not concerned with currently available or highly potential 
scientific understanding of Space and astronautics, wherefore I exclude them from the category treated in this 
chapter. In a slightly self-confusing manner, Space exploration SF films are actually more akin to other Space 
exploration (non-SF) films, both fictional and documentary.  
5 I will elaborate further on this when I discuss in Chapter three embodied science fiction realism’s relation to the 
world-picture and why it was not possible to speak of it before Apollo 11’s Moon landing.  
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inherited more directly the scientific rigor and limited cognitive estrangement popular in the 
earlier films from the 1950s and 60s. The re-emergence of serious Space exploration films such 
as 2010: The Year We Make Contact, sequel to Kubrick’s 2001, in 1985, Apollo 13 in 1995, 
Contact in 1997, Deep Impact in 1998, Mission to Mars in 2000, etc. all go back to the rich 
resources of the earlier tradition of Frau im Mond. Robert Zemeckis’s Contact, for instance, was 
even reputed for the direct participation of Carl Sagan, one of the better known astrophysicists 
and science writers of modern times, ensuring that the film offered a rigorous engagement with 
astrophysics, while at the same time embodying some of its theories.  
The reignited interest in Space exploration had everything to do with the newly operational 
Hubble Space Telescope (launched in 1990) and a much better knowledge of our Solar System 
thanks to the help of manmade Space probes. Inspired by the picture of Earth as a small blue dot 
sent back by the Space probe Voyager 1 as it was leaving the Solar System on February 14, 1990, 
Carl Sagan’s 1994 book Pale Blue Dot, which was written in a poetical way, reflects on our 
humanity, on history, and on the universe. Both Sagan and his book played a central role in this 
renewed enthusiasm, which in turn called for an update in SF cinema’s world building practices.  
As I have mentioned, television/digital live footage of real Space and astronautic activities 
have profoundly transformed the world-experience and horizon of the general population. 
Speculative moving images are no longer believable if they do not conform to the images 
brought back from Space. Against such an atmosphere, the 1969 live images of the Moon 
landing have not only expanded our horizons, they have also dominated and sanctioned the “look” 
of Space ever since. As our extended sensory organ, the audio-visual experience of Space 
becomes the proper fact of the real Space. So long as Space travel is limited to specially trained 
personnel, such dominance will last because of the truth-value it entails. Thus, the baseline or the 
“zero world” as Suvin calls it (“Poetics” 377) is no longer the perceptual world as such, but 
rather the world-experience given through the very first astronautic images.  
There is not much work done on the construction of such images and sounds within the 
scientific and astronautic realm, but the “Curious Droid” channel on YouTube did brilliant 
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research and presentation, detailing technological developments in the recording equipment in 
Space programs.6 The team has traced the modern day rocket launch video aesthetics to the 
early days of rocket tests in Germany, where the recordings of the launch were not intended to 
awe audiences but to help researchers and technicians in identifying problems and keeping track 
of the conditions of each launch. This activity, started when Walter Bruch developed the world’s 
first CCTV system at the missile facility at Peenemünde in Germany, evolved into two different 
kinds of techniques: on the one hand, the camera technology developed from hand-held/cranked 
devices housed in nearby bunkers—an extremely dangerous work—to modified cameras 
(developed by Clyde Holliday) that can withstand the shock and be fitted onto the body of a V-2 
rocket, and finally to live TV broadcast equipment that can transmit the images immediately 
back to Earth while being remotely controlled. On the other hand, tracking systems grew from 
the photo-sonic platform “Bright Eyes,” a track-and-shoot device based on an M-45 anti-aircraft 
cannon (developed by Clyde Tombaugh in 1946 at the White Sand testing ground in the United 
States), to the modern day Contraves Kineto-Tracking Mount (KTM), a remotely operated 
system capable of filming the lift offs of Space shuttles, and to the more recent Recording 
Optical Tracking Instrument (ROTI) upgrading the focal length and extending the tracking of the 
rocket up to more than five minutes after lift-off.7  
Hence, we observe in the early astronautic activities two major approaches for producing 
documentary images of rockets. The first offers both a close-up of the rocket and a view from the 
rocket. Shockproof cameras are installed throughout the service structure that surrounds and 
supports the rocket before the launch, providing a multi-angle coverage of the lift-off. The 
images captured by such cameras (namely the structure’s releasing of the rocket, usually 
accompanied with huge smog rising from the bottom; the slow motion bird’s eye view of the 
rocket lifting off; and the low angle view from the launch pad of the rocket’s ignition, frequently 
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6 This video essay entitled “How did NASA get those great film shots of Apollo and the Shuttle?” by “Curious 
Droid” can be found on YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BlPfHV36G-g> The channel “Curious 
Droid” is famous for its in-depth research and the almost academic quality of its video essays. 
7 The extended tracking shot offers a telephoto visual experience of a rapidly rising rocket, although it is rare for 
fiction films to retain the entire duration of rockets’ trajectories. 
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with the nozzles gradually enshrined by the flame) have become stereotypical images in today’s 
television broadcasts of rocket launches. These images are, moreover, almost always 
accompanied or preceded by a countdown through voice-over. Inversely, when cameras are 
attached to or fitted onto the body of the rocket, the images display the view from the rocket. 
Sometimes, they show the launch pad covered in smog and receding as the rocket lifts off, or 
else the ground structures are seen left behind (an example of which is the famous 1946 V-2 
images of Earth I mentioned). Other times, what we see are images of the rocket body/space 
shuttle against the sky, or even the interior view of the rocket vehicle jettisoning its first-stage 
booster and the separation between rocket and payload. In addition to the first technique, the 
second one consists of establishing shots as well as tracking shots. The tracking system stationed 
at some distance from the launch pad is able to provide a clear view of the entire launch facility: 
the testing ground, the sky, the launch complex, the service structure, and the rocket. After the 
lift-off, the tracking shot usually retains the rocket at the center of the frame, with the image 
slightly shaking before the accelerating rocket vanishes completely from the view.  
These views, when combined into a sequence, resonate in part with the tradition set forth by 
Lang’s Frau im Mond, although Lang shot the segment using miniature models. Live television 
broadcasts of rocket and space shuttle lift-offs in turn conventionalized such segments into a 
fairly strict audiovisual syntax. Such segment, once conventionalized, can generate a sense of 
reality corroborated by science. An early example comes from the live broadcast of the Apollo 
11 mission. In the 20th anniversary special program produced in 1989, NBC News released the 
original footage of the lift-off taken on July 16, 1969 covering from ten minutes before lift-off 
(or T-10min as it is technically called) all the way to 6 minutes after it (T+6min). The sequence 
starts with several establishing shots of the Launch Complex 39 at the Kennedy Space Center 
(with and without journalists present in the foreground), followed by a closer shot of the launch 
complex. The images then crosscut with a high-angle shot overlooking the interior of the mission 
control center with staff and personnel each minding their own tasks at stations tidily lined up. 
Alternating with it are some telephoto close-ups of the upper part of the service structure and the 
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massive Saturn-V rocket where the Apollo spacecraft is located. The lift-off begins with an 
alternating montage consisting of establishing shots of the ignition illustrated by the rising flame 
and telephoto close-ups of the flame that starts to devour the lower part of the rocket. We see 
enormous smoke rising from the bottom, covering part of the view of the rocket. Following that 
is the establishing shot of the lift-off and a series of close-ups of the rising rocket with 
fragmentary materials falling off its body (see Figure 2.3 for reference), taken by anti-shock 
CCTV cameras installed on the service structure. The sequence ends with images where the 
tracking system fixes the rapidly rising rocket in the center of the frame, showing the rocket 
piercing through clouds and finally vanishing from sight. The images are accompanied 
throughout by a superimposed subtitle indicating the countdown towards the launch time, the 
caption of the program, and a slightly vague and indistinct voice-over coming from an intercom 
system that describes the ongoing procedures. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Snapshots from NBC’s live broadcast of the Launch of Apollo 11 in 1969 (left) ©NBC and snapshots 
from NASA’s footage of the launch of space shuttle Atlantis for STS-129 in 2009 (right) ©NASA 
A somehow standardized visual syntax and its related visual codes are clearly discernible by 
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comparing television footage of different eras (see Figure 2.1). The realistic effect of rocket 
launches and of Space travel was thus achieved and formalized through the condensation of 
those images and sounds in an audiovisual language taken up for real scientific and documentary 
purposes.  
The pervasiveness of such audiovisual standardization can be easily recognized in modern 
Space films such as Apollo 13, Interstellar, The Martian, and Salyut-7, etc. It follows that the 
impression of reality of Space exploration (SF) cinema does not only rely on the truthfulness of 
the scientific knowledge referenced, but also on the look (and sound) the film can offer, i.e., the 
perceptual experience it affords. This is especially the case for those who are not experts in the 
field of Space exploration and do not possess first-hand knowledge of Space travel.  
In his famous essay on film tricks (or “trucage” as he calls them), Christian Metz argues that 
it is difficult to pin down the boundary between a trucage and optical effects that function merely 
as grammatical markers. Some of the optical effects we now regard as belonging to the 
punctuation system (hence the syntax) of cinema used to be effects (trucage). The change is 
usually a result of trucages being stabilized and turned into unnoticeable conventions by the 
“force of habit” (“Trucage” 666). Interestingly, what we see in contemporary Space exploration 
SF films such as Gravity and Interstellar can be regarded as a unique way of appropriating such 
tricks. In these two films, the invisible trucages (both CGI and traditional) are used in a way to 
exploit the conventionalized visual traits of television broadcasts and documentaries of 
contemporary astronautic activities, so as to achieve ultra-realistic effects.8 The fact we take 
much of the film’s Space exploration segments to be shot realistically is due in good measure to 
the visual syntagmas (i.e., the broadcast sequences of conventional astronautic events) and the 
look (i.e., the appearance of Space above the atmosphere as well as the look of astronautic 
vehicles, equipment, and apparel) used in constructing the experience of Space travel. Both the 

8 In his essay, Metz distinguishes “imperceptible trucages” from “invisible” ones in that the former involve tricks 
that are not noticeable to the audience, such as the use of stunt man, while the latter tricks are sensible but cannot be 
located by the audience (“Trucage” 663-64). Gravity and Interstellar are conceived as fiction films, hence, 
spectators do expect the use of tricks in portraying sequences that take place in Space, but due to their resemblance 
to scientific and documentary footage the tricks nonetheless remain invisible. In this way, the films achieve the 
realistic effect of Space exploration. 
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syntagma and the look (as well as sound) have now been widely accepted and established as 
conventional audiovisual rendering of what real astronautic activities feel like. As long as the 
majority of spectators still cannot travel in Space and experience a Space flight first hand, these 
established tropes can continue to realistically stand in for such events.9 In a sense, they are the 
reality. As spectators, we only know such cinematic events are fiction if prominent fictional 
elements emerge, such as the presence of well-known film stars, non-existing technologies, 
currently impossible events, etc. Many effects are thus sensible but remain invisible in the film.  
 
Figure 2.2 Screenshot from Interstellar (left) ©Paramount Pictures and snapshot from Apollo 4’s footage of the first 
stage separation (right) ©NASA 
 
Figure 2.3 Screenshot from Interstellar (left) ©Paramount Pictures and snapshot from Apollo 11’s lift-off footage 
(right) ©NASA 
As can be seen from similarities in the above images (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3), Interstellar 
and many other contemporary Space SF films make full use of these audiovisual syntagmas and 
visual codes that have been conventionalized through years of television broadcasts. The fiction, 
in this manner, simulates what real scientific and astronautic events look like and even emulates 

9 Hans Blumenberg names such an effect of experiencing Space without really having been there “astroneotics” as 
opposed to “astronautics” (Vollzähligkeit 548). As we can tell from the word, the noesis takes the place of nautes, 
hence making such experience a purely mental activity in contrast to the astronaut’s real embodied experience in 
Space. See also Lazier’s comments on Blumenberg’s concept (620). 
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them qualitatively. The effects, or trucages, used here are rendered almost indistinguishable from 
non-fictional documentary footage, hence establishing an invisible trucage. Since the 
documentary footage is itself image and mediated rather than directly perceived, it calls into 
question the “baseline” (or “zero world” as Suvin calls it) of the photographic image that is used 
by spectators as a standard for separating special effects from non-effect images in a film. 
Usually, spectators can identify the nonrealistic elements in a film by comparing them to 
non-effect photographic images of ordinary events. In this way, such nonrealistic elements are 
understood to be the products of special effects. The situation of Space exploration is unique 
because few spectators have first-hand experience of it. Their audiovisual experience based on 
previous documentary footage is the only reality of Space activities they can refer to. Because 
Space exploration SF films and non-fictional documentary footage share the same medium, and 
now even the same visual codes and syntagmas, it can be almost impossible for spectators to 
differentiate the two. While such a situation is not entirely obvious in Interstellar as Nolan is 
using the visual codes and syntagmas only to supplement the main plot of interstellar travel, 
Cuarón pushes the limits further in making of Gravity.  
 





Figure 2.5 Screenshot from Hubble (lower) © IMAX and Warner Bros. 
In Gravity, the CGI animation that makes up the major portion of the film greatly obscures 
the boundary between effects and (pure) cinematography. According to the information provided 
by the production team,10 computer imaging is responsible for almost 80% of the film, and in 
some space-walk scenes, Sandra Bullock’s face ends up being the only photographic image in 
the final cut (Extra from Gravity’s Blu-Ray). The production team preprogramed an animation 
that details all the camerawork required for the actual shooting, the “Previs” (a low-resolution 
animated version of the film, serving as a sketch and blueprint), the “Prelight” (i.e., lighting 
designed for all sequences), the “Pre-DI” (i.e., coloring and timing), and the “Techvis” (i.e., the 
type of devices, the angles, the moving trajectories, the speed and so on). The data was then 
entered into the performing platform where the performers acted without actually moving. 
Instead, it was the computer-driven cameras that moved and performed acrobatics on a 12-wire 
motion control rig according to the preprogrammed trajectories (B 42). The platform was 
surrounded by a light box (which is a LED box), which the team designed to provide digitally 
controllable lighting that could change according to the camerawork and facilitate the 
immersiveness for the performers. It displayed a previsualized environment that corresponded to 

10 Both in interviews and the making-of extras provided in the DVD and Blu-ray disks, the production team reveal 
that a huge proportion is produced by CGI and animation-initiated cinematography and lighting. They regard such 
practices as a great innovation in film industry and for special effects. See B, Giardina 30, Giardina and Kit 85, 




what the characters are actually seeing in the storyworld and at the same time provided constant 
lighting throughout the shooting according to the programed plans. The images captured by the 
acrobatic cameras were then modified by software and synthesized with photorealistic animation 
that added to the images details of the spacesuits, the visor and its reflection, the spacecraft, the 
surface of Earth, and almost everything else seen in the film. Needless to mention, the CGI is 
also responsible for most of the lens flares and chromatic aberrations we see in the images so that 
spectators can be tricked into believing that the film is made photographically (48). Animation, 
or trucage, takes the lead in the making of Gravity, while the quality of (pure) cinematography 
becomes an effect to be reached (see Figure 2.4 and 2.5 above). Not surprisingly, the 
cinematographer Emmanuel “Chivo” Lubezki concluded that “[i]n the process [of filming], [he] 
had to learn to use some new tools that are part of what cinematography is becoming” (37). 
Despite the publicity of Nolan’s adamant insistence on using more traditional methods and 
non-digital equipment, a similar situation is equally noticeable in Interstellar where the 
production team had to digitally construct the mind-blowing images of the wormhole and the 
black hole. Astrophysicist and Nobel laureate Kip Thorne was invited to counsel on the CGI 
visualization of the cosmic objects. In a way reminiscent of Fritz Lang in 1929, the film industry 
once again interacted with and funded scientific research in astronomy. As a result, the special 
effects team even published articles on the film’s visualizing process in American Journal of 
Physics and Classical and Quantum Gravity. The use of CGI offered an opportunity to make 
abstract theories into something sensible, and, moreover, to explore how the wormhole’s 
parameters influence what the camera can see in that particular position of embodied space 
(James et al., “Visualizing” 486). It also helps to investigate what the “gravitational lensing” 
would be like if the camera were positioned very close to the spinning black whole (James et al. 
“Gravitational Lensing”). The film, thus, functions also to some extent as a large screen 
simulation for theoretical astrophysics. 
In terms of sound, the filmmakers have invested an equal amount of effort in securing the 
phenomenological sensation of Space that conforms to scientific claims. Sound is not heard in 
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Space, as both the advertising campaign for Alien (1979) and modern astrophysics have told us, 
because sound waves cannot be transmitted in the vacuum of Space. The filmmakers of Gravity 
have therefore opted to restrict directly audible diegetic sounds to interior spaces that are 
air-filled: the radio-transmitted conversation we hear inside the characters’ helmets, the radio 
communication between Dr. Ryan Stone (Sandra Bullock) and an unknown source on Earth 
inside the Soyuz spacecraft, the rustlings of suits and objects, and other sounds that emerge from 
interactions in the interior of the Space Station. It is strictly maintained that all exterior activities 
are not directly presented by sound11. To better reproduce the auditory experience of Space, 
Glenn Freemantle, the film’s sound designer, decided to use vibrations, such as touch and bodily 
collision, as a medium for the sound track (Extras from Gravity’s Blu-Ray). Consequently, when 
Dr. Stone escapes the Soyuz and approaches the Tiangong Space Station, the fire extinguisher 
she uses as a thruster is not heard. However, her collision with a solar panel in that scene is 
vividly expressed on the sound track by deep rumbling sounds that mimic the vibration inside 
one’s body passing through the bones. Simultaneously, these vibrations are also transmitted to 
spectators through those of the seats. The Dolby Atmos system has rendered it well, by 
producing a dense and powerful sound wave that shakes the theater seats (in a manner similar to 
how we usually experience explosion scenes). Besides this, other sound effects, such as 
scrapings or explosions are recorded literally through vibratory sound (Bender). In so doing, the 
film not only complies with astrophysical phenomena but perhaps can also be used for 
pedagogical purposes. 
As for Interstellar, apart from the almost constantly present atmospheric music composed by 
Hans Zimmer, a scientific treatment of sound effects is also prominent. One particularly 
memorable scene for such sound effects takes place about two hours into the film when Dr. 
Mann (Matt Damon) attempts to dock Endurance, the mother ship, before the other characters 
wishing to abort the mission, catch up and stop him. The sequence is intense. It intercuts between 

11 However, despite such efforts by the filmmakers, it can still be noticed that the diegetic events are usually 
accompanied by atmospheric scores and other synthesized sound effects that enhance the emotional intensity and 
thus act almost as diegetic sound. 
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Dr. Mann who steals the Ranger shuttle, trying to dock Endurance and Cooper and Dr. Brand 
who pursue Dr. Mann onboard the Lander, attempting to stop him. The close-ups of Dr. Mann’s 
attempted docking are taken from an exterior perspective and deliberately done without the 
sound of the clashing metal. These close-up sequences create a series of breath-taking moments 
inside the rapid and intense rhythm of the alternating montage: the repeated warnings Cooper 
gives to Dr. Mann—“Do not attempt docking”— intervenes the musical score, while the gaps 
between each of Cooper’s warnings match up with the constantly repeating motif of the score (a 
same duple-meter bar repeating itself) that Zimmer composed to resemble human heartbeats. 
Thus, the beat of the music and the sound gradually affect the spectators’ breathing, leading to 
their synchronization, and at the same time enacting a feeling of nervousness. Scientific spirit 
here matches perfectly with aesthetic creativity.12  
Thus viewed, both films have literally been turned into “vast trucages” (Metz, “Trucage” 
670). Of course, what Metz means by this term is the idea that cinema in general is trucage. 
Without endorsing such an extreme position, I do find many digitally produced Space 
exploration films to be literal trucages for the most part. What Gravity and Interstellar have 
achieved is an ultra-realistic effect of Space exploration because the shared visual codes and 
syntagmas produce in them an audiovisual experience that is continuous with the experience we 
have when watching a NASA documentary. With the increasing use of CGI, computerized and 
preprogrammed cinematography and lighting, Space exploration cinema has been transforming 
itself into an apparatus of effects that exploits visual conventions and syntax to mimic their 
non-fictional counterparts.  

12 A similar and equally brilliant case can be found in Kubrick’s 2001 when David Bowman (Keir Dullea) manages 
to return to the spacecraft Discovery One (after being denied by the AI, Hal 9000) by manually opening the hatch. 
The sequence focuses on the moment before Bowman ejects the explosive door of his EVA (extra-vehicular activity) 
pod when the character pauses and tries to gather enough oxygen in his lung. Spectators expect a blow, a huge and 
thundering sound that would follow the shot. But it is denied. The next shot is remarkably done in total silence. We 
see the door explodes, sending Bowman into the interior space of the airlock in the spaceship, hitting the walls, and 
finally managing to stabilize himself by holding onto the rail and shutting down the hatch. Not until the door is shut 
and the space is filled with air can we begin to hear sound. Kubrick has succeeded in building a deceptive 
expectation in the audience that is only to be corrected later as a surprise, while such a surprise, spectators finally 
realize, actually conforms to science. 
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Embodied World-Experience and Spatiality 
In addition to the visual codes and syntagmas, contemporary Space exploration SF films also 
endeavor to create a sense of real spatiality. Both visual and auditory elements participate in such 
a construction. Despite the already pervasive use of visual codes and syntagmas from lift-off 
footage, the early day Space exploration SF films still largely conform to the relatively static 
camerawork used in classical Hollywood cinema. In terms of their representation of Space travel, 
the interior scene of the rocket/spacecraft, and the alien environment, films made prior to 2001: 
A Space Odyssey deviated little from the standard set by Fritz Lang in the late 1920s. Space 
travel happened almost entirely inside the spaceship, the crew was usually depicted as tied up to 
their bunks in a similar way to people travelling in boats or in sleeping cars on trains. Views of 
Space outside the window were extremely restricted. Most significantly—due largely to 
technological limits—the weightlessness or zero-G effect was more frequently stated through 
dialogues than presented audiovisually through performance, cinematography, and sound. All 
these aspects of the depiction of Space travel are very different today.  
Yet, the evolution of the cinematographic and auditory aesthetics in SF cinema is rather 
complicated. As mentioned above, the aesthetics of today’s Space exploration SF films is neither 
a straightforward development from the embodied traditions of Lang nor an absolute 
abandonment of the speculative methods of Méliès. In the last chapter of Screening Space added 
for the 1987 enlarged edition, Vivian Sobchack summarizes that Space travel in films of the 
1950s had “an aggressive and three-dimensional thrust—whether it was narrativized as 
optimistic, colonial, and phallic penetration and conquest or as pessimistic and paranoid earthly 
and bodily invasion” (226). The situation, however, changed rapidly with a certain loss of 
interest in Space travel (and Space) during the 1970s and 80s. With the emergence of video and 
personal computers, Sobchack contends, the change in technology led directly to the change in 
our “contemporary ‘sense’ of time and space,” which in turn transformed the SF cinematic 
aesthetics of the age (223). Whereas in SF films of the 1950s space was presented as “deep” and 
time as “accelerating and ‘urgent’,” the emerging electronic technologies in the 1970s overturned 
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such conceptions.  
[S]pace became semantically inscribed as inescapably domestic and crowded. Time lost 
its urgency—statistically stretching forward toward an impoverished and unwelcome 
future worse than a bad present. Pointing to the dystopian despair of a country negatively 
involved in both domestic and international contestation and unable to avoid its 
representation in constant and pervasive media imagery. (226) 
Today’s [1970s-80s] SF film evidences a structural and visual willingness to linger on 
“random” details, takes a certain pleasure (or, as the French put it, “jouissance”) in 
holding the moment to sensually engage its surfaces, to embrace its material collections 
as “happenings” and collage. Indeed, both playfulness and pleasure are cinematic 
qualities new to SF in the late ’70s and the ’80s, replacing the cool, detached, and 
scientific vision authenticating the fictions of its generic predecessors. (228) 
As a result, Sobchack concludes, “Space is now more often a ‘text’ than a context” (232). 
There seemed to be a tendency to align Space with cyberspace in the years when digital and 
other electronic technologies started to invade and pervade people’s everyday world-horizon. In 
this vein, enthusiasm in the embodied three-dimensional Space gave way to a frenzy of virtual 
space that is two-dimensional and omnipresent, and for a certain period of time in the 1970s and 
80s, interest in the exploration of virtual reality replaced that of real Space (as can be seen in 
films such as Tron in 1982).  
Now, almost twenty years into the 21st century, Sobchack’s conclusions regarding SF 
cinema of the 1980s require updating. The increasing tendency since the 1990s, as I mentioned 
earlier, has signaled a return to the embodied tradition inaugurated by Frau im Mond, both in 
numbers and in phenomenological quality. Recent films have developed a particular focus on the 
experience instead of the goals of Space travel and extraterrestrial activities.13 If earlier films 
such as Forbidden Planet (1956) mainly employed the alien planet as an exotic location (or 
unimportant background) for the (psychoanalytically flavored) story to unfold, recent films take 
Space and extraterrestrial environment as one of the central focuses. The very world-experience 
is one of the major things these films want their spectators to arrive at. Diverse though their 

13 In an interview, Cuarón comments on his emphasis on affect created by camerawork as parallel to an interest in 
the story, “the story is like the cinematography, the sound, the acting and the color. They are tools for cinema, and 
what you have to serve is cinema, not story” (B 41).  
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themes may be—Space colonization tales like Avatar (2009), Moon (2009), District 9 (2009), 
Elysium (2013) and The Martian (2015), Space exploration films such as Mission to Mars (2000), 
Solaris (2002), Prometheus (2012), Gravity (2013), Interstellar (2014), and Passengers 
(2016)—these films all share an interest in building world-experience, which was lacking in Le 
Voyage dans la lune and Aelita, but was crucial since Frau im Mond. In all these recent films, 
one can indeed perceive some prominent traces of and development from earlier attempts in 
Frau im Mond, Destination Moon, and Marooned, in the way they seek to construct an 
immersive S/space all the while provoking strong affective resonance toward them.  
In fact, one of the most significant achievements in contemporary Space exploration SF 
cinema is its ultra-realistic constitution of S/space. It is at once an act of constructing (outer) 
Space and an exploration seeking to create the sense of space through spectators’ kinaesthetic 
resonance. That is, these recent films have created for spectators a world-horizon that they take 
up by kinaesthetically (and virtually) feeling it. This tendency in contemporary Space 
exploration SF cinema is directed at experiments with what audiovisual media can accomplish 
by maximizing spectators’ affect through (special) effects. Contrary to SF films in the 1980s, 
which Sobchack sees as the epitome of a sort of cinema where effects replace affect (Screening 
Space 285), the contemporary productions mentioned above reverse the trend and return instead 
to affectivity as their primary goal. I have to note, however, that these Space SF films do not 
represent the general trend in contemporary SF cinema. They follow an alternative path to other 
fantastical blockbusters, namely Space operas such as the Star Wars series. Nevertheless, their 
tendency of minimizing the perceptibility of effects and maximizing the affectivity of the film 
experience make them of particular interest to my research. These films (among which Gravity 
and Interstellar are prominent examples) are crucial for understanding the interactions between 
the subgenre of embodied SF, current astronautic activities, and the SF cinematic traditions. Such 
practices of experience building (or horizon shaping) involve development in both technologies 
and techniques. 
The development of digital cinema has hugely transformed the way images can be produced. 
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For instance, while Steadycam helped in solving problems relative to camera movements, digital 
technology takes a step further by greatly reducing the size of cameras without sacrificing image 
quality. An evident example can be found in point-of-view shots; the awkward camerawork in 
Lady in the Lake (1947) is now replaced with high definition images from a subjective 
perspective in Hardcore Henry (2015), made possible by wearable digital recording devices, 
namely GoPro cameras. The contemporary POV shot leaves behind the generally static bulkiness 
that resulted from the large and clumsy equipment of analog 35 mm cameras, replacing it with 
the mobile swiftness of new cameras. As a result, the image acquires a quality that better 
approximates what a person would see. Similarly, motion-control rigs enable filmmakers to 
accomplish acrobatic motions that are unthinkable for a human cinematographer, such as the 
extremely rapid movement of the camera going from a long shot to a close-up and back again, as 
shown in several sequences of Gravity. These shots are all software-programed and motion 
controlled via the rigs. Furthermore, commercial drones have made aerial cinematography much 
less costly and much easier to do, and submarine cinematographic equipment has become more 
affordable and has made location shooting more flexible.  
As I mentioned in the first section above, Gravity also makes use of an entirely new lighting 
system, which consists of a 20 by 20 feet LED light box. Such equipment “enable[s] the real 
faces to be lit by the very environments into which they [will] be inserted, ensuring a match 
between the real and virtual elements in the frame” (B 44). According to Emmanuel Lubezki, 
Gravity’s cinematographer, the old method of using real light produces only one color, one tone 
at a time. In many circumstances for the shooting of Gravity, it would have been problematic to 
simulate a light source that is located hundreds of kilometers away from the character. With this 
new technology, the light box shows the animation of the environment so that all light sources 
are simulated at once and are easy to manipulate according to the needs of a given set-up. For 
instance, the very situation of Dr. Stone determines that she has to be lit by constantly changing 
sources: the sunlit side or the dark side of Earth, the reflection of the space shuttle, or the 
profound darkness of the vast universe. The team has also used such equipment to achieve 
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minute lighting details such as the particular light tones and color temperature when the 
characters are against the background of the Sahara desert—which produces a warmer color—or 
the Gulf of Mexico—whose reflection is cooler but with higher reflectance due to the oceanic 
water. 
These technologies are crucial for producing a believable and ultra-realistic Space, the 
low-Earth-orbit (LEO) Space to be specific. While these may be works mainly of trompe l’œil, 
the employment of such technologies in moving cinematography and its animated counterpart 
plays a truly essential role in phenomenologically enacting a sense of space in (outer) Space.  
The idea of simulating human experience by maximizing the potentiality of camera 
movement has been excessively explored in recent Space exploration films. What was hardly 
plausible at the time of Frau im Mond can now be effectively achieved. In Christopher Nolan’s 
Interstellar (2014), much of the camerawork is done by smoothly moving the IMAX camera 
back and forth in between the characters in a studio. To shoot the scenes inside the spaceship 
Endurance as well as the Rangers and the Landers, both cameras and actors are suspended by 
wires and lifted off the ground to simulate a sense of weightlessness. The highly mobile 
camerawork (even with a relatively heavy IMAX camera) is carried out smoothly by the 
cinematographer Hoyte van Hoytema, whether it stands beside, facing, or is following the 
characters. The camera, as if present in the very space, traverses and floats through it alongside 
the characters. Its manipulation is flexible enough to pursue the performers’ movement through 
the complex and compact structures of the spacecraft.  
Similarly, in the repeatedly lauded opening sequence of Gravity, the (virtual) camera starts 
with a distant view of the globe and then moves closer toward the Space shuttle Explorer. The 
approaching movement appears to be slow at first against the vast globe of Earth but starts to feel 
a little faster when the shuttle and the astronauts come into our sight. Note that this approaching 
move is not done straightforwardly by a normal zoom-in, but rather in a manner of floating that 
much resembles Commander Matt Kowalski’s (George Clooney) Space walk—which is yet to be 
revealed. When Kowalski floats past the point of view of the (virtual) camera and then around 
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the Hubble Space telescope only to appear again at the distant end in our field of vision, 
spectators are sure that the camera—which they recognize as the origin of the view—has 
somehow participated in this Space walk. Subsequently, the camera offers a view of Kowalski 
and mission specialist Sharif both conducting EVA and both rotating upside down in relation to 
the camera’s orientation. This is where the dizzy effect kicks in. With the characters’ movement, 
especially the spacewalking Kowalski’s constantly spinning and rotating motion, and the 
seemingly capsized space shuttle, the gaze begins to feel disoriented. The sound, which is 
designed to appear as if it were coming through the radio transmission, totally deprives 
spectators of the possibility of locating its source. It takes some time for spectators to confirm 
who is speaking and who is playing the music, increasing the confusion. The revealing of the 
Hubble Space telescope against the Earth globe ruptures the sense of orientation: it is no longer 
clear which is at the down side, the Earth or the telescope. This is exacerbated by the camera’s 
movement minutes later after Kowalski starts to help Dr. Stone at her workstation and jokes 
about Sharif who is dancing in Space while taking a break. The camera starts upward when 
Kowalski says “You have to admit one thing, can’t beat the view,” moving beyond his helmet 
toward the Earth’s surface above the characters (in terms of screen space); it pans slowly toward 
the right, covering almost half the globe, and ends at the right side of where it started when, out 
of the blue, Kowalski appears again. This is a visual trick: when the camera tilts up, the 
characters have switched side, thus definitely disorienting the viewer. Following this, the mission 
control warns the crew that the potential debris caused by the destruction of a Russian spy 
satellite has led to a chain reaction that can threaten the astronauts. The camera movement speeds 
up and follows Kowalski to the bay area of the shuttle to disconnect the Hubble. The camera 
intentionally mimics Kowalski’s movements, such as accelerating, fast falling, and grabbing the 
rail to stop the free fall. Subsequent to that, the impression of danger in Space escalates when the 
camera casts sideway (in response to Dr. Stone’s warning) to capture the sight of fast incoming 
debris flying by like bullets. This is the first quick pan and the first sight of blurring objects in 
the film. The camera then starts a series of reaction movements to locate the floating characters, 
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following them and flying in between the Hubble, the mechanical arms, and the shuttle.  
The ensuing segment is highly kinaesthetic. The camera initially focuses on Kowalski who 
comes to help Dr. Stone’s attempt to return to the shuttle, which is interrupted by a flying piece 
of debris that kills Sharif. The view of Dr. Stone struggling to detach herself from the mechanical 
arm is disrupted when Hubble is hit by debris, causing the shuttle to go into a spin. The camera is 
now detached from the character and the vehicle, remaining roughly at the same location until 
the spinning Dr. Stone is once again caught in sight. The mechanical arm is now suddenly cut off 
in the middle, leaving Dr. Stone attached to the upper part that begins to spin violently off the 
shuttle. The subsequent view fixates on Dr. Stone and tracks in the direction she is moving until 
it catches up with her and the two start drifting together. The vision remains relatively stable 
when it is attached to Dr. Stone, but suddenly breaks off when the character detaches herself 
from the spinning arm. She is sent off toward the dark expanse of Space by the reverse force. 
The view is accompanied by Kowalski’s voice (heard through radio transmission) saying that he 
is losing sight of Dr. Stone.  
Several scholars have dealt with this particular segment and issues related to it. For instance, 
Adriano D’Aloia has proposed to differentiate between three bodies in the film experience: the 
character’s body, the spectator’s body, and the film-body. The character’s body is a quasi-body 
for its lack of flesh and blood in the perceptual world (i.e., the characters are not real persons as 
are spectators). The character’s body is different from the performer’s body although it remains 
inseparable from it in many ways. The spectator’s body is real and sensible, sitting in the movie 
theater as flesh and blood (“Spectator Involvement” 95). In contrast, the film-body is an idea 
taken from Sobchack who sees the film as a whole to be a quasi-subject (Address 167).14 
Therefore, the spectator’s engagement with the film can be conceived as a quasi-intersubjective 
relation (191). The key idea here is that what we see in the film is something we see through the 
film-body’s perceiving mechanism. In line with Sobchack’s theorization, D’Aloia argues that the 
spectator experiences space in the film through their empathy for the characters and that this 
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empathic tie unfolds via the mediation of the film-body. According to him, this empathic 
connection “is a factor that ‘fills the gap’ between the bodily presence of the spectator and the 
bodily absence of the character thanks to the film’s mediation (in the double sense of keeping 
separate and putting in contact) between these two lived bodies, even though the character’s 
body is only a quasi-body” (98). By conflating the “bodily expressions of the character and the 
bodily perception of the viewer,” cinema, argues D’Aloia, creates a “shared experiential space” 
(“Character’s Body” 187), establishing a kind of “structural homology” (188). 
D’Aloia’s approach focuses on the spectator’s empathic engagement with the character and 
aligns the kinaesthetic sensations provoked in watching the film with the empathic connection. 
Hence, what spectators feel is attributed to the character, completing the quasi-body’s sensations, 
which further helps to enhance the emotional power of the narrative:  
On the one hand, we bodily experience the ‘detachment’ of the astronaut and her drift in 
space as imbalance, loss, and suspension; on the other hand, we experience the 
‘attachment’ of the film-body to the character’s postures and movements, offered by the 
film in order to balance dizziness, to ‘ground’ suspension, to restore graspability and 
comprehensibility. (197; original emphasis) 
Thus, the film experience is constantly shifting between detaching itself from the character 
and attaching to the film-body, which through the empathic connection is in turn established as a 
re-attachment to the character. Drawing on Edith Stein and Albert Michotte, D’Aloia believes 
that empathy functions as the mediator enabling spectators to attribute the experience of the 
film-body to the characters. He also argues that the (virtual) camera’s incursion into Dr. Stone’s 
helmet visor where it comes to merge with her point of view on the perceptual level resonates 
with spectators’ empathy toward the character on the emotional level.  
D’Aloia’s explanation is interesting and persuasive in most places, which I will address 
toward the end of the chapter, but it does not account for the kinaesthetic aspect of the 
experience per se, especially in moments in the film when characters are not particularly salient. 
For instance, in the sequence following the fire in the ISS, Dr. Stone manages to get into the only 
remaining Soyuz spaceship. This segment consists of several relatively long shots of the Soyuz 
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from an external perspective. Because the landing parachute has been released by mistake, the 
spaceship is attached to the ISS’s structure by static lines (i.e., the fixed cords linking the chute 
and the ship). Thus, every time Dr. Stone starts the engine, the Soyuz is pulled back violently 
toward the ISS, resulting in intense spins and rotations. Nevertheless, the spectators’ kinaesthetic 
resonance with the camera movements as well as the movements of the spaceship is equally 
strong. It therefore reveals that our kinaesthetic experience (such as the feeling of dizziness and 
balance) attaches more to the camera (or its point of view in the film world) than to the 
characters. D’Aloia’s theory seems therefore less convincing in segments without characters. 
The problem with D’Aloia’s claim is that he may have exaggerated the importance of empathy in 
enacting kinaesthetic experiences. The spectators’ dizzy feeling in viewing Gravity is simply not 
accounted for by their empathic attitude toward Dr. Stone. Instead, dizziness (and equilibrium) 
manifests itself primarily through perception and the body’s immediate response to camera’s 
movements “freed” from gravity.  
It is important to distinguish those real camera movements that take place when the film is 
shot and (virtual) camera movements perceived on screen by spectators. From a 
phenomenological perspective, I use “camera” here to refer mainly to the latter sense of the term. 
In this regard, camera movements are not some objects we can see in the film, but rather 
something construed through various image objects’ changing positions in relation to the screen 
frame. By invoking camera movements, we have already presupposed objects shown on the 
screen and their movements in relation to the screen frame; otherwise it would be nonsensical to 
talk about them. When viewing Gravity, the change in experience from dizziness to relative 
balance at the end of the film actually corresponds to the process of restoring our ordinary 
kinaesthetic orientation on the ground of Earth. The situation of weightlessness and 
disorientation in Space (especially when Dr. Stone is off structure) is generated through the 
discrepancy between a constantly floating, spinning, and rotating camera and the static screen 
frame in the movie theater (where the spectators fixed to their seats are equally static). The 
movements of most image-objects here have little to do with the disorientatedness felt by the 
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spectators, because objects’ constant movements across the screen do not necessarily lead to 
such an experience (think, for example, of most superhero blockbusters where things and 
characters are in constant motion). Rather, only objects serving as background will affect our 
conception of the camera (and its movements). For instance, if we see the sky as underneath the 
ground, we tend to understand the camera as being upside down, but that is the case only if we 
take sky-ground relation as an indicator of a default orientation of up and down. In films like 
Gravity, indicators of orientation disappear because the background is the expanse of universe 
without any default setting of up and down. In this case, spectators can only resort to camera 
itself for orientation, since the camera’s orientation usually aligns with that of our ordinary 
perception on the ground of Earth (same with the sky-ground orientation). However, because 
here in Gravity the camera itself is also in constant shift of orientation, we are deprived of any 
coordinates that we use to orient ourselves. Hence, the lack of a static referential background and 
the (virtual) camera’s changing orientation together are responsible in Gravity for the sense of 
disorientation by creating a discrepancy between themselves and spectators’ bodies at rest in the 
movie theater. The restoration of a sense of balance toward the end of the film is therefore also a 
resolution of such a discrepancy, an act of realigning the orientation of the camera with that of 
the spectators (and hence also that of the screen frame).  
In contrast to D’Aloia, Scott Richmond speaks of Gravity as “adher[ing] us to an unworldly 
world whose alien logic of manifestation thematizes such adherence. [...] this relation of 
adherence not only encompasses my perception of the world but also includes my perception of 
myself, my proprioception” (134; my emphasis). He argues that the film “ruptures” our 
“vestibular sense” and our vision (134). Because this disordering of our vestibular and visual 
senses goes against our actual senses of gravity and our tactile sense of the theater chair we are 
sitting on, we feel dizzy. This feeling of abnormality makes explicit our proprioception, or 
kinaesthetic self-experience. It is felt rather than understood.  
The resulting anxiety, according to Richmond who opposes D’Aloia’s position, is not 
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entirely due to our secondary identification15 with the character of Dr. Stone, even though we 
care about her success or failure in surviving. Even after several viewings of the film (so that we 
already know the outcome) or when watching sequences where Dr. Stone is not prominently 
present, we still feel the same anxiety. Richmond concludes that the film “induces anxiety in its 
viewers [also] through its dissolution of horizontal and vertical axes of perception, as well as the 
way it displays the human body striving and only barely succeeding to get purchase in the 
frictionless, weightless vacuum of space, where life is impossible” (138). 
Richmond moves away from the characters and objects depicted in the film and redirects our 
attention toward spectators, and to their own proprioceptive experience. The kinaesthetic, or 
proprioceptive resonance with the cinematic images helps spectators attune to the film world, 
and such an attunement at the same time makes manifest cinema’s capacity for perceptually 
modulating the spectators’ sense of spatiality and orientation (126). Richmond emphasizes that 
the space created by Gravity is “unworldly” for the spectators because it deviates too much from 
our ordinary perceptual experience where the ground is fixed and orientations are easily 
determined. It is true that as earthbound beings, human spectators are not used to groundless 
space where a frame of reference is hard to find. Although he does contend that the film 
demonstrates the “incredible plasticity of the human capacity for orientation and orientedness” 
(122), Richmond does not elaborate on why this deviation can result in such proprioceptive 
reactions.  
What Gravity presents is actually a horizon that departs from our ordinary perception on 
land. The horizon, according to Husserl, is largely enacted through our kinaesthesia. In his 
lectures and research manuscripts on space constitution, Husserl stresses that “the role played by 
the body's activity must be considered in any discussion of how a multiplicity of appearances is 
brought into a synthetic unity such that we recognize them as appearances of one and the same 
object” (Drummond 20). While we might make mistakes about objects when seeing them from 
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15 Here, Richmond follows Metz’s terminology of character engagement based on psychoanalysis. It differs from 
D’Aloia’s phenomenologically inflected theory of empathy in that the latter does not claim a total identification and 
dedifferentiation between the character and the spectator but rather a resonance of experience with differentiation. 
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afar, bodily movement reduces such errors and helps establish the spatial relations between the 
object and its environment. Many enactivist cognitive scientists share such a view. Francisco 
Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch write explicitly in their groundbreaking book The 
Embodied Mind about the importance of kinaesthesia in world constitution.  
In a nutshell, the enactive approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists in 
perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent 
sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided. (Varela, et al. 177) 
The enactive approach follows the legacy of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in understanding 
the genesis and constitution of our world-experience.  
The environment is not a structure imposed on living beings from the outside but is in 
fact a creation of those beings. The environment is not an autonomous process but a 
reflection of the biology of the species. Just as there is no organism without an 
environment, so there is no environment without an organism [...] Cognition is not 
representation but embodied action and that the world we cognize is not pregiven but 
enacted through our history of structural coupling. (Varela, et al. 202-4) 
From a similar perspective, Alva Noë in his Action in Perception argues that “all perception 
is touch-like . . . [w]hat we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we know how to do)” 
(1) and all animals can develop depth perception insofar as they develop the ability to move (13). 
This line of thinking follows the genealogies of phenomenology and James J. Gibson’s 
ecological psychology (of whom Richmond speaks highly in his book). It has spelled out the 
essential role of our kinaesthesia’s active participation in world-experience constitution. 
Richmond is right that cinematic experience involves primarily the proprioceptive experience 
instead of real kinaesthetic involvements because the spectators are fixed to their seats. But such 
a proprioceptive resonance enacted by the audiovisual information shares the same mechanism 
with our kinaesthetic world-constitution.  
Thus, in viewing Gravity, spectators implicitly participate in the kinaesthetic motion of the 
film-body (via their proprioceptive resonance). Such participation helps instill a sense of space 
on the part of spectators, which in turn enables them to develop a horizon around what they see 
and hear. The disorientation that is strange to spectators is gradually absorbed as a normal feature 
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of the world-horizon in Space while the focus is directed toward more recognizable 
objects—namely the main character and her actions—to reduce such dizziness, disorientedness, 
and anxiety.  
I expect challenges to this conception of world/space constitution in Gravity. One prominent 
argument appears in Ryan Pierson’s essay against the discourse of “camera movement.” Since 
real cameras are gradually replaced by animation in the age of digital filmmaking, Pierson 
contends that it makes no sense to speak of “camera movement” anymore (7). He uses Gravity as 
an example to demonstrate how a virtual camera is free from the physical laws as it enters into 
Dr. Stone’s helmet visor with ease, while in the diegesis these very laws jeopardizes Dr. Stone’s 
life (7). By giving two experimental examples from the domain of film animation (Norman 
McLaren’s Blinkity Blank and Caroline Leaf’s The Metamorphosis of Mr. Samsa), Pierson 
contends that such films (including the computer-generated animation of Gravity) are forms of 
filmmaking that can do without camera and world (19).16 Pierson’s conclusion that some 
animated films have completely abandoned the “camera” is right, but this does not however 
support his argument that all discourses on animated films should do without “camera” and 
“world” (17, 19). Pierson argues that in films such as Blinkity Blank and Caroline Leaf’s 
sand-on-glass animations, perspective no longer exists, objects are merely abstractly depicted, 
and the transformation of figures presuppose no world as their background (14-17).  
Even though I am sympathetic to Pierson’s view, I feel rather reluctant to agree with him 
when speaking of McLaren’s Blinkity Blank and Caroline Leaf’s sand animations as worldless. I 
believe it would be nonsensical to say that we recognize the characters (e.g., Gregor Samsa in 
Leaf’s sand animation), the objects (e.g., the figure of a bird in McLaren’s abstract animation), 
and understand the story to be adapted from Kafka’s The Metamorphosis without the background 
of a world, or horizon to comprehend all these. Pierson is essentializing the concept “world” as a 
concrete perceptual reality. He does not seem to see the virtuality and implicitness of world (or 
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16 Richmond endorses Pierson’s position on which he has partly based his argument that we should not talk about 
the representational aspects of the cinema but should focus on the spectators’ proprioceptive experience and it alone 
(see Footnote 23 in Introduction). 
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horizon) when the world is not perceptual or not even visible. It is true that neither McLaren’s 
nor Leaf’s work conforms to the principle of perspective, hence making it difficult to talk about 
them in terms of “camera movements.” However, their works require a minimal horizon to 
understand because nothing can be understood without horizon. World as a horizon, instead of 
world as a perceptual entity, renders it possible to comprehend these animated films. But Gravity, 
unlike these experimental animations, is certainly very different and much closer in important 
ways to camera-based traditional filmmaking. 
Virtual cameras used in computer-generated photorealistic images (which is different from 
3D animation in general) should by no means be considered as fundamentally different from 
embodied cameras for the simple reason that they attempt in every possible ways to imitate and, 
in some virtuosic cases, simulate the latter. What we see in Cuarón’s Gravity is a brilliant 
example where the virtual camera is used to reach beyond the limits of traditional cameras’ 
physical possibilities. The digitally enabled camera achieves physically impossible movements; 
the syntax set by the scientific footage is pushed beyond its normal boundary. In this regard, it is 
fair to say that Gravity managed a new revolution in the aesthetics of Space exploration. Perhaps 
in the near future, we will see similar images accompanying live television broadcasts of real 
Space activities in replacement of the relatively static camerawork of scientific footage, 
increasing the pleasure and immersiveness of the program.  
Nevertheless, the virtual cameras in Gravity do not in any explicit manner break away from 
the imagery created by photographic cameras, especially the latter’s visual principles based on 
perspective, making the film different from animations that deliberately avoid the monocular 
perspective. In cases where images no longer comply with the principle of perspective (such as 
McLaren’s and Leaf’s animations aforementioned), the realistic effect breaks off. What the 
spectators see will clearly be understood as animations instead of realistic images. For such cases, 
there is no point in debating whether we should conceive the motions as “camera movements” 
because there is no camera, not even a virtual one. Moreover, whether there is a camera is a very 
different issue from whether there is a world. Pierson has mixed these two separate issues 
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together due to his rather limited conception of “world.” Imaginary worlds do not have to be like 
our perceptual world, and therefore their visual appearances need not conform to the principle of 
perspective. 
Gravity, despite its minimalist narrative, is a fiction film that revolves around an imaginary 
event. In order to enjoy and to be immersed in the film, we inevitably engage with its characters 
and its story. Hence, what D’Aloia has demonstrated in his analysis about empathy is certainly 
an essential part of our film experience of Gravity. Because the kinaesthetic resonance in 
watching the film provides us with a horizon about this unfamiliar world, we are capable of 
engaging with the characters, the events, and the story. It is this engagement that will in the end 
offer us the meaning and experience of the film as a whole.17  
The problem with Richmond’s argument about Gravity, and in some sense with the larger 
argument in his book, lies in his decision to dismiss the objects of intentionality in the film, 
namely the characters, the Earth, the shuttle, the Hubble, the universe, the lake, the animals, the 
radio transmissions, and the events that take place. By excluding such elements, he tries to argue 
that proprioception alone (or the experiential aspect of intentionality alone) is able to directly 
attune spectators to the world onscreen. That is, the film world is not given through the objects 
shown, but enacted directly through the spectators’ bodily sensations. This begs the question: 
how do the spectators arrive at the world directly from their proprioceptive experience, and what 
exactly is this “world” Richmond talks about if there is no need to pay attention to the objects in 
the film? On a face value, Richmond’s conclusion seems to concur with enactivist philosophers 
who argue that the world is enacted through our bodily movements. But on a second thought, 
Richmond is speaking of something very different. Because film spectators remain seated in the 
movie theater for almost the entire duration of the screening, they barely move, neither in the real 
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17 Yacavone calls this global meaning the “cineasethetic” expression of the film. In Chapter seven of his Film 
Worlds, he explicates this concept in detail. Following Mikel Dufrenne, Yacavone makes the distinction between the 
artwork (as the physical object) and the “aesthetic object” (as “the work as and when it is concretely experienced, 
wherein its full ‘sensuous’ potential is actualized”) (191). He contends that with the proper “aesthetic attitude,” we 
can access the film’s “global, cineaesthetic world-feeling” (201), which is realized in “multifaceted temporality of 
films, as integral to the achievement of such work-embracing expression” (201). The global cineaesthetic experience 
(or the film’s world-feeling) relies on the unity of three aspects: “the relation structure of a work’s felt duration, its 
qualitative affectivity as experienced, and the lived time of the beholder” (213).  
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perceptual world nor in the storyworld of the film. They can therefore by no means enact a space 
around them solely through their kinaesthetic sensations. Richmond seems to totally neglect the 
fact that the kinaesthetic or proprioceptive experience in watching films only emerges when the 
spectators see the movements of the images and objects portrayed. Once spectators close their 
eyes (and cover their ears), they will feel nothing at all of the film. Actually, all kinaesthetic or 
proprioceptive experience is evoked and activated by the images the spectators see on the screen. 
Richmond’s dismissal of image-objects altogether leads his understanding of film experience 
astray. The particular experimental films he has selected for his book (i.e., Marcel Duchamp’s 
Anémic Cinéma [1926], Kubrick’s 2001, Godfrey Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi [1982], Cuarón’s 
Gravity, and Tony Conrad’s The Flicker [1966]) are all designed to provoke strong 
proprioceptive experiences in spectators (and perhaps all succeeded in doing so). These cases 
provide the least persuasive support for his rather general argument that kinaesthetic or 
proprioceptive experience alone (without referring to the objects seen) can enact the world in all 
films. Is speaking of experience possible without referring to the intentional object? I strongly 
doubt it, and all the films discussed in my thesis can serve as counterexamples, including 
Gravity. 
Unlike Richmond, I therefore suggest we take the filmmaker’s own statement literally and 
seriously as it reveals an important feature of world building practices. Alfonso Cuarón offers a 
view on this particular issue in an interview about the camera’s subjectivity in Gravity: 
The camera is neither an objective observer nor Sandra’s subjective POV—the camera is 
a third astronaut, and that astronaut is the audience. [...] The audience is floating in space, 
following these characters who are bonded by the loss of physics in zero gravity, floating 
and rolling and spinning. The idea is to immerse the audience so that your emotional 
experience is projected onto the screen in a primal way. (Winter 52; my emphasis) 
We, as spectators, are supposed to take up the vision of the film as an embodied participant 
in the world even though it is neither a diegetic position taken by a particular character nor the 
omniscient perspective of an authorial observer. The film-body creates for spectators a position 
that lies between the diegetic storyworld and the spectators’ perceptual world. It takes place in a 
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liminal space that does not belong in either material spaces, but only happens, as a temporal 
possibility, in the virtual and potential space of horizon.18 Not all movements happen in material 
space. For instance, pure imaginative movements occur neither in the physical space around us 
nor in any physical representations (such as films). It is wrong-headed to say that they happen in 
the mental theater (or a “Cartesian theater” as Daniel Dennett calls it). Dennett has pointed out 
cogently that any mental theater involves a homunculus to watch it, while the homunculus’s 
consciousness of seeing the theater involves yet another homunculus, ad infinitum (107). 
Similarly, Jean-Paul Sartre criticizes such a conception of mental representation and calls it the 
“illusion of immanence” (5), because a mental image is not an image at all; it is nothing (7). 
Imagination or thoughts do not happen in a physical space, but only in a virtual realm, that is the 
horizon. In his lectures on inner time-consciousness, Husserl proposes that horizontal 
intentionality is what makes the flow of (time-)experience possible (85). Since any (kinaesthetic) 
experience has to be in the flow of time, it necessarily takes place in our horizon, a virtual realm. 
It is exactly in this virtual realm that we kinaesthetically experience the violent spinning and 
rotating in the weightless vacuum of Space, without our bodies actually moving in the theater or 
in the storyworld.  
This is also the place where the very expansion of our world-experience happens, the very 
place where our horizon is manipulated. Richmond does not tell us where our proprioceptive 
experience takes place, because his conception of world seems to fall within the dualistic 
opposition between onscreen storyworld and spectators’ ordinary perceptual world. Both of them 
are worlds of presence; they are visible and can be clearly located. The virtual realm of our 
horizon always escapes our vision and cannot be located. It belongs instead to the realm of 
temporality. Like thoughts, imagination, and memory, cinematic kinaesthetic experience is real 
but remains invisible to the corporeal eyes. In short, Richmond fails to see that, besides the 
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18 In a way, I agree with Annette Michelson’s argument that the film (she is talking about Kubrick’s 2001) happens 
“somewhere between screen and spectator. It is the area defined and constantly traversed by our active restructuring 
and reconstitution, through an experienc of ‘outer’ space, of the ‘inner’ space of the body” (64). She is equally right 
in saying that “[t]he fascination [with 2001] is not so much in the substance, but rather the adventurous form of 
experiencing it, the intensity and excitement with which it lets us feel life” (68). 
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storyworld and the perceptual world, there is also a virtual world where spectators’ enacted 
kinaesthesia (or affect) takes place and expands our horizon. The horizontal virtual space is 
implicitly given with/in our perception. It is neither explicitly present in the form of flesh and 
blood nor clearly utterable through language. Horizons are not restricted to either imaginary or 
perceptual worlds, but are enacted elastically according to our need in the virtual world. 
Richmond points out that the ability to adapt when watching a film reveals the human capacity 
for orientation. However, there is more to it than this, for such ability also, and perhaps more 




Space and Home: Between the World-Picture and the Earth-Ground 
Oh my God! Look at that picture over there! Here’s the Earth coming up.  
                                 —— Frank Borman, Apollo 8, 1968 
All animals, all living beings, all beings whatsoever, have ontic being only on the 
basis of my constitutive genesis and this has “earthly” precedence. 
                                 —— Edmund Husserl, “Foundational” 130 
The first human visit to outer space did not take place until October 24, 1946 when a camera 
that was attached to a captured-and-modified V-2 rocket brought back images taken beyond the 
Earth’s atmosphere (65 miles or 104.61 km above the ground) (Daley). Ever since the surrender 
of Wernher von Braun and his engineering team to the United States army in the Bavarian Alps 
on May 2, 1945, the military forces of the United States had been very eager to experiment on 
the newly captured and even quasi-mythical Nazi weapon and see what it could do (Biddle). 
During 1946 and 1950, more than 1,000 pictures of Earth came back from the V-2 rockets 
(Reinhardt). Clyde Holliday, one of the scientists in the research group at the White Sand testing 
ground in New Mexico where these experiments were carried out, stated in his article for 
National Geographic that these photos showed “how our Earth would look like to visitors from 
another planet coming in on a space ship” (Qtd. in Reinhardt). At the same time, he predicted “a 
time when cameras may be mounted on guided missiles for scouting enemy territory in war, 
mapping inaccessible regions of the earth in peacetime, and even photographing cloud 
formations, storm fronts, and overcast areas over entire continent in a few hours” (Qtd. in 
Reinhardt). Holliday definitely saw the possibilities of what could be achieved with this sort of 
technology that had nonetheless been designed to be one of the most horrifying killing machines 
at the time—second only, perhaps, to America’s A-bomb. The note is interesting in that it points 
toward diverse applications of rocket technology in the future, while focusing specifically on the 
possibility it affords us to view our planet (and ourselves) from an external perspective.  
Most relevant to my topic in this chapter is what Holliday added to his speculation: “the 
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entire land area of the globe might be mapped in this way” (Qtd. in Reinhardt). Such a vision 
was soon to be realized, first in the images of films and other mass media, then in real astronautic 
explorations. I have mentioned as side notes in previous chapters that almost all films of the 
Space exploration subgenre utilize the image of Earth as a prominent gesture to show a 
perspectival shift from and a horizontal expansion of ordinary perception. These include the 
Earth rising in Le Voyage dans la lune, the diminishing globe in Aelita, the sun appearing from 
behind the Earth in Frau im Mond, the view of the Earth’s surface in Destination Moon that 
resembles the 1946 photographs, and the glowing quarter of the blue Earth as background for 
spaceships and the spinning Space Station-5 in 2001: A Space Odyssey. Recent films have more 
frequently employed images taken from or based on real astronautic activities. The launch 
footage in Marooned is taken directly from NASA’s recorded images of Apollo 8, while the 
almost constantly shown Earth in Gravity is computer generated according to available scientific 
images of the planet. As for scientific explorations, with the successful launch of the first 
man-made satellite Sputnik-1 (1957), the Soviet Union and the United States soon became 
involved in the Space Race. When NASA published the famous “Earthrise”, a photograph taken 
during the Apollo 8 mission on December 24, 1968 and named after the recorded conversation 
between the astronauts who took it (as shown in the epigraph), the dream of taking a picture of 
Earth/world not only came true merely 18 years after Holliday’s speculations, but even paled 
next to a mission that sent human beings up in Space and for whom Earth could be directly seen 
from the “outside” by human eyes. Finally in 1995, the fully operational Global Positioning 
System (GPS) enhanced this technology and our ability to see our home planet from the 
“outside”. It became the first functioning system that practically “mapped” the entire globe 
(“USNO”).  
In this chapter, I will look specifically at these images of Earth and Space. The focus will be 
on how those pictures of our world produced in films and scientific explorations relate to the 
ideology and the metaphysics Martin Heidegger calls the “world-picture” (Weltbild). This is 
examined against Gravity and Interstellar to show that a representational conception of Earth is 
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problematic and might even be dangerous. Drawing on Heidegger and Edmund Husserl, I will 
also show how these two films, each in their specific ways, engage the issues of world-picture 
and earth-ground (Erdboden). The difference between the content and expressions of the two 
films leads further to their different attitudes toward the future of human beings, our home planet, 
and interstellar colonization, some of which are identified as consequences of the ideological 
lineage that can be traced all the way back to the modern metaphysical premises of the 
world-picture. One prominent case among these traditions is Nazi imperialism and its direct 
legacy in the postwar Space Race, in Space technologies and even in the science fiction film 
genre. Towards the end of this chapter, I will explore in what ways such an ideological legacy is 
deeply intertwined with (and perhaps even responsible for) the current crises of the 
Anthropocene, and how an alternative can be sought. 
World-Picture (Weltbild) and “Earthrise” 
In an essay written in 1938, Martin Heidegger addresses one of the fundamental problems of 
the modern age. He argues that this era is founded by metaphysics, “in that through a specific 
interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the 
basis upon which it is essentially formed” (“Age” 115). He calls for a reflection (Besinnung) on 
such a metaphysical tendency to represent the essence, the truth, and the world (115-16). In the 
essay, he points out five areas that are illustrative of such an age: science, machine technology, 
aesthetics, culture, and the loss of gods. But they are all closely related since they all belong to 
the modern practice of “research” (Forschung) which “must bind itself [in advance] and adhere 
to the sphere [that science] opened up” (118). The research objects, nonetheless, interact 
dialectically with the scientific laws (or the plan set out in advance) (120). It at once “accounts 
for an unknown by means of a known” and “verifies that known by means of that unknown” 
(120). All those areas of modern research are necessarily founded on their “spheres” (Bezirke) or 
“ground plans” (Grundrisse) that are set in advance and will guide the subsequent research 
activities.  
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Essential to such activities of research is the tendency of “objectification.” Heidegger 
contends, “Knowing, as research, calls whatever is to account with regard to the way in which 
and the extent to which it lets itself be put at the disposal of representation” (126; my emphasis). 
Through such representation, “Nature and history become the objects of a representing that 
explains. [...] Only that which becomes object in this way is—is considered to be being” (126-67; 
original emphasis). That is, representation substitutes the objects per se, and comes to be 
understood as being itself. Heidegger argues that if such a conception of science as research is 
essential to the modern age, the age must have already been grounded in such metaphysical 
ground plans (127). What we seek turns out to be exactly what we have put there in advance.  
Heidegger understands that such ground setting is laid out in the form of a “world-picture” 
(Weltbild). The “world” in this very concept refers to the “totality,” a projected entity that 
encompasses literally everything, while “picture” means “a copy of something” (128). Hence, 
the world-picture is a “painting” of “what is as a whole.” Moreover, it also points to the world 
itself as such, something “normative and binding for us” (129). Paradoxically, as we talk about 
the world picture, we are part of the picture.1 The conclusion can thus follow: this particular way 
of inquiring into the world picture is an essential feature of the modern age, yet it is not at all 
possible to have such a world picture (130).  
 The performance of representing something entails presenting something at hand 
(vorhanden) before oneself; it implies also someone who receives the representation (131). Thus 
begot the subject who represents and receives the representation. “Man becomes the 
representative [der Repräsentant] of that which is, in the sense of that which has the character of 
object” (131). 
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1 Markus Gabriel proposes a similar argument in his Why the World Does Not Exist? where he shows that the 
paradox of talking about world and being part of it excludes the possibility of an entity of world as a whole. That is, 
there cannot be a sphere called world that encompasses everything because the very act of talking about it 
contradicts the statement. However, “although the world does not exist”, contends the author, “there do exist 
infinitely many worlds, which in part overlap but are also partly independent of one another” (65). This is crucial for 
us to understand the world-horizon as one of the many “worlds,” instead of some “closed totality” (65). Nonetheless, 
Husserl’s account of the world-horizon or the total-horizon is somewhat more complicated since it is pre-given to 
our experience as an a priori form that is open to the particular and the historical instead of a closed totality that 
stays static and includes everything. See Walton, “Die Lebenswelt” for more on Husserl’s conception of 
world-horizon in his research manuscripts.  
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What is decisive is that man himself expressly takes up this position as one constituted by 
himself, that he intentionally maintains it as that taken up by himself, and that he makes it 
secure as the solid footing for a possible development of humanity. [...] for the purpose of 
gaining mastery over that which is as a whole. (132) 
[T]he more extensively and the more effectually the world stands at man's disposal as 
conquered, and the more objectively the object appears, all the more subjectively, i.e., the 
more importunately, does the subiectum rise up and all the more impetuously, too, do 
observation of and teaching about the world change into a doctrine of man. (133; original 
emphasis) 
 The position of (hu)man here is conceived as a “world view” (Weltanschauung), which 
human beings have taken up to preside over other points of view. The world picture can thus be 
seen as a “structured image” (Gebild) created by humans. By doing so, humans “contend for the 
position in which [they] can be that particular being who gives the measure and draw up the 
guidelines for everything that is” (134). Thus, by taking up the perspective that is secretly put 
there as the “objective” standpoint, human beings have made themselves the “subject” to look. 
As science becomes an act that turns things into representation, the world is no longer 
experienced but almost always represented in the form of a picture. It becomes a “system” set 
before humans who self-recognize themselves as subiectum, or a subject (129).  
 Two aspects from Heidegger’s thinking are essentially relevant to my discussion. First, in 
the modern age, the world is turned into a representation, a “picture.” Second, by doing so, 
human beings have sought to acquire mastery over the world. Therefore, going back to the 
world-experience becomes an urgent matter, not only to re-connect us to the world (as horizon) 
but also to withdraw ourselves from such a privileged position as that prescribed by the 
metaphysical ground plan. 
 I will start with world as representation. It is important to note that by “world-picture,” 
Heidegger by no means refers to any actual pictorial depiction, not to mention a physical picture 
of the world/Earth. What he means is that the world (as a totality, a sum of everything) has been 
turned into a representation. I am here going to use this concept more broadly and try to show 
how such physical pictures of Earth contribute to and consolidate our representational conception 
of the world. The process of turning the world, or the place where we dwell, into a picture has 
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been going on long before the modern age. It had not, however, dominated our public opinion 
until modern science came to occupy the center stage. Human beings have for a long time 
preoccupied themselves with the work of representing the world, from the primordial cave 
paintings in Chauvet, Lascaux, or Altamira to the earliest maps discovered around Pavlov in the 
Czech republic and Spanish Navarre. But not until the early modern times did these techniques 
of representing the world transform into something of a system, something conferred with 
absolute objectivity, something conceived as even truer (and more objective) than our 
world-experience. Prior to the time of Nicolaus Copernicus, it is difficult to see the Sun as the 
center around which our earth (i.e., the ground)2 travels, not because people were blind but 
because they had not developed the method of representing the world as a picture yet.3 The 
world was not yet represented; what had been painted were pictures of objects in the world. 
Therefore, despite the long history of representing worldly objects, the attempt to represent the 
world as a whole is relatively new.  
 Such a metaphysical conception of the world is not at all unfamiliar. As I have mentioned, it 
usually involves the form of a literal picture of the Earth planet. We have learned from modern 
science that Earth is but one of the planets that revolve around the Sun which is in turn part of a 
much bigger galaxy and the universe. But this knowledge is not always understood in the same 
way we learn how to ride a bike or how to swim. Moreover, even if we watch the stars in the sky 
everyday with our telescopes, we are not able to arrive at astronomic theories directly from our 
observations. Most times, we look up at the sky with some astronomic knowledge that we have 
already acquired independently. Primary and secondary education as well as astronomical 
societies around the world promotes knowledge about what we can see in the sky in any 
particular season. Nowadays when we do such observations, we do them according to the plan, 
such as a night sky guide for enthusiasts.  
A funny recent event is revealing. On March 20, 2018, an astronomy professor from the 

2 The capitalized Earth is deliberately distinguished from the small lettered earth. Whereas the former indicates the 
planet as a representation within the scientific discourse, the latter refers to the ground we feel intuitively. The 
distinction will become clear as I proceed. 
3 With Copernicus, the method of representing the world is fundamentally mathematics.  
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University of Cape Town published his discovery of a bright new celestial object on The 
Astronomer’s Telegram, only to find out 40 minutes later that he actually mistook Mars for an 
unknown star. The official twitter account of The Astronomer’s Telegram jokingly awarded the 
professor a certificate congratulating him on discovering Mars.4 The hilarious mistake can help 
lay bare the mechanism of modern scientific research. New research activities always presuppose 
previous maps. When the representational maps/ground plans are not rigorously taken up, 
mistakes happen. My point in invoking this event here is to show that the modern research 
attitude replaces the researcher’s intuitive response, and the latter is no longer trusted without the 
help of a preconceived scientific map. The presupposition of a representation, a picture of the 
world nowadays usually precedes our activities of discovery.  
The same thing happens when we encounter pictures of Earth. When the pictures are shown, 
be they painted or photographed, modern viewers spontaneously come up with the horizon 
proffered by modern science according to which Earth is a planet that revolves around the Sun, 
as a tiny little speck in the vast and endless ocean of stars. What I want to emphasize here is not 
the image of Earth per se, but what this image entails. It is the background, the horizon for the 
image that matters. The very act of seeing Earth as a whole as an object out-there differs so 
sharply from the experience of living and standing on the earth right-here. For most people today, 
a point of view from outside Earth cannot be comprehended in terms of our experience, but only 
remains as a speculation, a pure intellectual product. Hans Blumenberg calls this particular kind 
of experience “astronoetics”, as opposed to astronautics (Vollzähligkeit 548). The activities of 
astronoetics refer to the general intellectual contemplation of the cosmos without really going 
there, and these activities have been going on for thousands of years in human history. Such 
speculation and calculation gradually became in the modern age a subject that was given 
rigorous considerations based on the mathematical formalization of the world, a form of 
representing the world as a picture. This process as part of the general project of scientific 
research has made modern astronautics possible. As a result, the sky finally came closer. 
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4 The news can be found on many news sites. My source comes from Science Alert (Bowler).  
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Especially with the advent of modern rocketry and other astronautic technologies, our experience 
of the world changed. A ground-based horizon was somehow replaced by a scientific perspective 
from somewhere outside the universe. People started to view the earth as the Earth planet, and as 
a result, the horizontal consciousness shifted from a centrifugal movement to a centripetal one. 
That is, the world-experience based on our own sense of space made way for the sense of our 
position in a preconceived world-representation. Whereas our forebears arrived at the 
world-horizon as the vanishing point of their vision, we are now directly taught by scientific 
theories the horizon, as in the case of the Big Bang theory. In a reverse order, we now start with 
a scientifically established map and then come gradually back to ourselves as a point on the map. 
The practice of positioning ourselves relative to the globe (through such devices as Global 
Positioning Systems) is one of the most prominent examples of the replacement of 
world-experience by world-representation. The process of coming to understand the world 
around us gives way to the process of determining where we are (i.e., the location) on a 
pre-given map, the world-picture.  
This tendency to represent the world can be witnessed in early SF films as well. Méliès, 
Protazanov, and Lang all seem to rely on such an idea of Earth as representable and objectifiable 
in terms of the astronomic map of the universe. Even if they are simply using these images as an 
indication that the characters have left Earth, our ability to understand such indications 
necessarily entails the logic of modern science and that of the world-picture. The intriguing 
images of Earth as a globe in all those films implicitly mobilize the scientific way of looking at 
the world. However, once represented and frozen in the film frame, Earth loses its nature as 
horizon such as we usually entertain it as the background for perception. Instead, Earth itself 
becomes yet another object for our observation, just like the specimens under the microscope in a 
biological laboratory. The danger of the world-picture is that we, who have not gone to outer 
space, might forget that this is a representation derived from theory, not something we 
embodiedly experience. The absence of perceptual and sensory experience outside Earth in real 
life hinders us from grasping these images of Earth as literally seen from outside the planet. That 
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is also why I argued in Chapter two that films made prior to the Apollo missions could not be 
properly called “embodied science fiction realism.” It is not cinematic technology that prevented 
them from becoming realistic SF films; it is rather the absence of a real astronautic horizon (the 
fact humans had not yet been to outer space) that constrained these films as fundamentally 
speculative. 
 
Figure 3.1 “Earthrise” ©NASA.  
With the first picture of Earth coming from the camera on a V-2 rocket in 1946, people 
started to reconfigure what they had in mind when thinking about Earth. Only after that, did the 
idea of Earth as a globe became something almost tangible, solid, and intuitable, something more 
than a diagram: these images even offered a quasi-embodied feeling about the Earth globe. The 
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truly mesmerizing moment took place on Christmas Eve, December 24, 1968 (Eastern Standard 
Time or UTC-5) during the Apollo 8 mission. The astronauts—Frank Borman, Jim Lovell, and 
William Anders—broadcasted live what they saw from the spacecraft: the Earthrise from the 
Moon’s horizon (see Fig. 3.1). This was the first time that we earthlings managed to occupy the 
point of view of the Moon and looked back at Earth from the outside. Certainly, the experience 
for the three astronauts was different from that of the audience in front of the television sets. But 
through the very media of photo-electronic moving images, the horizon of the spectators can be 
said to have expanded along with that of the astronauts.  
In this picture of Earth with the Moon’s surface in the foreground, something peculiar 
happened. For this is not merely a picture of Earth, but a picture of our planet within a certain 
horizon and from a certain point of view. What is seen is understood as really happening in an 
embodied space, and not merely another picture in the long series of speculative depictions. In a 
sense and for those who lived that moment, the experience of seeing the picture of “Earthrise” 
resembled that of seeing oneself in the mirror for the first time: suddenly, what was invisible to 
the self is for the first time made visible.  
Benjamin Lazier in his 2011 essay, which serves as a great inspiration for this chapter, also 
understands Heidegger’s concept of the world-picture by evoking these early photographs of 
Earth and the impact they exerted on us. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, Hans Blumenberg, Husserl, 
and Heidegger, Lazier considers Heidegger’s conception of modern astronautics a little too 
pessimistic since the latter fears that the modern age necessarily involves the reduction of the 
world-horizon to a mere representation and the reduction of the earth as ground to Earth as 
“merely [an] astronomical idea of a planet.” Heidegger fears that the earth-ground (Erd) will be 
replaced by the Earth planet (Erdball) (Pathmarks 183-230; Qtd. in Lazier 611-12). Lazier 
follows Blumenberg’s reflections in contending that “photographs of Earth [are] different from 
their astronoetic predecessors” (622). He uses the example from Jules Henri Poincaré who asked 
whether the Copernican revolution would have been impossible if Earth were constantly clouded 
and no one could ever see the stars and the Sun. His own conclusion was simple and clear: No. 
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The Copernican revolution was destined, not because of our sensory and optical experiences, but 
because of mathematics and physics. Copernicus’s success is built on the fact that he is neither 
an astronomer nor an observer, but a mathematician and a physicist (622-23). Following this, 
Lazier concludes forcefully, “Heidegger worried that thinking globally precluded being locally. 
The Earthrise era, Blumenberg thought, would enable us to do both at once” (623).  
Hence, the proliferation of “Earthrise” and of other pictures that followed—especially the 
1972 “Blue Marble” taken during the Apollo 17 mission—have changed the world-experience 
for ordinary Earth dwellers who have never travelled to outer space. These images not only 
expanded our horizon of the world, but also brought us back to earth, and in many instances to 
caring for our home. The mirror effect made us aware of ourselves and of the place we have been 
living in (especially the ecological sphere that we are part of). Now we come to understand that 
our home can be endangered (e.g., that ecological disasters are true and possible). In this sense, 
“[e]ven if Earthrise was picture first, experience second,” argues Lazier, “it could still prompt a 
transformation: a return to Earth by way of the rise of Earth in the pictorial imagination” 
(625-26). But before going into issues of caretaking, I would like to linger a bit longer on the 
destructive side of the world-picture. Self-awareness is precious, but it always comes one step 
too late. Space exploration cinema of the SF genre and real Space programs played yet another 
role in the process of this horizontal shift.   
From V-2 to Saturn-V, From von Braun to Nolan 
This section will first address the second aspect of Heidegger’s thinking in the world-picture 
essay and then bring the two aspects together with the help of Interstellar. In addition to 
reducing world-experience to world-representation, the very logic of the world-picture entails the 
idea that the world is represented to a subject. The representation of the world is always 
accompanied by the birth of the subiectum, the subject who makes and receives this 
representation. The emergence of the subiectum gives rise to the split of subject and object. 
Hence, the process of reducing things (Dinge) into objects (as representation) always comes 
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along with the process of raising ourselves, as subjects, to a position where we have mastery over 
objects. The peril is immediate, as I will explicate in the following. 
Let us rewind our time line and return to Lang’s Frau im Mond. The film paved the way for 
a long-lasting debate on the style and form of Space exploration SF cinema. Many contemporary 
(leftist) critics saw it as “old-fashioned and backward looking,” especially for its “reactionary 
mawkishness” (Gunning and Loew 566). The position was established so as to counter the right 
wing, nationalistic, anti-democratic ideologies pervasive during the Weimar republic. Some even 
deemed Lang and his work to be a “remnant of the Wilhelminian era of film history” (567). 
While Siegfried Kracauer also criticized Lang for his “Nazi aesthetics,” others believed this 
accusation oversimplifies what is ambivalent in the film (Gunning and Loew 571).  
I subscribe to Gunning and Loew’s interpretation: the ambiguous ending thwarts any 
one-sided view of the film. The evil cartel representative and the greedy scientist are both killed, 
while Windegger (Gustav von Wangenheim) is punished for his cowardice by losing Friede’s 
(Gerda Maurus) love. The wished-for union of Helius and Friede not only satisfies the appetite 
for the story logic of good-man-deserves-reward (as both of them admirably sacrifice 
themselves), but also celebrates the Romanticist spirit embodied in rocket science. What appears 
to be a story about “a futuristic gold rush” (556) is actually a reflection and even a critique of 
such an expansionary and conquest-thirsty tendency resulting from the combination of capitalism 
and ultranationalism.  
However, the Nazi ideologies of expansion and conquest are also latent, intertwined with the 
Romanticist ideal to achieve superhuman potency—the ability to escape gravity and to see what 
human vision cannot perceive is on a par with the ability to produce technologies that serve 
conquests and colonization. For one thing, the vision of aerial photography, a combination of 
photography and rocketry, anticipated the use of cameras attached to V-2 rockets that would later 
bring back the first picture of Earth. For another, the theft of Helius’ rocket plans and documents 
by the cartel in the storyworld forshadowed the later real-life, secret employment of rocket 
engineers, such as Wernher von Braun, by the Nazi regime. It is undeniable that Frau im Mond 
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played an important role in the development of Nazi’s V-2 rockets. Not only did von Braun 
admit the film’s influence on him, but as we saw earlier, he also directly alluded to this lineage 
by symbolically adding a Frau im Mond logo to his first successfully launched rocket (Hardesty 
and Eisman 2).  
Michael Neufeld in his biography of von Braun defends the leading engineer of the V-2 
rocket and regards him as an “apolitical” enthusiast for Space travel (Von Braun 55). 
Interestingly, Neufeld adds that, according to Willy Ley, von Braun was “indifferent to party 
politics but comfortable with his father’s values” (55). Magnus Freiherr (baron) von Braun, 
father of Wernher von Braun, a descendent of a well-established Prussian noble (Junker) family, 
was once a member of the Nationalists and served as Weimar minister at the beginning of June 
1932 until January 28, 1933. Even though von Braun’s father was not directly involved with the 
Nazi regime, he was hardly apolitical. Despite various defenses for his indifference toward 
politics, Wernher von Braun’s passion for Space travel and rockets necessarily involved political 
acquiescence during both the Nazi era and the Cold War Space Race. As both Neufeld and 
Biddle have uncovered, this “dreamer of space” was fully aware of the use of slave labor at the 
rocket plant Mittelwerk in Thuringia (Neufeld, Von Braun 160; Biddle). According to the 
testimony from Guy Moran, one of the prisoners who were forced to build the rocket and found 
to have “sabotaged” its construction when von Braun (who was a member of the SS himself) 
visited the plant, the latter “ordered the [supervisor] to have [the prisoner] given 25 strokes in his 
presence by an[other] SS who was there,” “[w]ithout even listening to [the] explanations” 
(Biddle 124-25). Robert Cazabonne, a survivor from the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp, 
who was also forced to work in the rocket factory, witnessed that some of the chained “saboteurs” 
were “hanged from hoist” (125). Among the onlookers, he reported, was von Braun (125). But of 
course, as von Braun’s team member Konrad Dannenberg recalled when asked if von Braun ever 
objected the forced laboring, “If he had done it, in my opinion, he would have been shot on the 
spot” (Roop). 
I do not want to go into too much detail about the debate on whether von Braun should be 
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held responsible for the deaths caused by the construction and use of the weapon. It is undeniable 
that for von Braun the passion for rockets is more important than other people’s lives. 
Notwithstanding such ethical problems, the U.S. government recruited him anyway to lead the 
first Space programs after the Second World War. Von Braun, who might have cared little about 
politics, always worked as an essential engineer for political powers in their efforts to counter the 
enemies, first for the Nazi against the allies, then for the United States against the Soviet Union. 
These seemingly different experiences of cooperation follow the same logic, that of the 
world-picture. It can be identified in two of von Braun’s post-war achievements whose influence 
are considered to be worldwide and remain strong for almost all Space programs today.  
The first of von Braun’s most well known achievements in the U.S. is the Saturn-V rocket, 
the model that served the Apollo 11 mission. It is a massive construction that can send 
140,000 kg (310,000 lb) of payload to the LEO, a record holder since its first successful launch 
in 1967. The shadow of this giant can still be felt today on Space exploration. On February 6, 
2018, Elon Musk’s Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, known as SpaceX successfully 
launched the Falcon Heavy rocket, a heavy-lift launch vehicle that aims for future transportation 
to Mars, a goal much resembling, and even emulating, that of Saturn-V. While SpaceX’s now 
mature technology of recycling first stage rocket boosters might be considered a concrete step 
forward in modern rocketry, the Falcon Heavy is much less impressive than its illustrative 
predecessor. The rocket is almost entirely based on the Falcon 9 model; it consists basically of a 
strengthened Falcon 9 first stage as the core and two additional strap-on boosters.5 The 
achievement is a result of a desire for the quantitative gigantic. The desire calls for the ability to 
lift heavy objects off the ground (against gravity) and the ability to travel unthinkable long 
distances in the universe (against humanity’s existential scale). If Lang’s presentation of Space 
technology still bore the Romanticist inflection of overcoming the human, von Braun’s and 
Musk’s wish is to turn the human into a superhuman that can master cosmic objects and defy the 
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5 According to the company, an even larger vehicle will follow. It will be a super-heavy lift launch system called 
the “Interplanetary Transport System (ITS)”and will be able to send a payload of 300,000 kg to LEO. The rocket 
system is currently under development and is expected to be functional around 2024 (Chang). 
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forces that tie the human to the earth.  
The other influence is less well known today, but equally pervasive. During the 1950s, von 
Braun published a series of articles in Collier’s magazine. Besides von Braun, Willy Ley, one of 
the oldest members from VfR, was also among the contributors, and Chesley Bonestell, who 
contributed to the production of Destination Moon, designed the illustrations for most of these 
articles. The series is titled “Man Will Conquer Space Soon!” These articles further served as the 
basis for a three-episode Disney animation series for Disneyland: “Man in Space” (1955), “Man 
and the Moon” (1955), and “Mars and Beyond” (1957) (Tomorrow Land). Among them, “Baby 
Space Station,” co-authored with Cornelius Ryan, “Crossing the Last Frontier,” and the episode 
of “Man and the Moon” introduced the idea of a wheel-shaped Space station that would generate 
gravity by propelling itself into a spinning motion. The idea ended up in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: 
A Space Odyssey and its now iconic Space Station 5. Similar traces of influence can be found in 
recent films such as Station Elysium in Elysium (2013) and Station Cooper in Interstellar. In 
other articles, von Braun also envisaged the journey to the Moon and the interplanetary travel to 
Mars. The latter project found its way into a book that was published in the same year, The Mars 
Project. In the book, von Braun proposed a 70-person Mars expedition consisting of a fleet of 10 
Space ships of a 39-ton lift capacity and he calculated that the journey to Mars would take about 
260 days. All details for the expedition from departure to landing were delineated (viii). 
Prominent among all these publications is the idea of conquering Space and even colonizing 
other celestial bodies, such as the Moon and Mars. Elon Musk, in parallel, is one of the most 
stubborn proponents of such a grand project today. Colonizing Mars is one of the major goals 
and reasons Musk founded SpaceX (Chang). The Falcon Heavy mentioned above is simply a 
step in a much more ambitious project. The company has developed systematic plans for the 
colonization, the transport system (e.g., the “Mars Colonial Transporter”), the self-sufficient 
Mars base and city, the life-supporting system, etc. Musk envisioned at the 2016 International 
Astronautical Congress in Guadalajara, Mexico, that SpaceX vehicles would take “100 
passengers on the journey to Mars, with trips planned every 26 months, when Earth and Mars 
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pass close to each other,” and it would take “40 years to a century” to build a self-sufficient city 
on Mars (Chang). 
These two influences are illustrative of the logic of the world-picture, especially how human 
beings, by turning things into objects, seek to take control of the world. The greater power of the 
interplanetary rocket comes hand in hand with the greater ambition to conquer. As we have seen 
towards the end of World War II, the V-2 rocket of the Nazi regime and the atomic bomb of the 
U.S. demonstrate the fiercest power of destruction that human beings had ever created. Both 
weapons signalled a huge leap in terms of scale: the unprecedented distance and speed the rocket 
could travel and the unbelievable destruction the bomb could cause. Alongside other weapons of 
mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons, these human inventions are not 
side-products of a grand project, but are themselves the manifestation of the catastrophic power 
of the logic of the world-picture. Von Braun might have had in mind a greater plan that would 
have benefitted human beings in the future, but the plan itself was problematic and its realization 
has proven itself to be murderous. If von Braun believed that almost everything could be 
sacrificed for his final project, seen as a prospective greater good, what was this greater good? 
No one can be so sure. Von Braun, his colleagues, and many other enthusiasts following him 
were indeed passionate about the task they have been carrying out. Yet the very raison d’être of 
the project remains ambiguous, whether it was simply an act of curiosity, a gesture of “dare to 
know,” or something else was never elucidated. Neither von Braun nor Musk has pointed out 
exactly what they are up to, yet they are pretty sure about the process of executing such a grand 
plan: human’s colonization of outer space.  
This is the illusion of mastery the world-picture has offered. The position of the subiectum 
demands the deed be done while the project of turning the world into a representation promises 
an empty reward. If I may invoke another essay by Heidegger here, he identifies technê, or 
technicity, as what is really taking control in such instances. “[T]he essence of technology,” 
claims Heidegger, “is by no means anything technological” (Question 4). All technological 
activities do not serve the human but the very essence of technology, which he calls “enframing” 
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(Gestell) (20).  
Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., 
challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. 
Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern 
technology and which is itself nothing technological. (20) 
When people believe that with the help of technological development they are finally in 
control of their fate, technology has only just revealed itself as the arbiter of human destiny. The 
modern age has provided technology with an absolute control from the moment we have given 
up the world-horizon for a world-representation, a world-picture. Human beings become in the 
process the “standing-reserve” (Bestand) that carries out the will of technology. Enframing is the 
world-picture being realized so that the so-called objectivity can encroach and enslave living 
beings, or the Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein).  
In terms of film history, what was portrayed in the early Space exploration SF films not only 
anticipated real histories outside cinema but also impacted on future films of the subgenre. While 
the Nazis carried out part of Frau im Mond’s story in reality and the U.S.-Soviet Space Race 
actualized what was depicted in Destination Moon, later films belonging to this subgenre have, 
to this day, carried along and largely retained their techno-oriented world building practice. As a 
result, many contemporary SF cinema of Space exploration inherit both the embodied method (in 
terms of both expression and content) and the logic of the world-picture behind modern 
astronautic activities. 
The logic of the world-picture is most evident in Nolan’s Interstellar, embodied in the 
escapist theme that runs throughout the film and in the ending where humans begin to colonize a 
distant planet. Interstellar as a whole, I will show, is more complicated, but it portrays well 
through the characters professor Brand (Michael Caine), Dr. Mann (Matt Damon), and even 
Cooper in the first half of the movie, the very logic that Wernher von Braun and Elon Musk 
share. 
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The World-Picture in Interstellar  
In the first part of the film, Cooper’s meeting with the teachers of his children does not go 
well and he gets Murphy (Mackenzie Foy), his daughter, suspended from school. Returning 
home, he sits on the bench in the front porch of his house with his father-in-law and complains 
about the times he lives in, a time when the world no longer needs engineers (like him) but 
farmers, because the ecological situation is causing food shortages. He mumbles something 
about how people tend to look down to the ground instead of looking up to the stars, as they used 
to do. What he believes is essential to humans, but that others have forgotten, is that we are 
“explorers, pioneers, not caretakers.”  
Cooper’s line, integrated with the great Mid-Western setting (the scene was actually shot in 
Alberta, Canada) the film begins with, strikes the chord of an admirable spirit of mankind. But 
this chord, despite its heroism, is deeply entrenched in the ideology of “man-”kind. The 
“we-are-not-caretakers” string attached to the line reveals one of the most serious problems that 
modern men face: the usually dismissed and even disparaged value of nurturing. Cooper’s manly 
character sets the stage for the entire film and serves as the momentum that drives the ensuing 
plot. His depreciation of the “feminine” side of life, shown in his earlier conversation with the 
school teachers, will be a mainstay of the plot until the crew receives the video message of a 
grown-up Murphy (Jessica Chastain). By then, the expedition team has left the Solar System and 
started travelling in a distant galaxy. In the video, the already middle-aged daughter accuses her 
father of abandonment. By pursuing his masculine ambition to explore and pioneer, Cooper fails 
in his duty to take care of his children, the nurturing task belittled by the patriarchal values. The 
sight of his daughter, who has caught up in age with Cooper thanks to the laws of spacetime, 
shocks Cooper who, though he knew the astrophysics well, only now experiences its effects for 
the first time. A world-representation suddenly takes the form of a world-experience. This shock 
not only derives from the sublimity of such laws’ effect, but also emerges as a feeling of guilt for 
his abandonment of his daughter. For spectators, the departure sequence where Cooper promises 
Murphy that he will soon return home occurs little more than an hour in the past. Cooper tells 
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Murphy that when he will return they will be the same age due to the relativity of time. Here, the 
law of narrative time intensifies the law of relativity in astrophysics, bringing with it the 
unbearable weight of regret. Only when Cooper comes back from the Miller planet of water and 
faces his grown-up daughter in the video message does he finally realize the sacrifice he has 
made in order to pursue his manly ambition as well as the mistake he has committed by failing to 
carry out his responsibility to nurture. The sorrow is only made more unbearable by the loss of a 
crewmember Dr. Doyle (Wes Bentley) and the time wasted on an uninhabitable planet where an 
hour amounts to seven earthly years.  
Interestingly, the first video message of Murphy comes right at mid-point in the film, exactly 
at the moment where, according to many screenplay gurus, the protagonist “tries something new, 
takes control of his or her own destiny in a way that has not been done before” (Qtd. in Bordwell 
29). At this moment, a decision has finally been made by the protagonists to battle the antagonist 
(Bordwell 29). In terms of Interstellar, the bad guy is first revealed here as the Cooper of the first 
half. Here, self-recognition leads to a race with time, both at the level of the narration (in the 
form of a speeded-up rhythm) and at that of the storyworld (in the form of astrophysical 
time-dilation). The emotion escalates again when Cooper and the team land on Mann’s planet 
and receive a second video message from Murphy pronouncing the death of professor Brand and 
disclosing that Plan A was a sham. The revelation of professor Brand’s lie sends the latter third 
of the film into a very different direction. It functions as the tipping point at what again many 
screenplay gurus believe to be the “darkest moment” in the narrative: the end of Act 2 and the 
start of Act 3 (Bordwell 29). Following that, the problems are gradually resolved in the 
remaining part. Contemporary films, as Bordwell cogently argues, have inherited this 
conventional three-act narrative structure of the classical Hollywood cinema (28). Act 3 is 
typically made up of the continuous moments of a “ticking clock” (29), which we see in 
Interstellar as partly an act of revocation of what professor Brand and Dr. Mann stand for and 
partly an act of repentance for a possible salvation for Cooper.  
The effect of this series of shocks is twofold. On the one hand, Cooper’s realization of his 
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own betrayal of his daughter urges him to finish the trip in time so as to save Murphy and reunite 
with her. Although he succeeds in the end, the sacrifice is such that it will never be fully 
compensated. On the other hand, Cooper finds out that professor Brand’s Plan A to save all the 
people on Earth and transport them to new colonies is but a sham leading to the execution of 
Plan B in which only human embryos are kept safe and brought up to rebuild a human society in 
new colonies. His indignation at the discovery of this scheme results in his adamant insistence on 
carrying out Plan A in addition to Plan B. It responds to the call of duty the shock has sparked. 
As a result, both the escape from Earth and the abandonment of his family appear finally 
justified by the act of rescue.  
Although the film certainly complicates matters by having Cooper and Dr. Brand (Anne 
Hathaway) denounce Plan B, Nolan seems to hold the eco-disaster on Earth as something 
irreversible, which is what leads to the idea that human embryos alone will restore a human 
society, one without plants, animals, or any other earthly elements.6 I do not want to ask too 
much of Interstellar, its conclusion shall hopefully never be the future of our world, for what is 
lost here is not only the planet Earth, but also the ground of earth, the nurturing side of life. The 
resolution offered by the film is ambiguous but it is clearly problematic to believe that Earth 
must be abandoned, sooner or later, a view confirmed in The Hollywood Reporter’s “In Focus” 
interview with Nolan where he expresses his personal take on leaving Earth as a necessary step 
in the future. The problem is that neither Plan A nor Plan B conceives of human beings as part of 
the earthly eco-system; they unambiguously share the belief that the human species is unique and 
can restore a living environment for humanity independent of any other species or earthly 
organisms. Similarly, the disastrous sandstorm is considered in the film purely as the deed of 
some malicious devil, as if unrelated to human activities. Humanity’s responsibility for such 
eco-disasters is almost totally obliterated from the narrative.  
By adamantly executing Plan A, the film ends with an ethical note as the majority of living 
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6 It is mentioned by Dr. Brand that plan B does entail the issues of diversity, but it merely concerns humans. 
Nothing about other Earth-dwellers is given a slice of thought. The message embedded is therefore devastating: the 
entire project is about saving humans as a species and nothing else, as if human beings emerged out of nowhere and 
had always lived independent of anything else.  
 
humans left on Earth are saved, and thus antagonizing professor Brand and Dr. Mann, as well as 
their distanced manner typical of a certain scientific positivism. However, this resolution simply 
replaces one problematic view with another. Both plans, in the end, revolve around an 
anthropocentric bias, a belief in the uniqueness of humanity, and a speculation regarding the 
human species as independent of the relational networks of Earth.  
The film ends with Cooper saving the people remaining on Earth by sending out the 
quantum data collected from the gravitational singularity inside a black hole. He is then saved 
and reunited with his now dying daughter, who has by then become a renowned physicist by 
solving the conundrum of gravity. The scene of the reunion is rather brief (no more than two 
minutes of screen time), in which Murphy quickly dismisses her father as if all the past mistakes 
had been forgiven and life had carried on much better without him because now she has a huge 
family to accompany her. This time, Cooper is asked by his daughter to leave for the reason that 
Cooper should stick to the role of frontier explorer he has identified with since the start of the 
film. The narrative has come full circle only to return to a line Cooper spoke at the beginning.  
“He’s prepared to destroy his own humanity in order to save the whole species. An 
incredible sacrifice,” says Dr. Mann of professor Brand. Now, we are meant to understand that 
Cooper is different from them because of the choices he makes. But exactly how different is he? 
If we recall the conversations in the first half between Cooper and professor Brand, we will 
notice that both plans actually entail the same problem. First of all, the plan (B) of leaving the 
living beings behind and restarting on an alien planet some new human civilization is already 
inscribed into the project’s name. During the first visit to NASA’s secret facility, professor 
Brand tells Cooper that the mission is called “Lazarus” because Lazarus came back from death, 
to which Cooper immediately responds, “Sure, but he has to die in the first place.” The 
characters and spectators come by the meaning of this interchange only when Murphy’s message 
announces that Plan A is a sham after she confirms it with the dying professor. Cooper must have 
noticed traces of the secret in the name of the mission though he did not understand it fully. 
Hence, what Cooper regrets is not only his abandoning of his daughter and son, but also the fact 
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that he did not fully understand professor Brand’s scheme. He, judging from the narrative as a 
whole, is also a victim, a victim of professor Brand’s lie. Following this logic, Cooper might not 
have chosen to take up the mission but to stay with his family on Earth.  
But on second thought, this is not true either, for Cooper expresses explicitly his ambition of 
going up to explore and his contempt for farming. His behavior toward the school teachers is 
evident of this. When the principal tells him that his son Tom (Timothée Chalamet) may have to 
become a farmer in the future because his score is not high enough to get into university, Cooper 
laughs at the principal and ridicules the policy. His response to the female teacher is somewhat 
similar. He uses his deceased wife as evidence to refute the teacher’s claim that all Space 
programs are a waste, blaming the cancellation of Space programs as the cause of the medical 
inability to cure his wife’s disease. Neither of his responses seems rational and appropriate to his 
own status as an engineer. Instead, they are grouses about not being able to actualize his manly 
ambition. The film gives us the sense that Cooper has resolved his inner conflict by saving his 
daughter and the people on Earth, which seems to be confirmed by his dying daughter when she 
answers “I know” to Cooper’s explanation that he was her “ghost” all along and therefore it was 
he who saved humanity. Yet Cooper’s hubris is such that he mistakes “Station Cooper” to be 
named after him, while actually it was dedicated to his daughter. It is evident that Cooper 
believes by the end of the film that he has paid his debts and cleared his guilt. In fact, Cooper 
does not come to understand that his initial ambition is equally problematic.  
At stake with this ambition is a desire to conquer the universe, to colonize alien planets, and 
to leave our home Earth, a desire whose inherent logic is that of the world-picture. Professor 
Brand has displayed this logic well in one of his speeches, “We will think not as individuals, but 
as species.” This species-mode of thinking is a way of treating things as representations. By 
thinking as a species, one no longer relies on his/her own experience but puts the faith on an 
external picture, especially the mathematical way of thinking. The human being, as a generalized 
category, is given a place in the world-picture, the grand map of everything. Living individuals 
give way to the future of the general human being. Instead, life no longer matters insofar as the 
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biological species of homo sapiens survives. Professor Brand’s Plan B, as a product of certain 
calculation, pins down the “essence” of human civilization.7 Therefore, people come to believe 
this distanced view of themselves to be objective. However, it neglects that such an outsider’s 
point of view, or a “view from nowhere” in Thomas Nagel’s term (56), is impossible in the first 
place. It is a blind premise imposed by a metaphysical way of thinking popularized in the 
modern age. Even scientists are part of the world they investigate. Objectivity is not derived 
from the external, but rather from transcendence within our immanence. Every perspective of a 
particular person (or other living organism) already entails objectivity. Hence, not only is 
Interstellar’s Plan B an unethical solution but so is Plan A. When professor Brand encourages 
Cooper to “get up there, and save” his children, he is not thinking about Murphy and Tom as 
individual beings who live in flesh and blood, but as mere numbers belonging to the population, 
as two specimens of the species homo sapiens. It is most disturbing to see that not only is Cooper 
convinced by such an encouragement but also that the film ends with a reconciliatory note 
without every confronting this issue.  
But is that all? Must we conclude that Interstellar is simply an embodiment of the logic of 
the world-picture? Not exactly. The film says something more, perhaps even more than what the 
filmmakers intended. Together with Gravity, such Space exploration SF cinema can serve as an 
antidote, a reminder, and a suggestion for a way out of the logic of the world-picture. And yet, 
the alternative has to be sought not from without but from within.  
Towards the end of his essay on the world-picture, Heidegger touches on the idea of the 
“gigantic,” which slightly changes the tone of the essay and complicates the argument. “The 
gigantic,” argues Heidegger, “is rather that through which the quantitative becomes a special 
quality and thus a remarkable kind of greatness” (“Age” 135). The gigantic becomes so 
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7 The sound design is also worth mentioning. Many spectators noticed when the film was released that all dialogues 
are almost inaudible, many of which are totally submerged in the constantly present non-diegetic music Hans 
Zimmer has composed for the film. Viewed against my argument here, it seems to have well demonstrated the point 
that real human individuals are not important, and they are no longer in control of the mood of the narrative 
progression. The grand universe and the enframing of the film take charge of sound and image. The narrative is 
taken by the sublimity of Space and propelled by the sense of awe. But most important of all, it reduces humans into 
an abstract whole that belongs to the abstract world-picture. 
 
enormous that it is even made to disappear (135).  
[A]s soon as the gigantic in planning and calculating and adjusting and making secure 
shifts over out of the quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what is gigantic, 
and what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes, precisely through 
this, incalculable. (135) 
 The transformation of the gigantic into the incalculable leaves behind the “invisible shadow” 
that resists calculation. The incalculable and its shadow withdraw from the representation and 
remains something unique, something denied to be known (136).8 To Heidegger, this is what is 
being revealed as a result of the happening of the gigantic. To us, this is where we will begin to 
seek an alternative to the world-picture.  
Saving Home as an Alternative 
 As I have shown, quite a few Space exploration SF films derive their ideas from the logic of 
the world-picture. This begs the question whether this subgenre is doomed to follow such 
metaphysics. My answer is negative. The way-out of the world-picture is equally there in the 
films, but it requires us to return to world-experience, world-horizon, or what the later Husserl 
called the “earth-ground” (Erdboden). 
 In a research manuscript written during May 7 and 9, 1934, entitled “Foundational 
Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, 
the Earth, Does Not Move,”9 Husserl addresses directly the issues of modern astrophysics and 
Space travel. This almost contemporaneous piece of writing points to the same problem 
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8 The concluding part of the essay and its related appendix are reminiscent of (Tanizaki Jun'ichirō)’s
	 (In Praise of Shadows), which is an essay on Japanese aesthetics published in 1933. In that essay, 
Tanizaki argues similarly in favor of shadows as opposed to light. Although it is mainly on aesthetics, the essay 
illustrates a long tradition of aesthetic preference in East Asia that is distinct from the logic of the world-picture 
which became popularized in the modern age. 
9 The manuscript is classified in Husserl’s Archive (Nachlass) at Leuven as D-17 and transcribed by one of 
Husserl’s assistants Ludwig Landgrebe. The original title goes like this: “Umsturz der Kopernikalischen Lehre in 
der gewöhnlichen weltanschaulichen Interpretation. Die Ur-Arche Erde bewegt sich nicht. Grundlegende 
Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Körperlichkeit, der Räumlichkeit der Natur im ersten 
naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne, Alles notwendige Anfangsuntersuchungen.” (The overthrowing of Copernican 
teachings in the ordinary interpretation of world-perception. The originary ark, earth, does not move. Foundational 
investigations of phenomenological origin of corporality, the spatiality of Nature in its first scientific sense. All 
necessary inquiries into the beginning. The translation is mine.) 
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identified in Heidegger’s essay on the world-picture, but from a different perspective. Husserl 
notices that science treats the world as an “ideality of infinity” (118). It is a “ready made 
‘representation of the world,’” on which further representations are built (118). That is, the 
world-picture arises exactly from our world-experience, but the more “complete” and “objective” 
it becomes the farther it deviates from our original horizon. Gradually, one “takes for granted 
that [E]arth is a body [...] is only one of the accidental bodies of the world, one among others” 
(128). Therefore, abandoning a no longer inhabitable Earth and leaving for a new one becomes 
justifiable. However, “[E]arth is a spherical body, certainly not perceivable in its wholeness all at 
once and by one person; rather it is perceived in a primordial synthesis as a unity of mutually 
connected single experiences” (118). It is, essentially speaking, not at all an object for us, but a 
necessary horizon. The Copernican way of thinking, nonetheless, has made it into an object. 
What is “not experienced at first as body (Körper)” becomes just one among the innumerable 
celestial bodies. The logic of the world-picture “nullifies its primordial form of the ground” 
(118).  
 Husserl is not saying that Earth as a planet does not move; what he means is that the 
earth-ground neither moves nor rests. “Only in relation to it are movement and rest given as 
having their sense of movement and rest” (118). Modern astronomy and astrophysics take an 
external point of view that is itself posited as constantly still so that the movement of Earth can 
be determined. It is done through a sort of astronoetic activity, totally bereft of the role of our 
sensory body. The motion of the Earth planet is derived from the world-picture where the planet 
is given a specific place within the system. But as a matter of fact, the ground is neither moving 
nor at rest. “[M]otion is relative when experienced with respect to a ‘ground-body,’ which is 
itself experienced as at rest and in unity with my corporeal flesh” (121). What modern science 
has discovered therefore is not the world-horizon but the world-picture, while the world is 
always and already there, given together with our ordinary perception, as the horizontal 
background. The possibility of scientific induction is “determined through [horizontal] 
expectation and in the course of actual experience, my own and communicative experience, as a 
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consequence of actuality is shown to be confirmed or disconfirmed” (120). 
It is important that the world-experience (or horizon) is originally a bodily experience. For 
Husserl, “[t]here is no pure point of view and there is no view from nowhere, there is only an 
embodied point of view” (Zahavi, Phenomenology 98). The body in any perceptual experience is 
regarded as the “zero point” and the “indexical ‘here’”, a “center around which and in relation to 
which (egocentric) space unfolds itself” (99). It is the body and our embodiment that render it 
possible for us to access worldly things. In addition to its status as a center of orientation, the 
body plays a crucial role in enacting the “kinaesthetic experience” which in turn enables our 
perception. On the one hand, the kinaesthetic experience grounds the unity of a perceptual 
experience and makes sure that the object intended remains one and the same. On the other hand, 
the very sense of spatiality is constituted as a background with the help of our kinaesthetic 
experience. The same goes for the world-horizon. To truly understand and feel the scientific 
world, the original embodied experience has to be activated. Otherwise, we take up the 
world-picture at the expense of the world-horizon.10 
In this sense, “[m]y flesh is the center” (Husserl, “Foundational” 123). The world is first 
grasped as an intersubjective horizon that we share with others through our embodied experience. 
It is not an intellectual process, but rather a bodily one. Hence, Husserl speaks of birds and other 
animals as sharing with us the same world-horizon. But it does not mean that our 
world-experience will always remain the same. It never has. Everyone’s horizon is constantly 
changing although it is always open to sharing. When Armstrong landed on the Moon, the shared 
world-horizon changed suddenly. However, such changes do not supplant the original 
world-experience we were born with, they expand it. Put otherwise, although we cannot but stick 
to the earthly horizon we were born with, it is always open to new possibilities and changes.  
The totality of the We, of human beings, of “animals,” is in this sense earthly—and at 
first is not opposed to the nonearthly. This sense is rooted and has its orientation center in 
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10 In his famous research manuscript “Origin of Geometry,” Husserl offers an insightful discussion on the loss of 
our link to the originary experience in modern science. He also identifies writing as a stand-in for the embodied 
experience of the original geometers. Similarly, Bernard Stiegler speaks of such a substitution of the embodied 
experience by representations as a “short-circuit” and a process of being “proletarianized” because the subjects are 
deprived of their savoir-faire (Technics 3 37; Disbelief 115, 142). 
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me and in a narrower We who live with one another. But it is also possible for the 
earth-ground to be extended, possibly such that I learn to understand that, within the 
space of my first earth-ground, there are large aerial vessels which travel in it for a long 
time: I am born on one of them and my family lives on one of them. It was my ontic 
ground until I learned that we were only sailors on the larger earth, etc. Thus a 
multiplicity of ground-lands, of homelands, is unified into one ground-land. (126; my 
emphasis)  
 Husserl envisages the possibility of a spaceship-born baby, to whom the spacecraft seems to 
serve as the original ground and hence different from his/her parents’ earth-ground, but it is not 
exactly so. The “large aerial vessel” itself would be an extension of the earth-ground. Even for a 
Space baby, floating off structure in the vacuum is unthinkable. The baby is inevitably, although 
indirectly, linked to his/her parents’ earth-ground.11 The earth here functions as the 
“source-ground” (125). Moreover, if we think in a slightly different manner, the earth is just like 
a huge spacecraft travelling in the universe; it serves as the ground and at the same time also as 
the ark. In a word, the world-horizon will expand, but the accidental fact that we happen to be 
earthlings matters.  
To return to Gravity and Interstellar, I find the two films particularly complex and rich in 
meaning among other contemporary SF films. In them, traces of our reflections above can be 
found, and they, whether intentionally or not, reveal that salvation is to be found here on earth 
instead of out there on some far away planets. By looking into both their formal aspects and 
thematic concerns, I will show how these two films manifest the significance of the earth-ground 
and how they point toward an alternative path to the world-picture.  
 With regards to the cinematic form, both Gravity and Interstellar take effort to make a 
world-representation (calculated) into a world-experience (actualized). As I have mentioned in 
Chapter two, Gravity’s extensive use of CGI aims to simulate and emulate the aesthetics of 
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11 Would future human descendants who migrate to another planet evolve to be otherwise than earth-bound? I have 
no answer to that. They might. Had situations allowed for it to happen in a distant future, our descendants, who 
might very well evolve new physiological features that we today cannot imagine to adapt to the new environment, 
could become almost disconnected from their ancestral planet—Earth and its earth-ground. It might be an entirely 
different matter to speak of Earth, e.g., the mythical homeland where the ancestors dwelled. However foggy and dim 
the primordial sense of being an earth-bound Being might become, the tradition—perhaps in a similar way we come 
to know about ancient (mostly legendary) myths—will still be there, retained as something unattainable yet 
significant in making what we will become in the future. 
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photographic moving images. For the look, Cuarón and his visual effects team from Framestone 
did a large amount of research on real documentary footage from previous astronautic activities. 
For camera movements, it is an entirely different thing. The team, working with the film’s 
director of cinematography Emmanuel Lubezki, invented a novel domain for digital filmmaking: 
photographic footage incorporated into a digitally rendered photorealistic sequence with all the 
movements and lighting effects matched.  
Some claim that such CGI effects create a different kind of realism, one that is “associated 
with nonhuman nature” (Jenner). Joseph Jenner contends that the computer-generated Earth 
“draws attention to the nonhuman nature of our planet,” while live action footage foregrounds 
the “human experience” (Jenner). He draws a conclusion from it that the relation between human 
and nonhuman is fluid. However, doesn’t such an argument presuppose the distinction between 
the human and the nonhuman in the first place? Moreover, he seems to have taken for granted 
that CGI must stand for the nonhuman, while photographic footage shows the human. To me, 
this does not seem so obvious. Isn’t Bazin’s understanding of photographic ontology essentially 
based on its automatic reproducibility? In this sense, photography seems much more nonhuman 
than the highly manipulable, human-made CGI. For many commentators, reflections on the 
technical choices stop at the term “CGI” without ever considering how it is carried out in a 
specific film. For the same reason, Ryan Pierson concludes that Gravity is a film without a world, 
and draws an analogy between it and Norman McLaren’s abstract animation films. Here, I 
believe he pays too much attention to the technology instead of the finished images per se. It is 
absurd to say that Gravity is unworldly, for everyone who has watched the film knows it takes 
place mainly in the low Earth orbit.  
In contrast to those scholars, I consider the film to be extremely earthbound despite its 
apparent uses of CGI for the majority of its images. It requires us to look at the (virtual) camera 
movements enacted by the software. Pierson argues against the use of the term “camera 
movement” when analyzing Gravity for the simple reason that the camera travels through the 
glass visor of Dr. Stone’s helmet at one point of the film (7). But he does not recognize that this 
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shot, though seemingly against the law of physics, by no means rules out the embodied 
experience of the camera. Except for this particular moment, all other movements are strictly 
enacted according to physics and the view always conforms to the principle of perspective. 
Moreover, by “virtual camera,” one does not simply mean a physical camera created within the 
digitally constructed 3D space, but, perhaps more specifically, a point of view that exists and 
takes place within a virtual space. It does not have to be physically “there” in the same sense as a 
character in the diegetic space. The “embodiment” of the virtual camera is thus to be understood 
as a point of view embedded within the storyworld, but not necessarily in the form of a material 
body.12 Pierson’s view is a little too materialist even when he is dealing with intangible, digitally 
created objects. 
The (virtual) camera movements in Gravity enact in the spectators a series of potential 
kinaesthetic experiences through which they feel as if they were present in Space and cut loose 
from man-made structures. However, the feeling of dizziness evoked by such images inevitably 
presupposes the sense of stillness and balance on the earth-ground. It is the very horizon of the 
earth-ground the spectators have in the background that guarantees and anticipates the loss of 
balance and the sense of abnormality. Husserl has cogently argued that the horizon of the 
earth-ground is so essential that it can only be expanded but never relinquished. The fierce 
feeling of dizziness can only arise from the horizon of the earth-ground that is perceived as 
normative. It would be nonsensical to speak of dizziness without presupposing the state of not 
feeling dizzy. Nevertheless, as Husserl has added, it does not mean that the state of balance is 
necessarily the normative condition. For beings born and living in water or else, if possible, for 
future generations of humans who might be born in zero-G Space, it could well be the opposite. 
For them, the feeling of stillness on solid ground might be a state of abnormality. But since 
Gravity is intended for ground-dwelling human spectators, it is fine to speak of the kinaesthetic 
experience it creates as a departure from our normative and ordinary perceptual senses. To put it 

12 Although the virtual camera is embedded in the storyworld, it is invisible to the characters (in most fiction films) 
and therefore does not actually belong to the storyworld. As I mentioned toward the end of Chapter two, the 
kinaesthetic experience spectators feel and the world-horizon that is conferred through such experiences take place 
in our horizons, a virtual realm that belongs neither to the storyworld nor to the real material world.  
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differently, in order for the effect to be successful, the film requires its spectators to be 
earthbound dwellers. Scott Richmond has recognized this implicated layer of senses, but does 
not go far enough to investigate the meaning of such proprioceptive experience. The kinaesthetic 
reaction Gravity provokes, I contend, not only offers an otherworldly experience but also points 
toward our own inescapable origin in the earth-ground.  
The apparent tension between the story of the earthbound returning and the digital 
filmmaking techniques freed from earthly constraints is rendered less prominent through the use 
of the photorealistic aesthetics Cuarón has chosen. Dr. Stone displays a restored sense of security 
at the end of the film when she returns to Earth and struggles to be back on the ground. For the 
first time in the film, spectators regain the ground, both in the sense of narrative space and in the 
sense of kinaesthetic experience. What have been restored are not only earthbound camera 
movements and a state of balance, but also the meaning of being human, of having an 
earthbound existence.  
The film’s formal construction provides further support for the thematic ruminations about 
life. There are several moments where the rotating motion and disorientation are less noticeable. 
When Dr. Stone enters the International Space Station after losing Kowalski, she strips her 
spacesuit and helmet and starts to float gently in the airlock of the station. Against a circular door, 
Dr. Stone gradually holds her body into a fetal position. She is lit from behind by the sunlight 
coming through the window of the door. What we see is the image of an embryo. The door 
separates the threatening space outside and the protective space inside, turning the Space station 
into a mother, the airlock into a womb. The station functions as a (symbolic) mother who takes 
care of the baby—the astronauts—and the secured attachment to the station serves as the 
umbilical cord. The mothering role of the station discloses its nature as the extended 
earth-ground. The Space station, as well as spaceships, is an extension of the earth-ground where 
the earthlings feel safe and nurtured with necessities such as air, water, and food.  
About half an hour later, we are in the Soyuz with Dr. Stone and she finds out that the main 
thruster is not working. She now tries to contact Houston for help, but what the radio captures 
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instead is someone who speaks a totally different language. A short film, directed by the 
screenwriter and son of Alfonso Cuarón, Jonás, was put online shortly before the film’s release. 
It is entitled Aningaaq, about the character who is only heard through the radio inside the Soyuz 
spaceship. It takes place in an entirely different setting, perhaps in the frozen lands of North 
America. Aningaaq, an Inuit fisherman who is camping in a frozen fjord with his wife, his baby, 
and his dogs, manages to communicate with Dr. Stone via the two-way radio. Despite the fact 
that he only speaks his native tongue, of which Dr. Stone can understand nothing, the 
communication is somewhat successful. First, Aningaaq mistakes Dr. Stone’s call for help 
“Mayday” to be her name, but Dr. Stone soon realizes this mistake and tries to correct him. Then, 
a dog’s sound is heard. Aningaaq explains that she is an old sick dog and that he must kill her to 
end her suffering although he does not want to give her up. Dr. Stone also hears the dog, and 
mimics the woofs of dogs, which is then corrected by Aningaaq as inaccurate. During my first 
viewing of the film (and without knowing the existence of this short film), I conceived of this 
episode as a nonsensical yet meaningful self-reflection on the side of Dr. Stone. But after 
watching the short film, I learned something new about it. The communication that seems to be 
mutually incomprehensible is actually more successful than I had thought, not because of the 
establishment of some mutual understanding through language, but rather as a result of their 
belonging-togetherness to the world, to the earth-ground. If Earth is considered dispensable or at 
least replaceable by von Braun, Musk, and Nolan, perhaps it is because they do not see such a 
hidden aspect to life, that of living on earth together with other Earth dwellers (i.e., humans, 
animals, plants, etc.). The mutual nourishment and dependency this implies is part of what we 
are.13  
This accidental encounter foreshadows Dr. Stone’s self-reflection. In the hallucinatory 
sequence that follows, the imagined Kowalski says to her, “It’s still a matter of what you do now. 
[...] You gotta plant both your feet on the ground and start living life.” Kowalski is not there, so 
it is indeed Dr. Stone talking to herself. The series of encounters after the disaster reveals the 

13 See also Haraway for a similar account. She proposes, “We need to make kin sym-chthonically, sym-poetically. 
Who and whatever we are, we need to make-with—become-with, compose-with—the earth-bound” (161). 
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meaning of life. She realizes that she has not been living her life since her daughter’s death. She 
has disconnected herself from mother earth. When she wakes up from the hallucination, the first 
word coming out of her mouth is a whisper of “landing.” To live, is to land on the ground, to 
reestablish the link (the umbilical cord) with mother earth.  
The landing takes place minutes later, into the water. As many have noticed, the final 
sequence (besides its symbolic indication of Dr. Stone’s rebirth) replays human evolution from 
aquatic animals to amphibians and reptiles, and finally to erect primate. A closer look unveils the 
meticulous and exquisite design of sound and image in this sequence. First, the regained sound 
(hence the air) intercut with a muffled sound underwater. As the lifeboat of Shenzhou is quickly 
submerged, Dr. Stone instinctively struggles for air instead of water. But she soon realized that 
even water is less dangerous than the vacuum of Space. Plunging into the water and freed from 
her spacesuit that drags her down to the bottom of the lake, she swims upward in similar fashion 
to the frogs seen in the foreground. The manmade protective shield (e.g., spacesuit) gives way to 
the natural skin, and life is restored in its original contact with the world. Once above the water, 
Dr. Stone’s breathing is heard, and accompanying it (on the soundtrack) are the buzzing sounds 
of flying insects and chirps of birds, indicating that human life is never alone on earth. That life 
on earth is always a mesh of animals, plants, air, water, and even objects. Immediately after she 
touches the shore and grabs a handful of sand, Dr. Stone smiles and says “Thank you.” To whom 
is she expressing her gratitude? I reckon it is to Kowalski, to her daughter, to herself, and also to 
the ground, the mothering earth. It is the earth-ground that gives her the sense of security, the 
power to live on, and the courage to finally face her daughter’s death. 
In comparison, it is more difficult to identify the message of the earth-ground in Interstellar, 
but the film also manages to express what it means to be an earthling through its filming process 
and messages hidden between the lines, images, and sounds. Examined merely on the level of the 
technological materiality, Interstellar seems poles apart from Gravity. The abandonment of the 
home planet in Interstellar’s storyworld is truncated by its predominant use of location shooting 
instead of the purely inventive digital generation. The preference for colonizing an alien planet 
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over saving mother earth is betrayed by the expressive devices and techniques Nolan is reputedly 
stubborn about—the insistence on using celluloid equipment rather than digital cameras and the 
obstinate uses of mock models in location shooting instead of green screens and 
computer-generated sets. In the bonus features accompanying the released BluRay disc, we learn 
that even the two lovable AIs are puppeteered by human actor Bill Irwin. The practice of 
embodied filming is somewhat revealing. Beneath the façade of an escapist story, there remains 
an untold aspect and Nolan’s subconscious attachment to the earth-ground sometimes slip 
through his rigorously designed image-sound.  
Whereas Cuarón’s film is about the danger of Space, Nolan’s envisions Space as a land of 
opportunity, a place of hope for the dying population on Earth. However, it does not have to be 
an either/or. So long as Space exploration remains connected to the earth-ground, we maintain 
both the meaning of being an earthling and the possibility of an open and constantly expanding 
horizon. The aesthetic form of the film is essentially earthbound.  
First, the interplanetary mother ship Endurance is a spinning Space station, which follows 
the conception of von Braun and that of the Space Station 5 as well as Discovery. Different from 
the low Earth orbit in Gravity where micro-gravity dominates the scenes, Interstellar consists of 
episodes that are mainly earthbound. Besides a huge portion of the story taking place on Earth, 
most of the scenes about Space travel and alien planets are similarly portrayed as subject to 
gravitational pulls (in various degrees), not to mention the enormous Station Cooper which is 
made possible by harnessing gravitational laws. Whereas gravity is only restored at the end of 
Gravity, it is almost constantly present in Interstellar.  
Second, the sandstorm interviews that start the film is actually footages quoted from Ken 
Burns’ The Dust Bowl (2012) that recounts the experience of the Dust Bowl in the U.S. during 
the Great Depression. For Nolan, those survivors from the disastrous sandstorms might serve as 
evidence that catastrophes are nearer than we think, but for spectators of the film, they can be 
read in a very different way. If people of the 1930s have suffered through and survived such a 
hellish calamity, why couldn’t we? The resilience of life seems to have been embodied in the 
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very slogan made popular in Britain during the Second World War: “Keep calm and carry on.”  
Third, another string that ties up the entire story is self-discovery. It all starts with Cooper’s 
dismissal of the school teachers and his self-identification as an explorer. As I have discussed in 
the second section, his disrespect for the teachers, contempt for farming, and arrogance of his 
own ambition all boil down to his failed responsibility as a father. The journey to the alien 
galaxy is more of a journey into the bottom of his own heart. Without the separation and time 
dilation, Cooper could hardly understand his misstep, his choice of an empty world-picture over 
his own children. The self-discovery reveals his abandonment of home, and, despite the 
unsatisfying ending, urges a further move to self-salvation. 
Lastly, Cooper’s salvation does not really take place in Nolan’s film as I have explained 
earlier, but it does not however rule out the possibility of finding hints and clues in the film that 
open up to an alternative. The film, in a similar way to 2001, constantly delays the revelation of 
the alien’s identity. These intelligent aliens are the ones who put a wormhole within humans’ 
reach and help Cooper send back the quantum data collected in the black hole. These saviors are 
referred to as “they” throughout the film until Cooper concludes toward the end that “they” are 
actually “us” in the future. Similarly, the ghost in Murphy’s bedroom has been Cooper all along. 
It is “they” who help us to understand ourselves, to learn that we should come back and save 
Earth. Instead of abandoning home, the earth-ground, the unbearable weight of love and family, 
it matters more to care and take care, to stay and cure. “They” are also those who contradict us, 
those who disagree with what we believe. “They” are the teachers, Cooper’s son and 
father-in-law, and many people who think that it is a waste to spend money on Space programs. 
Explorers like Cooper can learn more if they reflect on their own arrogance and start listening to 
those whose opinions differ. One will be shocked if I quote what the female teacher says to 
Cooper, a line dismissed by Cooper and inundated by the main plot of the film: “If we don’t 
want to repeat the excess and wastefulness of the twentieth century, then, we need to teach our 
kids about this planet, not tales of leaving it.” 
Interstellar, in a rather unexpected way, reveals a covert narrative that converges with 
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Gravity. The narrator of the NASA documentary Hubble notes, “It’s said that in the process of 
going to the Moon, we discovered Earth;” in a similar way we can say that it is in the process of 
encountering the otherness of the nonearthly Space that we discover the earth-ground. The 
importance of nurturing, of taking care of our earth have become explicit only after human 
beings left the earth. Lazier has noticed that the concept of “environmental protection” or the 
German counterpart Umweltschutz was only coined shortly after the photograph of “Earthrise,” 
and James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, despite its coinage in 1967, “flourished only in the late 
1970s and 1980s (616-17). Hence, it is no coincidence that both Gravity and Interstellar concern 
themselves with ecological problems.  
In reading between images and sounds, we have glimpsed into unexpected messages in 
Space exploration SF films. Despite their apparent focus on outward exploration, they always 
address implicitly the issues of the earthly ecology, or that of the Anthropocene. Many scholars 
have expressed the view that art can act as a power of salvation (see Morton); it can recompense 
where modern science is horribly lacking. The climate change, the constant extinction of species, 
and the potential threat of a visiting meteor, they are all common candidates for destroying 
humanity and the earth-ground. But fundamental to them all lies the logic of the world-picture 
Heidegger has exposed. The picture has led us astray, but it also discloses the invisible in the 
shadow, the meaning that cannot be represented but only understood through our intimate 
connection with the earth-ground. Science fiction films, especially those that focus on Space 
exploration can help us find the path alternative to the world-picture, exactly because they are 
themselves partly products of the very logic. The wisdom lying in the shadow awaits our 
discovery, and it will provide us with the Neganthropocenic power to redeem the Anthropocenic 
crime committed by the human (who followed the world-picture and a one-sided positivist 
science that lost sight of our own ground of meaning). What is the point of talking about living 
and surviving if the very ground of meaning has been lost? Distinctive as they are, Gravity and 
Interstellar manage to teach us this same lesson: instead of leaving and escaping, we might as 




I have so far delved into the origin and history of the subgenre of Space exploration SF films, 
and investigated the interactions Space exploration SF has had with real scientific astronautics, 
revealing in the process how contemporary films belonging to this subgenre are largely indebted 
to the visual codes and syntagmas established by modern television live broadcasts of Space 
programs and astronautic activities. I also explored how contemporary films, such as Gravity and 
Interstellar push further the limits of the embodied tradition of world building by focusing on the 
creation of kinaesthetic immersion. Finally, I examined the logic of the world-picture inherent in 
this subgenre as well as its related danger, and, in order to counter it, sought an alternative way 
in the details of Gravity and Interstellar for reconnecting us with the earth-ground that provides 
the foundation for our world-horizon. The three chapters are intended 1) to offer an historical 
inquiry into the subgenre and how it interacts with real Space programs and astronautics, 2) to 
display the expansion and fusion of our horizon with regards to world and Space, and 3) to 
examine the interconnectedness of the affective-phenomenological aspect of world-experience 
(horizon) with the cognitive-thematic aspect of world-representation. In this final chapter, I wish 
to first address these three aspects against the larger background of film experience and world so 
as to show in what way they compensate Daniel Yacavone’s study on film worlds. I will then 
conclude by exploring some potential issues my project might open up that await future study.  
Experience, Horizon, and World 
My thesis attempts to engage in a dialogue with Yacavone’s volume on film worlds. In order 
to address the issue of “world” in film aesthetics, he has navigated vast areas of film theories, 
including semiotics, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. But it is somewhat surprising that he 
says very little about the notion of “horizon,” except for a brief mention of Gadamer’s idea of the 
“fusion of horizons” (237), where he focuses on the “transsubjective” nature of cinematic 
hermeneutics without really going into details on how it is to be carried through (240). In a word, 
he speaks of “world” merely as a vague encompassing label to bring everything under its 
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purview. But such a gesture fails to truly address the problem of world because of the lack of real 
theoretical attempts to do so; he fails to bridge the gap and reconcile the conflicts between these 
diverse theoretical positions referenced in the book. In short, Yacavone does not really provide a 
perspective or a method that can tie up all the threads he has introduced and synthesize the 
different topics that fall under the heading of “film worlds”. The result is a list of approaches that 
can be used to engage film worlds, while each of them conflict with the others in fundamental 
ways. What is the point of talking about “film worlds” if anything can be included under this 
banner: from narrative storyworlds, to cognitive constructs, affective film experience, auteurs, all 
the way to interpretive and evaluative practices?  
 Instead of using the term “film world” in such a general and extremely broad sense, my 
thesis proposes a perspective of “world” as horizon inspired by the works of Husserl and 
Heidegger. It is not a step backward to draw on these “old” philosophical sources, but rather a 
necessary step forward. The fact is that all imaginary worlds (or other forms of 
world-representation) are founded by the fundamental world-horizon. World is not provided 
solely by the film, a conception Yacavone’s study may have implicitly entailed since he says very 
little about the perceptual world of the audience; rather, world has always been there with the 
spectators. On the one hand, the world-horizon of our perception lends the foundation for film 
worlds. As I have argued in the Introduction, my horizontal consciousness determines what I see 
in cinematic images (and hear in cinematic sounds). If I take up the horizon of the material world, 
the images are mere light and shade. But if I take up the horizon for the film-object, I grasp 
directly the figures, the things, and the events taking place in a film. Such a cinematic horizon 
(based on our ordinary perceptual horizon) supplements what is not there in the material image, 
providing us with a world-horizon that surrounds the characters and the events depicted in film. 
On the other hand, the world-horizon in the film that is given simultaneously with the cinematic 
images helps the understanding of the film world as a representation. Only through our 
world-horizon can a storyworld or an imaginary world be grasped and then explicitly described. 
My proposal for a method and a perspective of “world-horizon” does not aim to achieve what 
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Yacavone intends in his grand book, but only to suggest a possible way of thinking that can help 
us better understand the film experience, and grasp that it is never an isolated experience but 
always and already part of the interplay of various extra-cinematic horizons: the imaginary, the 
perceptual, the scientific, etc. My study, therefore, is carried out by engaging three aspects of the 
issue of film worlds: the interplay between the cinematic and our ordinary perceptual horizons, 
the coincidence of Space exploration and cinema’s exploratory nature, and the reconciliation of 
cognitive, affective, and interpretive approaches by introducing the extra-cinematic perspective 
of the world-horizon.  
First, the history of the subgenre of Space exploration SF cinema, especially the embodied 
tradition, demonstrates well the interpenetration of horizons and the (photographically based) 
cinematic expansion of our perceptual world-horizon. As shown in the thesis, film worlds are not 
mere world-representations, i.e., storyworlds, or imaginary worlds shared by various narratives 
or cultural products; they are primarily world-experiences that have to be felt and sensed as 
horizons. In contrast to cinema (and photography), the horizons conferred by words (such as 
through novels) remain abstract and are by nature world-representations that share the features of 
the world-picture. Novelists such as H.G. Wells and Jules Verne indeed expanded our conceptual 
horizon (i.e., representations) about Space, technology, and society; their works and ideas helped 
the emergence of Space travel, of new means of transportation, and even of new forms of social 
organization. However, before their ideas were realized in various artefacts and worldly practices, 
such expansions of horizon remained at the conceptual level and were fundamentally different 
from the world-horizon achieved through sense perception. It was the inventions themselves that 
truly expanded our perceptual world, not the words that described them. Similarly, when von 
Braun tried to convince the general public as well as the government to sponsor the project of 
Space travel (to the Moon and Mars), the more effective elements were the illustrations by 
Chelsey Bonestell that accompanied his articles in Collier’s magazine and the three-episode 
short films by Disney featuring von Braun and his models (of future Space stations and rockets). 
Both are illustrative of the old saying “Seeing is believing.” Only an immersive experience of the 
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world-horizon can be incorporated into our perceptual horizon, and thus comes to be considered 
actual. This is also the reason why the embodied tradition is crucial in creating a 
world-experience for spectators. Through a perceptually based, as well as realistic and 
scientifically congruent cinematic horizon with regards to objects and events, the film world is 
rendered sensible and hence continuous with our ordinary perceptual world.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, these world-horizons are not entirely the film(maker)s’ 
products, they also require contributions from spectators. For instance, the developments of 
modern rocketry and Space programs were indebted to the early Space exploration SF films, 
especially Frau im Mond, not only because of the latter’s creation of certain concepts about 
Space travel but also because they expanded our horizon by creating worlds that could be 
perceptually experienced as a continuation of our ordinary world. Later on, the immersive effects 
we experience when watching contemporary films such as Gravity and Interstellar are not 
merely the result of the films’ affective power; they call for the spectators’ own horizon of Space 
and Earth already conferred by the proliferated images from real scientific and documentary 
footage. In these films, the visual codes and syntagmas of Space travel with which viewers are 
familiar contribute substantially to the experience of immersion, alongside embodied 
experimental camera movements and sound designs. Such interactions between filmic horizon 
and perceptual horizon are what make these films excellent examples for exploring film worlds 
as horizon, as opposed to film worlds as representations.  
Second, Space exploration is a particularly relevant area for the study of film worlds as 
horizon because it constantly involves the expansion of our perceptual horizon. If past frontiers 
were made of deadly deserts, insurmountable peaks, and seemingly borderless oceans, Space has 
become the contemporary world’s new frontier. One of the reasons why the perceptual horizon, 
such as offered by ordinary perception or its mediation through film, is fundamental to our 
world-experience lies in the fact that, despite the conceptual horizons depicted for instance in 
creation myths, people’s worlds are determined by what they are able to see and feel, such as the 
vanishing horizons of the land or the ocean. Globalization, modern transportation, and 
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intercommunication have gradually replaced the innumerable and variegated world-horizons of 
different cultures (and communities) with a merged horizon of our earth. The interconnected 
world-horizon has become the grand background for modern life and has been accepted as an 
essential ground for perception. For us today, the sky becomes the only dimension where the 
horizon remains indefinitely open and the only direction where the horizon can be continuously 
expanded.  
Such a constantly expanding horizon concurs with cinema’s exploratory nature. Interestingly, 
cinema is a medium that always aims to expand our horizon. As both Dudley Andrew and David 
Rodowick have argued, films, unlike many animations which rely on our imaginative power, are 
products of cooperation between the filmmaker and the world that is not entirely under control. 
The world has never failed to surprise us, shock us, and amaze us. To use Andrew’s term, the 
very medium offers us a “cinema of discovery” (What 52), one that inherently intertwines with 
the expansion of horizon. We then have a fascinating situation where an exploratory medium 
meets one of the most important exploratory activities of the modern era. On the one hand, 
cinema takes us beyond the limits of our everyday world, opening us toward the unknown and 
the imaginary. With their ability to create quasi-embodied horizons and kinaesthetic senses, 
Space exploration SF films as well as live television broadcast intervene in the constitution of 
our world-horizon for Space, which pre-cinematic media are incapable of. On the other hand, the 
use of cinematic and video recorded sounds and images in Space programs and astronautic 
activities (both manned and unmanned) keeps increasing, to the point where it would seem 
impossible to think of the latter independently of the former. This relation between audiovisual 
footage and real Space activities renders possible a continuum between fictional astronautic 
events and real scientific practices. Also in this sense, cinema serves as a perfect medium to 
explore the issue of world, not only within film texts but also without, in relation to the 
extra-cinematic.  
Third, the explorations set forth in this thesis also attempt to provide a possible resolution to 
an apparent inconsistency between the three aspects of film worlds offered, almost in parallel to 
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each other, in Yacavone’s book: the cognitive-semiotic world, the affective-phenomenological 
world, and the interpretive-hermeneutic world. My analyses in the thesis demonstrate that the 
three worlds are actually interwoven and mutually interdependent. The thematic messages of 
both the logic of the world-picture and the alternative return to the earth-ground seen in Gravity 
and Interstellar are deeply entrenched in the films’ formal constructions: the embodied method 
of world building, the conflicting horizons of different characters, and the inherent logic that is 
shared among modern Space programs. World-representation in film can only be arrived at 
through the spectators’ world-experience of the film which is in turn founded on their horizon of 
the ordinary perceptual world.  
In a sense, my addition of the world-horizon, as a fourth aspect of film world, cuts through 
the three aspects addressed by Yacavone’s theory, and offers an extra-cinematic angle that can 
tie up the different phases of the cinematic experience. Because cinema is not something 
independent of our perceptual world or of other imaginary worlds, a proper engagement with the 
issue of film worlds requires us to treat film experience not as something sui generis but as the 
expansion and continuation of our ordinary perceptual world. The subgenre treated in this thesis 
takes advantage of such a continuation, interaction, and interpenetration.  
The Opening ... at the End 
More questions remain to be answered, however. Although I have argued why cinema is 
regarded as a medium that works much better than other pre-cinematic media to achieve the goal 
of expanding our perceptual world-horizon, it is nonetheless true that literature and other forms 
of art have been doing this long before the creation of cinema. This can be traced back to the 
time of writing (poems and novels), or perhaps even earlier, when our ancestors started to pass 
on words about what had been experienced only by a select few individuals. Definitely, this may 
pose challenges I cannot respond to at the moment. Understood that my horizon does not only 
belong to me but is also shared among others, it must have undergone similar processes of 
expansion and fusion. Being taught at school to add and subtract, to speak, to write, and to 
understand words written centuries ago by someone we are not able to meet in person, we exist 

in a state of constant becoming that incorporates different horizons about different things into our 
own. This is exactly what we mean by “education.”  
In the process of being educated, our world-horizon also changes and expands, although in a 
different way than the expansion of horizon that takes place when watching a film. Somehow, 
these imaginary or conceptual influences exert similar effects on our perception of the world. 
Our perceptual horizon is called for and it plays an essential role in our efforts to understand and 
comprehend things that have been taught. Bernard Stiegler poignantly points out that this very 
process takes place in our inner time-consciousness. He contends that newly learned ideas and 
concepts are enacted in the form of experience and are incorporated into the retentive structure 
where these experientially enacted ideas will later become our memory (Technics 3). Similarly, 
when we start to learn something new, these ideas and concepts are anticipated by a protentive 
horizon, one that helps us contextualize and situate the new knowledge. Many other things 
happen in the process. It may also involve imaginative participation from time to time in that my 
memory (or retentive content) can be reactivated as a horizon that opens up toward the 
prospective knowledge. My ability to anticipate—and equally to be shocked by—new 
knowledge reveals the working of my horizon.  
But, how are these processes different from the cinematic horizon? Is the perceptual horizon 
only evoked by physical images (but not by some of the more abstract forms of imagery found in 
written words)? What about the participation of imagination in watching films? These are 
important questions, to which, however, I do not yet have answers. They will point us to an old 
yet still unsolved puzzle about our faith in photography. In the digital age, such faith has been 
marred by the manipulating power of the new technology, but it nevertheless remains. What 
people tend to trust less is not the photographic image but the process of making it. Whether it is 
produced purely by the automatic photographic mechanism (be it in the form of celluloid or 
digital data) is no longer obvious. However, our faith in photography (i.e., in its very ability to 
seize or capture the world as it is) still plays an important role. As long as photography’s 
function as souvenir (e.g., selfies, family photo albums, and tourist photographs) and our 

stubbornness in using it remain an essential part of our life, this faith will persist. These 
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